LIBRARY 

NIX 
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UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  SAN  DIEGO 

from  the  collection  of 
Professor  Koppel  S.  Pinson 


NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 


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TORONTO 


NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN 
HISTORY 


BY 
J.   HOLLAND   ROSE,   Lrrr.D. 

FELLOW  OF  CHRIST'S  COLLEGE,  CAMBRIDGE 

READER  IN  MODERN  HISTORY  TO  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CAMBRIDGE 

CORRESPONDING  MEMBER  OF  THE  MASSACHUSETTS  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 


"  Avoir  fait  de  grandes  choses  ensemble,  vouloir  en 
faire  encore,  voila  la  condition  essentielle  pour  fitre  un 
peuple." — RENAN. 


fnrk 

THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 
1916 

All  rights  reserved 


COPYRIGHT,  1916 

BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  May,  1916 


PREFACE 

LECTURES  I-VTII  of  this  series  were  delivered  at  Cambridge 
in  the  Michaelmas  Term  of  1915;  and  Lectures  LX  and  X  are 
based  on  those  which  I  delivered  hi  December  last  to  the 
Historical  Associations  at  Birmingham  and  Bristol.  My  ami 
throughout  has  been  historical,  namely,  to  study  the  varied 
manifestations  of  Nationality  among  the  chief  European 
peoples,  before  attempting  to  analyze  or  define  it.  That  I 
have  sought  to  do  hi  Lecture  VIII.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
only  in  recent  tunes  has  Nationality  become  a  conscious  and 
definite  movement.  Apart  from  the  writings  of  Machiavelli, 
where  that  instinct  figures  dimly,  it  was  not  (I  believe) 
treated  by  any  writer  before  the  year  1758.  Then  an  anony- 
mous Swiss  brought  out  a  book  entitled  "Von  dem  Na- 
tionalstolze "  (Of  National  Pride),  hi  which  he  discussed  its 
good  and  bad  characteristics.  I  have  no  space  hi  which  to 
summarize  his  work;  but  at  some  points  it  breathes  the  spirit 
of  Schiller's  Wilhelm  Tell,  the  inner  meaning  of  which  I  have 
sought  to  portray  hi  Lecture  ILL 

I  began  these  studies  several  years  ago,  and  early  in  1916 
was  about  to  complete  them.  Most  of  my  conclusions  have 
not  been  modified  by  the  present  war;  but  the  questions  dis- 
cussed in  the  later  lectures  arise  out  of  that  conflict.  There, 
as  elsewhere,  I  hope,  my  treatment  has  been  as  objective  and 
impartial  as  present  conditions  admit.  Lack  of  space  has 
precluded  a  study  of  the  lesser  national  movements  hi  Europe 
and  of  all  similar  movements  outside  of  Europe.  I  regret  this 
latter  omission  because  the  growth  of  Nationality  hi  the 
United  States  and  the  British  Commonwealths  is  developing  a 
wider  and  cosmopolitan  sentiment  which  makes  for  peace. 


vi  PREFACE 

At  present,  however,  we  are  confronted  by  Nationality  of 
the  old  type;  and  to  pass  it  by  with  sneers  as  to  its  being 
antiquated  does  not  further  the  international  cause.  A 
careful  study  of  past  and  present  conditions  is  the  first  req- 
uisite for  success  in  the  construction  of  the  healthier  Euro- 
pean polity  which  ought  to  emerge  from  the  present  conflict; 
and  criticisms  of  German  Socialists  such  as  will  be  found  in 
Lectures  LX  and  X,  are,  I  believe,  necessary  if  mankind  is  to 
avoid  a  repetition  of  the  disastrous  blunders  of  July,  1914. 

The  sense  which  I  attach  to  the  words  "race,"  "people," 
"nation,"  "nationality,"  "nationalism,"  is,  briefly,  as  fol- 
lows: For  the  reasons  stated  in  Lecture  VIII,  I  have  rarely 
used  the  word  "race,"  and  then  only  as  a  quasi-scientific 
term.  The  word  "people"  I  have  generally  used  as  implying 
a  close  sense  of  kinship;  "nation"  as  a  political  term,  desig- 
nating a  people  which  has  attained  to  state  organization; 
"nationality"  (in  the  concrete  sense)  as  a  people  which  has 
not  yet  attained  to  it;  but  I  have  nearly  always  referred  to 
"Nationality,"  in  the  ideal  sense,  namely,  as  an  aspiration 
towards  united  national  existence.  In  Lecture  IX  I  have 
used  "Nationalism"  to  denote  the  intolerant  and  aggressive 
instinct  which  has  of  late  developed  in  Germany  and  the 
Balkan  States. 

My  thanks  are  due  to  Professor  Bury,  Litt.  D.  Regius 
Professor  of  Modern  History  in  the  University  of  Cambridge; 
to  Professor  Deschamps  of  the  Institut  superieur  de  Com- 
merce of  Antwerp  (now  resident  in  Cambridge) ;  to  Mr.  G.  P. 
Gooch,  M.  A.,  formerly  Scholar  of  Trinity  College,  Cambridge; 
and  to  Mr.  A.  B.  Hinds,  M.  A.,  formerly  Student  of  Christ 
Church,  Oxford,  for  their  valued  advice  and  criticism. 

J.  H.  R. 

February,  1916. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 
LECTURE  I 

THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA 

PAGE 

A  survey  of  Europe  through  the  centuries  suggests  the  ques- 
tion: What  has  made  States? — No  national  State  in  the 
Ancient  World — The  barbarian  invasions  split  up  Europe 
into  tribal  areas — Discords  arising  from  struggles  of 
Pope  and  Emperor — Was  Dante's  ideal  in  De  Monarchid 
national? — Why  national  feeling  emerged  in  England 
and  France — Unifying  forces  at  work  in  reign  of  Edward 
III — Chaucer  and  the  English  spirit — The  Hundred 
Years'  War  developed  a  national  spirit  in  France — The 
influence  of  Jeanne  d'Arc  ......  i 

LECTURE  II 

VTVE  LA  NATION 

The  work  of  the  monarchy  in  helping  on  the  union  of  France 
— New  spirit  in  1791 — "If  the  King  has  escaped,  the  na- 
tion remains" — Influence  of  Rousseau  on  the  develop- 
ment of  French  Nationality — Its  manifestations  in 
1780-91 — "Sovereignty  resides  in  the  nation" — The 
"federations"  a  consolidating  force,  e.  g.  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine — The  uprising  against  the  invaders  in  1792-3; 
finally  it  erred  by  excess;  hence  Bonapartism  .  .  18 

LECTURE  HI 

SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE 

German  ideals  in  eighteenth  century  were  rather  international 
than  national — Kant — Germany  weak  and  attracted  by 


viii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

French  Revolution — Schiller  at  first  decried  patriotism; 
so,  too,  Fichte,  figured  Europe  as  a  Christian  Common- 
wealth— Schiller's  Wilhelm  Tell  (1804)  struck  the  na- 
tional note — Significance  of  its  message  to  Germans  and 
Swiss — After  Prussia's  overthrow  by  Napoleon,  Fichte 
delivered  his  Addresses  to  the  German  Nation  (1807-8) — 
Selfishness  had  ruined  Germany;  a  renovated  nation 
must  restore  her — National  education  and  its  influence 
on  the  events  of  1813  .  .  .  .  .  -34 

LECTURE  IV 

THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING 

Differences  between  the  German  and  Spanish  national  move- 
ments— Aloofness  of  Spain  and  pride  of  her  people — 
Excessive  confidence  of  Napoleon  in  dealing  with  her — 
The  rising  of  May- June,  1808,  and  alliance  with  Great 
Britain — Fury  against  him — Weakness  and  strength  of 
provincial  procedure — Efforts  at  reform  partial  and  im- 
itative— The  constitution  of  1812  short-lived — Influence 
of  the  Spanish  resistance  on  European  developments  and 
the  fall  of  Napoleon 56 

LECTURE  V 

MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY 

Thought  determines  the  course  of  action — The  Italian  move- 
ment a  struggle  against  the  policy  of  division  and  subju- 
gation imposed  in  1815 — Italian  parties:  (i)  Neo-Guelf, 
(2)  Monarchist,  (3)  Mazzini  and  Young  Italy — His  pro- 
gramme of  national  unity  (1831) — Charm  of  his  person- 
ality— His  faith  in  Italy's  mission,  after  the  failure  of 
French  individualism  in  1789-93 — True  patriotism  need- 
ful in  order  to  attain  cosmopolitan  ideals,  which  other- 
wise are  unattainable — Mazzini  failed  for  his  day — Will 
his  ideals  now  be  realized?  .....  74 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS          ix 
LECTURE  VI 

THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS 

PAGE 

The  Slav  character  moulded  by  the  life  of  the  steppes — 
Russia  profoundly  stirred  by  Napoleon's  invasion  of  1812 
— Patriotism  soon  diverted  into  reactionary  channels — 
Friction  with  the  Poles — Centrifugal  tendencies  of  the 
Slavs — The  South  Slavs  of  Austria-Hungary  awakened 
by  Napoleon — The  Kingdom  of  Illyria  influenced  the 
Serbs,  who  in  1815  gained  large  rights  from  the  Turks — 
Development  of  Serbia — The  Russian  Slavophiles  and 
Panslavists — All  Slavs  excited  by  Balkan  events  of 
1875-6 — The  Bulgars  and  their  efforts — Beaconsfield's 
pro-Turkish  policy — Russia's  liberating  campaign  of 
1876-7  and  the  settlement  of  1878 — Union  of  the  two 
Bulgarias  in  1885  .......  93 


LECTURE  VII 

THE  GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE 

Varied  conceptions  of  the  State — Ancient  democracies  re- 
quired very  much  from  their  citizens — So,  too,  the  ab- 
solute monarchies  of  Europe — Frederick  the  Great  was 
the  Prussian  State — His  activities  and  stem  resolve — 
Kant's  gospel  of  duty — Fichte  in  1804  exalted  the  State 
as  furthering  Kultur — His  Spartan  aims — In  1807-8,  he 
assigned  supremacy  to  the  nation — His  successor,  Hegel, 
glorified  the  State  as  an  absolute  and  all-pervading  entity 
(1820,  1830) — Did  he  confuse  it  with  the  nation? — Ro- 
chau  in  Realpolitik  (1853)  affirmed:  "The  State  is 
Power" — This  theme  developed  by  Treitschke,  who  de- 
manded the  absorption  of  Saxony  and  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
— His  State  morality;  subordination  of  the  people  to  the 
State  in 


x  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

LECTURE  VIII 

NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM 

PAGE 

Necessary  omissions  from  our  studies;  but  clearly  National- 
ity has  made  Europe  what  it  is — Reasons  for  thinking 
that  Nationality  does  not  depend  on  race  or  language — 
Examination  of  Hegel's  "World-Spirit"  theory — Na- 
tionality became  a  moulding  force  in  1789 — The  family 
instinct  of  the  French  provinces  made  France  a  nation — 
Reaction  against  her  aggressions  in  1808-15 — Failures  of 
sporadic  Nationalism  in  1848-9 — Successes  of  organized 
Nationalism  in  1859-70 — Militarism  an  outcome  of  the 
national  and  democratic  instinct  in  1792-3 — Armed  de- 
mocracy (developed  by  Napoleon)  routed  the  monarchs 
— Militarism  began  again  with  the  national  policy  of  Wil- 
helm  I  of  Prussia  in  1860,  and  triumphed  over  Austria 
(1866),  and  France  (1870) — Like  Napoleon  I,  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  II  has  misused  national  forces  raised  origi- 
nally for  defensive  purposes  .....  136 

LECTURE  IX 

NATIONALISM  SINCE   1885 

Nationality  a  great  constructive  force  up  to  September,  1885, 
has  since  altered  its  character,  witness  the  fratricidal 
attack  of  Serbia  on  Bulgaria,  the  failure  of  Greek  aims 
in  1897,  and  racial  strifes  in  Macedonia — Russia's  de- 
feats in  the  Far  East  emboldened  the  Central  Empires, 
and  in  1908  Austria  annexed  Bosnia — Support  of  Ger- 
many, Bismarck's  defensive  alliance  of  1879  with  Austria 
thus  became  aggressive — Austro-German  ambitions — 
The  Pangerman  and  Navy  Leagues  pushed  the  Kaiser 
on — Germany's  charge  that  the  Entente  Powers  "en- 
circled" her — Chauvinism  in  Austria-Hungary,  which 
probably  prompted  Bulgaria's  attack  on  her  Allies  in 
June,  1913 — Significance  of  the  alliance  of  the  Central 
Empires  with  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  .  ,  .  .  155 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xi 

LECTURE  X 

INTERNATIONALISM 

PAGE 

Great  wars  have  often  produced  efforts  to  mitigate  or  avert 
them,  e.  g.  those  of  Grotius  (1625)  and  of  eighteenth- 
century  thinkers — Kant  in  Perpetual  Peace  (1795)  pro- 
posed, though  doubtfully,  a  federation  of  free  Republics 
— Reasons  for  deprecating  the  supremacy  of  any  one 
State  and  requiring  proportionate  equality — Unwise  or 
unreal  efforts  after  1815 — "Young  Europe"  (1834) — Or- 
ganized Nationalism  overshadowed  the  Internationale, 
which  started  in  1864 — Folly  of  the  Paris  Communists  in 
1871 — Divergence  of  French  and  Slav  "Internationals" 
from  German,  many  of  whom  have  been  attracted  by 
the  Kaiser's  commercialism — Proposals  of  the  Interna- 
tionalein  1901, 1007, 1910 — Deadlock  on  Alsace-Lorraine 
Question  (1912) — Inaction  of  German  Socialists  at  the 
crisis  of  July- August,  1914 — Temporary  collapse  of  In- 
ternationalism— Reasons  for  hope  in  its  revival  .  .  177 


NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN 
HISTORY 

LECTURE  I 
THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA 

IT  is  well  sometimes  to  do  with  the  map  of  Europe  at 
critical  periods  what  a  painter  does  with  his  canvas,  stand 
away  from  it  and  view  it  with  half -closed  eyes  so  as  to  behold 
only  the  salient  features.  What  is  the  impression  produced 
by  the  Europe  of  the  Roman  Empire  of  1800  years  ago? 
Solidity  and  universality  are  its  characteristics.  Eight  hun- 
dred years  later  the  scene  is  changed  to  one  of  chaos.  The 
attempt  of  the  rulers  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  to  achieve 
unity  has  failed  and  civilization  is  lost  in  a  medley  of  little 
domains.  By  slow  degrees  these  sort  themselves  out,  like 
to  like  for  the  most  part;  and  by  the  year  1600  the  outlines 
of  large  States  are  clearly  defined,  especially  hi  the  West  of 
Europe.  Italy  and  Germany  are  minutely  divided;  and  the 
inroads  of  the  Turks  have  worked  havoc  in  the  South-East. 
Still,  Europe  is  settling  down  on  a  new  basis;  and  not  even 
the  Wars  of  Religion  long  delay  the  assorting  process  except 
hi  Germany.  The  political  bioscope  continues  to  shift  until 
there  emerge  large  blocks  of  territory  which  tend  to  absorb 
the  smaller  areas.  The  Napoleonic  Wars  and  the  series  of 
modern  wars  beginning  in  1859  complete  this  solidifying  work; 
and  only  in  the  South-East  of  Europe  do  we  find  a  great 
Empire  splitting  up  into  smaller  parts.  Elsewhere,  the  con- 


2  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

trary  is  the  case;  and  in  1878-1914  Europe  consists  of  solid 
blocks,  which  stoutly  resist  every  attempt  to  break  them  up. 

To  resume;  in  the  old  Roman  times  Europe  forms  a  solid 
whole.  In  the  fifth  century  it  splits  up  into  small  areas;  and 
the  period  of  small  areas  and  fleeting  States  continues  far 
into  the  Middle  Ages;  but  by  slow  degrees  these  minute  sub- 
divisions lessen  in  number  and  increase  in  size;  until,  in  the 
nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries,  the  map  of  Europe 
acquires  a  clearness  and  consistency  never  known  since  the 
time  of  the  old  Roman  Empire.  First,  there  is  unity;  then 
chaos;  then  an  approach  to  simplicity  and  solidity. 

If  we  inquire  into  the  causes  of  these  very  striking  changes 
we  come  to  these  general  conclusions:  The  unity  of  the  Roman 
world  was  due  to  its  conquest  by  a  single  State,  which  pos- 
sessed a  far  greater  military  and  political  efficiency  than  that 
developed  by  other  peoples.  Therefore  they  were  absorbed 
by  it,  until,  on  the  break  up  of  that  wonderful  organism,  there 
ensued  utter  confusion,  the  natural  result  of  unchecked  racial 
strifes.  The  chaos  became  semi-organic  during  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  at  their  close  another  influence  began  to  operate, 
which  grouped  together  the  units  and  brought  them  into 
ever  larger  masses.  These  masses  are  the  modern  States. 
Now,  what  has  been  the  influence  most  conducive  to  State- 
building?  That,  I  hope,  we  shall  discover  in  this  course  of 
lectures. 

This  brief  survey  will  have  shown  that  some  mighty  in- 
fluence has  been  at  work  in  the  modern  world  far  different 
from  anything  that  was  known  to  the  ancients.  In  Europe 
and  on  its  confines  there  was  no  State  that  was  conterminous 
with  a  great  people.  Assyria,  Persia,  and  Egypt  held  sway 
over  several  peoples  alien  to  the  ruling  race;  and  the  Mogul 
Empire  was  a  mere  conglomerate.  But  there  was  one  ex- 
ception, small  in  extent  but  infinitely  interesting.  The  Jews 
during  some  generations  formed  a  single  compact  national 


THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA  3 

State.  With  the  possible  exceptions  of  China  and  Babylon 
they  are  the  first  example  of  a  nation  in  the  modern  sense. 
Their  records  show  the  rise  of  the  family  into  the  tribe,  of 
the  tribe  into  the  nation;  and  for  a  time  the  nation  was  held 
together  by  a  strong  instinct  of  kinship.  The  union  was 
sanctified  and  strengthened  by  religious  rites  and  by  a  pro- 
found sense  of  consecration  to  the  Deity.  Thus  there  came 
about  a  sense  of  unity  which  held  together  a  singularly  stiff- 
necked,  clannish  people;  and  there  grew  up  that  spiritual  and 
moral  fellowship  which  has  survived  eighteen  centuries  of 
dispersion.  True,  the  Jews  did  not  long  hold  together  polit- 
ically. But,  despite  the  disruptive  tendencies  of  their  de- 
generate days,  they  remained  and  still  remain  one  at  heart. 
The  consciousness  of  being  "the  chosen  people"  still  unites 
them,  whether  they  dwell  in  the  mansions  of  Paris  and 
New  York,  or  vegetate  in  the  slums  of  Warsaw  and  Lisbon, 
or  practise  their  ancient  rites  in  the  valleys  of  Abyssinia. 
Israel  is  still  a  moral  and  religious  unit,  inspired  by  the  most 
tenacious  sense  of  kinship  known  to  history. 

Elsewhere  in  the  Ancient  World  there  was  no  State  that 
can  be  called  national,  at  least  not  hi  Europe.  The  Greeks 
never  achieved  political  union.  Thrilled  though  they  were 
by  their  legendary  epic,  and  inspired  at  tunes  by  the  worship 
of  Zeu?  6  7rave\\ijvio<i ,  they  very  rarely  joined  in  defence  of 
their  peninsula.  Only  when  the  Persians  covered  the  plains  of 
Thessaly  did  the  Greeks  make  common  cause;  and  then  the 
union  was  brief  and  doubtful.  For  all  their  scorn  of  other 
peoples  as  barbarians,  for  all  their  care  in  excluding  non- 
Greeks  from  the  Olympian  and  other  great  festivals,  they 
often  sided  with  aliens  against  their  own  kith  and  kin.  The 
patriotic  appeals  of  Demosthenes  failed  to  unite  them  against 
Philip  of  Macedon;  and  they  fell,  because  at  bottom  their 
political  system  was  not  national,  only  municipal.  City 
fought  with  city;  and  never  at  the  supreme  crisis  did  the 


4  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

City-States  effectively  unite.  The  Greek  polity  stopped 
short  at  the  city  or  the  clan.  Except  in  regard  to  religion, 
art  and  athletics  it  never  attained  to  nationality.1 

Very  different  is  the  history  of  Rome.  Her  people,  though 
far  less  imaginative  than  those  of  Athens,  possessed  the 
political  gifts  needful  for  the  upbuilding  of  a  Commonwealth. 
Rome  early  absorbed  other  cities;  she  then  absorbed  the 
Samnites,  the  Greeks  of  South  Italy  and  the  Gauls  of  the 
North.  After  unifying  Italy,  she  went  far  towards  unifying 
the  then  known  world.  From  the  Clyde  to  the  Euphrates, 
from  the  Tagus  to  the  Rhine,  she  moulded  diverse  tribes  and 
formed  an  almost  universal  State.  As  Professor  Reid  2  has 
shown,  she  accomplished  this  wonderful  feat  largely  by  the 
grant  of  wide  municipal  liberties,  thereby  welding  into  her 
imperial  system  the  City-States  which  Greek  separatism  had 
failed  to  unite.  Besides  tactful  toleration  in  local  affairs, 
Imperial  Rome  displayed  a  peculiar  attractive  power  which 
drew  aliens  into  her  polity;  and  in  this  faculty  of  assimilation 
lay  her  chief  strength.  Vergil  proclaimed  that  it  was  her 
mission  to  crush  the  proud  and  spare  those  who  submitted. 
The  latter  process  is  more  important  than  mere  conquest. 
Indeed,  the  only  real  conquest  is  that  which  assimilates  the 
conquered.  All  other  triumphs  are  vain  and  evanescent. 
Now,  Rome  had  this  absorbing  power  to  a  unique  degree. 
The  Jews  and  Greeks  were  exclusive  and  intolerant  towards 
Gentiles  and  barbarians.  Not  so  the  Roman.  He  brought 
the  conquered  within  the  pale;  he  adopted  their  deities,3 

1The  Amphictyonic  Council  was  the  only  Pan-Hellenic  institu- 
tion; but  it  rarely  acted  with  vigor.  Isocrates  desired  to  unite  all  Greece 
with  Philip  of  Macedon  for  the  invasion  of  Asia;  but  Demosthenes  and 
nearly  all  Athenians  scouted  the  scheme. 

2  J.  S.  Reid,  Municipalities  in  the  Roman  Empire. 

1  See  the  complaint  of  Juvenal  [III,  60] : 

'Jam  pridem  Syrus  in  Tiberim  deflurit  Orontes." 


THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA  5 

he  enrolled  their  warriors  and  made  them  proud  of  fighting 
under  the  eagles,  until  it  seemed  possible  that  tribalism 
would  vanish  from  Europe  and  that  the  world  would  become 
Roman. 

It  was  not  to  be.  Other  barbarian  tribes,  obeying  some 
unknown  but  potent  impulse,  burst  into  the  imperial  domain; 
and  civilization  reeled  back  into  the  tribal  stage  from  which 
Rome  had  raised  it.  The  political  unity  of  Europe  vanished; 
and  the  human  race  has  never  again  been  able  to  realize  the 
homogeneity  attained  by  Imperial  Rome.  During  the  Dark 
Ages  the  annals  of  mankind  became  pettily  local.  Neverthe- 
less, amidst  those  bewildering  shiftings  to  and  fro,  racial 
settlements  of  the  utmost  importance  were  taking  place. 
Indeed,  since  the  year  1000,  few  ethnical  changes  of  any 
moment  have  occurred,  if  we  except  the  Norman  settlements, 
the  incursion  of  the  Turks  and  the  expulsion  of  the  Moors. 
With  those  exceptions  the  groupings  of  the  European  peoples 
of  to-day  are  discernible  at  that  date;  and  the  course  of 
events,  especially  during  the  last  fifty  years  has  tended  to 
identify  more  or  less  closely  the  political  frontiers  with  the 
bounds  of  the  habitations  marked  out  by  the  great  European 
peoples  during  the  long  and  obscure  struggles  of  the  Dark 
Ages.  As  will  appear  in  the  sequel,  some  peoples,  possessing 
greater  attractive  or  organizing  power,  have  gained  at  the 
expense  of  others  less  gifted  or  energetic;  but  in  their 
broad  outlines  the  great  States  of  to-day  recall  those  of  the 
chief  settlements  consequent  on  the  Wanderings  of  the 
Peoples. 

How  came  it  that  the  binding  influences  of  Christianity 
and  the  haunting  memories  of  the  old  Roman  Empire  did 
not  group  together  in  a  solid  polity  the  barbarous  tribes  that 
then  overran  Europe?  The  triumph  of  Christianity  over 
paganism  was  swift  and  complete;  and  even  the  proudest  and 
fiercest  of  the  barbarians  venerated  Rome  and  her  laws.  But 


6  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

during  the  Middle  Ages  the  city  which  had  united  the  Ancient 
World  became  the  source  of  disunion.  The  successors  of 
St.  Peter  contended  for  supremacy  with  the  heirs  of  the 
Caesars,  with  results  fatal  both  to  the  Papacy  and  to 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire.  Institutions  which  claimed  a 
dominion  as  wide  as  Christendom  were  rent  by  schism 
and  faction;  and  both  lost  in  vitality  owing  to  the  intolera- 
ble strain. 

During  the  struggle  the  first  glimmerings  of  national  con- 
sciousness become  visible.  In  their  struggle  for  Temporal 
Power  Hildebrand  and  his  successors  at  the  Vatican  could 
rarely  rely  on  armed  support  outside  Italy.  The  wavering 
fortunes  of  the  Empire  were  sustained  in  the  main  by  Ger- 
mans. Yet  the  struggle  never  became  national  in  the  modern 
sense.  The  Popes  could  always  range  many  a  German  duchy 
against  its  Emperor;  and  he  embattled  not  a  few  Italian  cities 
against  the  Vatican,  even  when  the  Lombard  League  formed 
its  sure  bulwark  in  the  North.  Thus,  clashing  claims  of 
world-supremacy  were  sustained  by  forces  that  were  not  even 
national;  and  to  this  cross  division  of  forces,  as  well  as  of 
ideals,  the  wretched  welter  of  Germany  and  Italy  in  the 
Middle  Ages  may  largely  be  ascribed.  Weltpolitik  cannot 
succeed  unless  its  foundations  are  both  extensive  and  solid. 
Both  Pope  and  Emperor  sought  to  found  their  polities  on  a 
basis  no  less  shifting  than  narrow. 

Against  this  perversion  of  a  divine  mission  and  of  a  na- 
tional duty  the  first  great  political  thinker  of  the  Middle 
Ages  uttered  a  solemn  protest.  Dante,  no  less  a  statesman 
and  patriot  than  a  poet  and  seer,  protested  against  the 
schism  to  which  Italy  and  Germany  were  a  prey;  and  in  the 
course  of  his  protests  he  uttered  words  which  foretold  the 
future  glory  of  the  Roman  people.  The  challenge  to  action 
rings  through  the  verses  in  which  he  bewails  the  degradation 
of  his  land: — 


THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA  ^ 

"Ah,  slavish  Italy!    Thou  inn  of  griefs! 
Vessel  without  a  pilot  in  loud  storm! 
No  mistress  of  fair  provinces, 
But  brothel-house  impure! 

Ah  people!    Thou  obedient  still  shouldst  live 

And  in  thy  saddle  let  thy  Caesar  sit 

If  well  thou  markedst  that  which  God  commands." 

And  then  he  appeals  to  the  Emperor,  Albert  I,  to  come  and 
claim  his  due: — 

"Come  and  behold  thy  Rome,  who  calls  on  thee, 
Desolate  widow,  day  and  night,  with  moans — 
'My  Cassar,  why  dost  thou  desert  my  side? 
Come  and  behold  what  love  among  thy  people.'"  * 

For  these  and  the  like  utterances  Dante  has  been  dubbed 
a  Ghibelline.  He  was  more  Ghibelline  than  Guelf;  but 
in  truth  he  was  a  farseeing  patriot  who  sought  to  reconcile 
the  Empire  and  the  Papacy,  thereby  assuring  peace  to  Italy 
and  order  to  the  world. 

Such  is  the  theme  of  his  chief  political  work,  De  Mo- 
narchid.  It  rests  on  the  fundamental  conception  that  the 
world,  being  a  thought  of  God,  is  designed  for  unity,  the 
attainment  of  which  is  the  chief  aim  of  man.  The  human 
race  never  achieved  political  unity  and  peace  except  during 
the  reign  of  the  Emperor  Augustus,  at  the  time  of  the  birth 
and  life  on  earth  of  Jesus  Christ.  Various  episodes  of  that 
life  (even  the  trial  by  Pontius  Pilate)  are  cited  as  proofs 
of  His  recognition  of  the  Roman  Empire.  Further,  the  whole 
history  of  that  Empire  showed  it  to  be  the  organism  divinely 
ordained  for  promoting  unity  and  peace:  "The  Roman 
people  was  ordained  by  nature  to  command."  There  must 

1  Dante,  Purgatorio,  Canto  VI,  11.  76  et  seq. 


8  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

be  one  such  people;  and  Rome  by  her  spirit,  no  less  than 
by  her  exploits,  proclaimed  herself  to  be  the  executant  of 
the  divine  will:  "Who  is  so  dull  of  mind  as  not  by  this  time 
to  see  that  by  right  of  ordeal  the  glorious  people  gained 
for  itself  the  crown  of  the  whole  world?  "  l  What,  then,  has 
of  late  lost  them  the  crown?  Mainly,  the  conflict  between 
Pope  and  Emperor.  The  striving  of  the  Pope  for  temporal 
power  has  brought  endless  strife  on  the  people  which  ought 
to  be  one  at  heart:  "O  blessed  people!  (Dante  exclaims  2) 
O  glorious  Ausonia,  if  only  he  who  enfeebled  thy  Empire 
had  either  ne'er  been  born,  or  ne'er  been  misled  by  his  own 
pious  purpose."  This  vigorous  outburst  is  directed  against 
Constantine,  whose  alleged  donation  of  the  Roman  domains 
to  the  Papacy  was  claimed  as  the  basis  of  the  Temporal 
Power  of  that  institution. 

Thus  Dante,  good  son  of  the  Church  though  he  was, 
recognized  her  Temporal  Power  to  be  an  evil,  because  it 
introduced  strife  where  there  ought  to  be  harmony.  Let 
the  Pope  be  solely  the  vicar  of  Christ;  let  the  Emperor  wield 
the  sword  hi  the  name  of  Christ.  In  no  sense  does  the  Em- 
peror derive  his  authority  from  the  Pope.3  Each  derives 
his  authority  from  Christ:  the  Pope,  in  order  to  lead  men 
to  eternal  life;  the  Emperor,  to  lead  them  to  temporal  felicity. 

By  this  teaching  Dante  hoped  to  heal  the  strifes  which 
desolated  Italy  and  Germany.  The  conflicting  authorities 
of  Pope  and  Emperor  were  to  merge;  then  the  Roman  people 
would  once  more  direct  human  affairs.  The  conception 
is  no  less  imaginative  than  statesmanlike.  Pope  and  Em- 
peror (i.  e.  in  the  main,  Italy  and  Germany)  were  to  work 
together  for  the  welfare  of  mankind;  but  the  guiding  impulse 
must  come  from  Rome,  the  divinely  created  source  of  religion, 
statesmanship,  and  armed  might. 

1  Dante,  De  Monarchid,  Bk.  II,  chs.  7,  n. 

2  Bk.  II  ad  fin.  3  Bk.  Ill,  passim. 


THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA  9 

In  pursuance  of  this  theme  Dante  sought  to  revive  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  Christianizing  its  spirit,  but  keeping 
the  initiative  always  with  "the  holy  Roman  people."  In 
this  sense,  and  this  alone,  is  Dante  an  Italian  nationalist. 
To  me  it  seems  that  Mazzini  in  his  essay  "On  the  minor 
Works  of  Dante"  read  into  the  De  Monarchic  much  of  his 
own  perfervid  nationalism.  But  it  is  true  that  Dante's 
world-empire  was  to  be  Roman.  Other  peoples  were  to 
yield  up  their  wills  and  act  in  conformity  with  the  fiat  of 
the  Eternal  City.  This  doctrine  is  not  Italian  nationalism, 
very  far  from  it.  It  is  a  flash  of  the  old  Roman  Imperialism 
focussed  in  a  Christian  lens.  But  here  we  find  the  source 
of  the  inextinguishable  faith  in  Rome  which  nerved  many 
Italian  patriots,  even  when,  like  Mazzini,  they  rejected 
Roman  clericalism. 

Dante,  by  ascribing  a  divine  mission  to  the  Roman  people, 
exerted  on  the  fourteenth  century  an  influence  not  unlike 
that  of  the  patriotic  priest,  Gioberti,  on  the  mid-nineteenth 
century.  Each  declared  the  Romans  and  their  descendants 
to  be  a  chosen  people,  marked  out  by  special  gifts  and  con- 
secrated by  divine  decree.  When  people  believe  that,  they 
can  never  be  wholly  enslaved.  They  have  taken  the  first 
difficult  step  which  leads,  it  may  be  through  ages  of  torture 
and  despair,  towards  political  independence.  In  this  sense 
Dante  was  the  father  of  Italian  nationalism. 

In  one  other  respect  Dante  uplifted  his  people  to  an  in- 
calculable extent.  He  taught  them  to  wing  their  thoughts 
to  the  highest  ecstasies  in  their  mother-tongue.  He  delib- 
erately chose  to  body  forth  the  holiest  and  most  thrilling 
thoughts  in  the  vernacular.  Leaving  other  scholars  to  stalk 
on  Latin  stilts,  he  strode  forth  easily  but  majestically,  using 
the  language  of  the  streets  of  Florence.  He  defended  his 
choice  in  the  work  De  Vtdgari  EloquenlicL,  which  is  the  first 
conscious  effort  at  nationalizing  literature. 


io  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Other  poets,  notably  Fazio  degli  Uberti  (circa  1370), 
wrote  canzoni  more  directly  inspired  by  the  national  idea. 
But  the  instinct  of  the  Italian  people  singles  out  Dante  as 
the  source  of  the  Italian  spirit.  In  the  year  1844  Mazzini 
thus  wrote  of  the  mediaeval  seer: — 

"The  splendor  of  no  other  genius  has  been  able  to  eclipse  or 
dim  the  grandeur  of  Dante;  never  has  there  been  a  darkness  so 
profound  that  it  could  conceal  this  star  of  promise  from  Italian 
eyes.  ...  As  if  there  had  been  a  compact,  an  interchange  of 
secret  life  between  the  nation  and  its  poet,  even  the  common  people, 
who  cannot  read,  know  and  revere  his  sacred  name.  The  moun- 
taineers of  Tolmino,  near  Udine,  tell  the  travellers  that  there  is  the 
grotto  where  Dante  wrote — there  the  stone  upon  which  he  used  to 
sit;  yet  a  little  while,  and  the  country  will  inscribe  on  the  base  of  his 
statue — 'The  Italian  nation  to  the  memory  of  its  Prophet.'" 

Yes:  Italy  has  become  a  nation,  and  she  owes  her  nation- 
hood no  less  to  the  thrilling  words  of  her  seers  than  to  the 
bravery  of  her  soldiers.  As  will  appear  in  the  sequel,  her 
union  is  due  very  largely  to  the  thrilling  thoughts  of  her 
gifted  sons.  Indeed,  the  unique  interest  attaching  to  the 
Italian  movement  is  due  to  the  inspiration  which  it  drew 
from  the  noblest  natures  and  thence  spread  through  the 
masses.  Italian  nationality  is  no  mechanical  product,  the 
result  of  warlike  pressure  from  without,  as  was  elsewhere 
often  the  case.  It  is  rather  a  soul-politic  than  a  body-politic. 

But  if  the  genius  of  Dante  inspired  the  leaders  of  thought 
in  Italy,  he  did  not  and  could  not  inaugurate  a  truly  national 
feeling.  The  times  were  not  ripe  for  that.  Lawgivers,  states- 
men, warriors,  even  inventors  and  mechanics,  had  to  play 
then*  several  parts  before  the  common  people  in  remote 
provinces  could  come  into  touch  and  feel  the  consciousness  of 
a  common  life.  As  a  rule,  such  an  awakening  is  due  to  forces 
that  compel  a  people  to  fall  back  on  its  reserves  of  strength; 


THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA  II 

and  these  forces  act  most  potently  in  time  of  war.  It  is 
probable  that  Italy  and  Germany  would  have  arrayed  them- 
selves in  conscious  hostility  but  for  the  cross  currents  that 
swept  across  them,  diverting  their  fortunes  into  side  channels 
and  many  confusing  eddies. 

As  it  was,  the  national  issue  was  first  definitely  posed 
between  the  Western  peoples.  Of  these  the  Spaniards  were 
almost  wholly  immersed  in  the  internecine  struggle  with 
the  Moors,  from  the  long  agony  of  which  there  emerged 
the  fierce  ballads  of  the  Cid  as  a  promise  of  many  a  deed 
of  fanatical  heroism  in  the  more  prosperous  future.  But 
France  and  England  learnt  to  know  themselves  during  the 
earliest  of  the  great  national  struggles,  the  Hundred  Years' 
War.  The  combatants  were  well  matched.  What  England 
lacked  in  bulk  she  made  up  in  the  excellent  organization  of 
the  monarchy  bequeathed  by  William  I  and  Henry  II  to  the 
three  Edwards.  The  French,  superior  in  numbers,  were 
weakened  by  feudal  divisions  and  the  strifes  of  the  great 
nobles.  Neither  State,  however,  was  much  distracted  by 
papal  or  other  external  claims;  and  thus  a  dispute  arising 
out  of  Plantagenet  ambition  developed  into  a  trial  of  strength 
between  two  warlike  peoples. 

To  trace  in  detail  the  growth  of  English  and  French  na- 
tional feeling  during  the  course  of  this  long  struggle  is  an 
impossible  task.  Limiting  ourselves  for  the  present  to  the 
islanders,  we  may  note  that  the  loss  of  Normandy,  unity  of 
law  and  administration,  and  the  influence  of  firm  government 
under  Henry  II  and  Edward  I,  had  prepared  the  way  for  a 
union  of  hearts  between  Norman  and  Saxon;  but  that  union 
was  cemented  on  the  fields  of  Crecy  and  Poitiers.  Fighting 
side  by  side  against  great  odds,  Norman  knight  and  Saxon 
archer  forgot  their  old  feuds  and  merged  their  racial  differ- 
ences in  the  pride  of  Englishry.  Thenceforth  signs  abound  of 
the  victorious  sweep  of  the  new  insular  sentiment.  In  1362 


12  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

proceedings  in  the  Law  Courts  were  ordered  to  be  conducted 
in  English;  and  in  the  following  year  our  mother-tongue 
gained  its  Poitiers,  when  Edward  III  opened  Parliament  in  a 
speech  delivered  in  the  vernacular. 

The  union  of  Norman  energy  and  Anglo-Saxon  stubborn- 
ness in  a  single  type  is  an  event  of  unique  importance.  For 
when  two  or  more  hostile  or  jealous  races  coalesce,  the  result 
is  a  notable  increase  of  mental  vigor  as  well  as  of  physical 
force.  In  England  the  reigns  of  Edward  III,  Elizabeth, 
James  I  and  Anne  are  remarkable  for  the  broadening  of 
national  life  and  also  for  literary  triumphs  which  express  the 
fuller  vitality  of  the  time.  A  similar  access  of  martial  and 
literary  energy  marks  the  complete  union  of  Spain  under 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  and  that  of  France  under  Louis  XIV. 
These  and  other  cases  reveal  the  connection  that  exists 
between  politics  and  culture.  Enlarge  the  outlook  of  peoples 
previously  cramped  and  you  quicken  all  their  faculties.  The 
result  is  frequently  seen  in  an  outburst  of  song,  as  happens 
with  birds  at  mating  time.  It  was  so  in  England.  The  age 
of  the  Black  Prince  was  also  the  age  of  Chaucer,  Langland, 
and  Wycliffe.  The  dawn  of  English  nationality  coincided 
with  the  dawn  of  a  truly  English  literature. 

There  was  something  in  the  air  as  well  as  in  Chaucer's 
genius  which  prompted  him  to  write  hi  English.  French 
in  ancestry,  courtier  by  choice,  and  thereby  condemned 
to  speak  mainly  hi  French,  he  chose  to  write  hi  the  tongue 
of  the  street  and  mart.  Moreover,  not  only  the  language, 
but  the  spirit  of  his  chief  work  is  thoroughly  English.  In 
their  origin  most  of  the  "Canterbury  Tales"  are  Italian, 
or,  in  a  few  cases,  French;  but  Chaucer's  presentment  is 
thoroughly  insular.  The  plot  and  the  setting  of  the  Tales 
are  aggressively  Cockney  or  Kentish.  Through  Mine  Host 
the  poet  chaffs  those  of  the  company  who  prefer  to  mangle 
the  French  language  rather  than  speak  their  own.  As  for 


THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA  13 

the  characters,  they  are  such  as  might  be  found  to-day  at 
a  village  penny-reading.  Perhaps  it  was  Chaucer's  cap- 
tivity in  France  which  sharpened  his  insular  patriotism; 
for  no  experience  can  be  more  nationalizing  than  a  time 
spent  as  prisoner  of  war.  Whatever  the  cause,  Chaucer 
was  a  thorough  Englishman.  I  think  that  we  know  him 
as  well  as,  and  perhaps  love  him  better  than,  most  men  of 
our  acquaintance. 

The  writing  of  charming  poems  in  what  had  before  been 
a  despised  vernacular  is  a  landmark  in  the  national  life. 
A  people  cannot  attain  to  its  full  powers  until  its  thoughts 
and  aspirations  are  wedded  to  the  mother-tongue,  until  that 
mother-tongue  ceases  to  growl  or  stammer,  or  learns  to  sing. 
The  difference  in  the  life  of  the  folk  resembles  that  which 
comes  during  the  growth  of  a  youth,  say,  between  fifteen 
and  eighteen.  The  boy  of  fifteen  is  tongue-tied,  awkward, 
perhaps  a  mere  hobbledehoy.  The  youth  of  eighteen  is  a 
different  being;  he  has  felt  the  first  thoughts  of  love;  he  has, 
perhaps,  spoken  them  forth;  he  has  become  vocal.  Possibly, 
too,  those  feelings  are  accompanied  by  others  much  the  re- 
verse towards  an  individual  of  his  own  sex.  If  so,  he  knows 
what  jealousy  or  hatred  is.  In  short,  he  has  begun  to  know 
himself.  That  delicious  time  of  life  has  its  counterpart  in 
the  experience  of  a  people.  A  crisis  comes  which  sets  the 
blood  tingling  and  calls  forth  energies  and  aspirations 
hitherto  latent.  That  is  what  happened  to  us  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Hundred  Years'  War.  The  Black  Prince, 
Chaucer,  Wycliffe  are  the  first  complete  manifestations  of 
the  native  spirit.  An  indefinable  energy,  vigor,  and  splen- 
dor radiates  forth  from  our  people  at  that  time,  as  it  does 
from  all  peoples  in  the  heyday  of  ripening  manhood.  So 
brilliant  are  the  exploits  of  the  Black  Prince  that  Froissart 
regards  England  as  the  chosen  abode  of  chivalry.  Chaucer 
awakens  her  brain  and  her  sense  of  beauty.  Wycliffe  speaks 


14  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

to  her  soul.  On  all  sides  of  her  being  the  nation  is  awake. 
It  was  a  keen  historic  sense  which  led  Shakespeare  to  place 
in  the  mouth  of  men  of  that  age  the  loftiest  of  patriotic 
paeans.  Old  John  of  Gaunt  sings  his  swan-song  in  praise  of 
England: — 

"This  royal  throne  of  Kings,  this  sceptred  isle, 
This  earth  of  majesty,  this  seat  of  Mars, 
This  other  Eden,  demi-paradise, 
This  fortress  built  by  Nature  for  herself 
Against  infection  and  the  hand  of  war, 
This  happy  breed  of  men,  this  little  world, 
This  precious  stone  set  in  the  silver  sea." 

And  Bolingbroke,  on  departing  for  banishment: — 

"Then  England's  ground,  farewell;  sweet  soil,  adieu; 
My  mother  and  my  nurse,  that  bears  me  yet! 
Where'er  I  wander,  boast  of  this  I  can, 
Though  banish'd,  yet  a  true-born  Englishman."  1 

The  clash  of  war,  which  first  made  England  know  herself, 
also  summoned  to  conscious  life  the  French  nation.  There 
again  forces  were  at  work,  some  promoting,  others  retarding, 
national  unity.  The  centripetal  influences  were  pride  in  the 
old  Roman  heritage,  and  the  community  of  language  and 
culture  which  it  bequeathed;  also  the  work  of  the  clergy, 
the  effects  of  the  Crusades,  and  the  efforts  of  the  stronger 
monarchs  to  promote  uniformity  in  law  and  the  adminis- 
tration. Of  the  centrifugal  influences  the  chief  were  of 
Prankish  origin,  the  instinct  to  follow  the  chief  rather  than 
the  King,  which  divided  the  realm  amongst  rival  and  greedy 
feudatories,  each  a  law  to  himself  and  the  source  of  law  to 
his  vassals.  The  Kings,  allied  with  the  Gallic  populace,  were 

1  Richard  II,  Act  I,  Sc.  3;  Act  II,  Sc.  i. 


THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA  15 

waging  a  doubtful  conquest  with  the  Teutonic  and  feudal 
elements,  when  there  burst  upon  this  divided  realm  the 
Hundred  Years'  War.  The  natural  result  was  the  triumph 
of  the  invaders,  under  whose  blows  all  that  was  left  of  the 
French  dominions  began  to  solidify.  The  one  possible  rally- 
ing point,  the  monarchy,  gradually  gained  ground  over  re- 
bellious feudatories;  but,  owing  to  the  contemptible  weakness 
of  Charles  VII,  the  struggle  was  still  going  against  France, 
when  the  most  remarkable  figure  of  the  late  Middle  Ages 
arose  to  vivify  her  people  and  confound  their  enemies. 
Jeanne  d'Arc  left  her  sheep  at  Domremy  and  came  to  drive 
forth  the  invaders.  Her  resolve  to  do  battle  against  the 
English  until  Charles  be  crowned  at  Rheims  was  the  more 
remarkable  because  legally  she  was  not  a  Frenchwoman. 
She  was  born  and  lived  in  the  Burgundian  part  of  that  border 
village.  But  in  her  meditations  in  the  woods  the  high- 
souled  maiden  heard  angelic  voices  that  bade  her  "go  into 
France";  and  we  may  question  whether  with  the  religious 
impulse  were  not  mingled  the  promptings  of  that  national 
sentiment  which  has  often  spoken  forth  in  the  moving  tones 
of  a  woman.  The  Baraks  of  a  great  crisis  have  rarely  lacked 
their  Deborahs;  and  a  cause  that  deeply  stirs  woman's  nature 
is  on  the  road  to  triumph.  Certain  it  is  that  the  advent  of 
Jeanne  d'Arc  meant  infinitely  much  to  the  French;  for  it 
heartened  them  and  bewildered  their  enemies;  and  this,  not 
only  for  superstitious  reasons,  but  also  because  Jeanne  was 
France  personified.  No  figure  in  history  has  more  fully 
typified  a  nation;  and  when  a  nation  sees  itself  thus  incarnate 
its  powers  are  doubled. 

From  our  present  point  of  view  it  matters  little  that  she 
was  captured,  was  deserted  by  the  French  and  barbarously 
burnt  by  the  English.  Those  actions  belong  to  the  super- 
stition and  cruelty  of  the  tune.  What  belongs  to  all  time  is 
the  saintly  heroic  influence  that  radiated  from  her  and 


16  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

passed  into  the  heart  of  her  people.  While  Charles  VII  was 
trimming  his  sails  to  every  breeze  she  uttered  words  instinct 
with  patriotic  wisdom:  "As  to  the  peace  with  the  English, 
the  only  one  possible  is  that  they  should  go  back  to  their 
country  hi  England."  That  is  the  national  ideal,  for  the 
first  time  clearly  defined.  The  French  are  one  people  and 
must  possess  the  whole  of  France.  There  will  be  no  peace 
while  the  islanders  hold  down  part  of  France.  The  thought 
is  very  simple.  It  is  the  inspired  common  sense  of  a  peasant 
girl  gifted  with  vision.  How  much  misery  would  mankind 
have  been  spared  from  that  time  to  this  if  rulers  and  warriors 
had  realized  the  truth,  that  every  civilized  nation,  when 
thoroughly  awakened  to  conscious  life,  must  control  its  own 
destinies  and  will  not  long  submit  to  be  held  down  by  another 
people. — "Let  each  nation  be  content  with  its  natural  bound- 
aries, and  not  seize  the  lands  of  its  equally  civilized  neigh- 
bors." How  simple!  And  yet  the  nation  which  claims  to 
be  at  the  summit  of  civilization  has,  even  now,  not  learnt 
that  rudimentary  lesson  in  the  doctrine  of  nationality. 

Notice,  too,  these  words  of  Jeanne  after  her  capture:  "I 
know  well  that  these  English  will  kill  me,  because  they 
hope,  after  my  death,  to  gain  the  Kingdom  of  France. 
But,  were  there  100,000  more  of  them,  they  shall  conquer 
it  never,  never."  There  spoke  forth  clearly  for  the  first 
time  the  soul  of  France,  unconquerable  in  the  fifteenth  cen- 
tury as  in  the  twentieth  century. 

The  head  typifying  France  on  the  corns  of  the  first  Re- 
public was  that  of  a  beautiful  actress  who  became  transiently 
famous  during  the  Terror.  Certainly,  the  French  genius  is 
best  personified  by  a  beautiful,  high-spirited  woman.  But 
when  I  think  of  France  I  always  see  the  Maid  of  Or- 
leans. 

Italy — not  merely  the  Italy  of  to-day,  but  of  seven  cen- 
turies— seems  to  resolve  herself  into  the  figure  of  Beatrice; 


THE  DAWN  OF  THE  NATIONAL  IDEA  17 

or,  in  her  many  tragic  phases,  to  be  transformed  into  the  sad 
yet  serene  features  of  Dante. 

The  English  people,  surely,  are  not  well  represented  by 
the  conventional  Britannia.  Their  character,  ruggedly  in- 
sular yet  widely  adaptable,  and  marked  by  a  maturity  that 
does  not  age,  is  perhaps  best  typified  by  the  genial  humanism 
of  the  countenance  of  Chaucer  or  of  Shakespeare. 

The  time  is  not  yet  ripe  for  limning  the  features  of  our 
enemies;  and  Russia  is  still  somewhat  of  a  sphinx.  But 
that  every  nation  has  a  distinct  personality,  who  can  doubt? 


LECTURE  H 
VIVE  LA  NATION 

"La  nation,  c'est  vous;  la  loi,  c'est  encore  vous,  c'est  votre 
volonte;  le  roi,  c'est  le  gardien  de  la  loi." — Adresse  de  I'Assemblfa 
nationale  au  Peuplefran$ais,  Feb.  n,  1790. 

IN  the  last  lecture  we  found  reasons  for  regarding  Dante, 
Chaucer,  and  Jeanne  d'Arc  as  the  first  exponents  of  the 
national  ideal  for  their  several  peoples.  But  it  is  very  doubt- 
ful whether  that  ideal  was  visible  to  the  people  at  large, 
except  hi  the  chief  crises  of  war.  At  such  a  time  every  man 
and  woman  who  could  think  felt  deep  hatred  of  the  foreign 
invader;  and  hi  this  sense  of  repulsion  for  the  foreigner 
nationalism  of  the  cruder  sort  doubtless  had  its  rise.  Idealized 
though  it  might  be  by  the  loftier  minds,  yet  in  its  lower 
forms  it  was  little  more  than  dislike  of  the  aggressive  stranger. 
This  feeling  it  was  which  ranged  French  and  English  against 
one  another  in  almost  solid  phalanxes. 

But  the  cross  currents,  which  we  have  noticed  as  confusing 
the  issues  in  mediaeval  Germany  and  Italy,  soon  began  to 
sweep  across  England  and  France.  Both  lands  fell  a  prey  to 
civil  strifes  which  nearly  effaced  the  nascent  sense  of  unity. 
England,  whose  polity  had  far  excelled  that  of  other  peoples, 
was  soon  distracted  by  religious  and  constitutional  disputes 
lasting  through  most  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  cen- 
turies. In  that  period  the  Elizabethan  Era  stands  out  as 
a  smiling  oasis;  for  then,  during  a  brief  space,  England  was 
almost  one  at  heart;  and  the  Spanish  menace  united  English- 
men of  all  creeds  in  defence  of  their  homes  and  liberties. 
That  danger  past,  the  island  realm  was  again  rent  by  schisms 

18 


VIVE  LA  NATION  19 

which  the  follies  and  perversity  of  the  Stuarts  prolonged  until 
the  Settlement  of  1688.  Consequently,  English  patriotism 
did  not  fully  emerge  until  the  times  of  Marlborough  and  the 
two  Pitts. 

The  fortunes  of  the  French  were  not  very  dissimilar. 
After  monarchy  brought  them  within  sight  of  political  union 
there  fell  on  them  the  Wars  of  Religion.  The  exhaustion  of 
the  people  and  the  statecraft  of  Richelieu  and  Mazarin 
finally  brought  about  internal  peace,  but  at  the  expense  of 
popular  liberties;  and  the  reigns  of  Louis  XIII  and  XIV, 
which  consummated  the  external  union  of  the  French  prov- 
inces, left  the  people  themselves  unfree  and  exhausted.  This 
state  of  things  (not  unlike  that  of  the  English  under  Henry 
VIII)  is  unfavorable  to  the  growth  of  patriotism,  a  virtue 
whose  highest  manifestation  needs  a  large  measure  of  civic 
freedom  and  an  abounding  vitality.  The  French  prov- 
inces, brought  together  by  Louis  XIV,  resembled  a  new 
plantation  of  shrubs  in  time  of  drought.  They  were  sapless; 
their  leaves  drooped;  they  were  starved  by  the  royal  oak 
hard  by.  "L'Etat,  c'est  moi,"  exclaimed  the  monarch;  and 
it  was  true  during  his  reign,  when  patriotism  centred  in  the 
person  of  the  King.  A  political  catechism,  drawn  up  for  the 
training  of  his  grandson,  the  Duke  of  Burgundy,  stated  that 
the  King  represented  the  entire  nation,  which  had  no  cor- 
porate existence  apart  from  him.1  That  was  correct.  During 
the  long  interregnum  of  the  States  General  (1614-1789) 
the  only  bond  of  union  was  the  royal  administration;  and  the 
edicts  of  the  Royal  Council  of  Ministers  formed  at  best  only  a 
partial  protection  against  feudal  injustice  and  provincial 
inequalities.  The  people  cried  out  for  efficient  government, 
which  could  come  only  with  a  close  and  effective  union  of  all 
classes  and  provinces.  Their  cry  finds  expression  in  many  of 

1  "La  nation  ne  fait  pas  corps  en  France;  elle  reside  tout  entifcre  dans 
la  personne  du  roi." 


20  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

the  cahiers,  or  writs  of  grievances,  drawn  up  in  the  spring  of 
1789.  The  Commons  of  Beauvais  demand — "an  invariable 
rule  in  all  parts  of  the  public  administration  and  public  order, 
that  is  to  say,  a  constitution.  ...  It  is  because  France  has 
never  had  one  that  her  administration  has  been  subject  to 
ceaseless  changes  and  she  herself  has  been  in  danger."  So 
again  a  village  near  Metz  writes:  "May  all  your  subjects, 
Sire,  be  made  truly  French  by  the  Government,  as  they 
already  are  by  the  love  which  they  feel  for  their  King." 
Again:  "Your  peoples  seek  refuge  at  the  foot  of  your  throne 
and  come  to  seek  in  you  their  tutelary  deity."  l 

These  and  many  other  similar  assertions  prove  that  France 
had  no  constitution  (though  Burke  denied  it)  and  that  she 
fervently  desired  to  achieve  in  the  sphere  of  law  and  adminis- 
tration the  national  unity  of  which  she  was  by  this  time  con- 
scious. That  Louis  XVI  should  make  her  effectively  a  nation 
was  at  first  the  desire  of  all;  and  even  when  he  egregiously 
failed,  and  the  National  Assembly  seized  the  reins  from  his 
nerveless  hands,  the  old  instinct  of  regarding  the  King  as  the 
keystone  of  the  national  arch  for  a  long  time  survived.  At 
the  news  of  his  flight  towards  the  eastern  frontier  at  mid- 
summer, 1791,  the  dismay  of  very  many  Frenchmen  almost 
resembled  that  which  fell  on  the  Peruvians  when  Pizarro  and 
his  handful  of  desperadoes  seized  the  sacred  person  of  the 
Inca.  Such  were  the  feelings  of  an  official  in  a  French  village, 
who,  on  learning  that  Louis  XVI  had  fled,  exclaimed  to  a 
better  educated  acquaintance:  "Alas!  What  shall  we  do? 
The  King  has  escaped."  The  nascent  consciousness  of  the 
new  age  flashed  forth  hi  the  reply:  "Well!  If  the  King  has 
escaped,  the  nation  remains.  Let  us  consider  what  to  do." 
France  did  consider;  and,  after  a  time  of  compromise  and 
hesitation,  she  decided  that  the  only  thing  to  do  with  a  King 

1  Archives  parlementaires,  III,  299;  VI,  24, 318.  See  too  Sorel,  L' Europe 
et  la  Revolution  fran^aise,  I,  p.  187. 


VIVE  LA  NATION  21 

who  desired  to  run  away  was  to  dethrone  him.  Thereafter 
the  idea  of  the  nation  was  paramount;  and,  despite  the 
triumph  of  reaction  in  and  after  1815,  it  has  been  paramount 
ever  since. 

The  delay  of  the  French  in  abolishing  the  old  monarchy 
is  somewhat  surprising,  if  we  remember  the  ardor  with 
which  their  leading  thinkers  had  adopted  the  political  theories 
of  Rousseau.  The  reader  who  peruses  his  chief  work,  Le 
Contrat  Social  (1762),  may  not  at  first  perceive  the  importance 
of  the  national  idea.  But  that  idea  is  fundamental  to  his 
whole  treatise.  The  dominant  notion  of  the  work  is  of  a 
contract  or  compact  by  which  men,  when  emerging  from 
savagery,  form  themselves  into  a  civil  society.  Rousseau, 
with  the  eye  of  faith,  beholds  them  frame  an  agreement  as 
free  men  and  equals;  and  by  this  mystic  contract,  which  may 
or  may  not  have  actually  happened,  they  become  citizens  and 
form  a  State.  It  matters  not  (says  Rousseau)  that  the  exist- 
ence of  the  social  contract  cannot  be  proved.  He  takes  it  for 
granted,  and  so  do  all  his  followers. 

Now,  this  explanation  of  the  rise  of  civil  society,  though 
it  is  altogether  fanciful,  has  exercised  a  potent  influence. 
It  lies  at  the  root  of  the  early  Socialism;  and  it  also  helped 
on  the  national  idea.  Take  this  statement  of  Rousseau: 
"Before  examining  the  act  by  which  a  nation  elects  a  King, 
it  would  be  fitting  to  examine  the  act  by  which  a  nation  be- 
comes a  nation."  l  That  act  is  the  social  contract,  which  he 
then  examines.  When  the  union  takes  place,  the  result  is  a 
body  politic,  a  respublica.  Men  who  before  were  separate 
units  are  now  citizens.  He  terms  their  association  in  its 
passive  aspect  a  State  (a  use  of  the  term  which  is  open  to 
grave  objections).  But  he  applies  the  term  "sovereign"  to 
the  body  politic  when  it  is  active.  Thus,  according  to 
him,  the  whole  body  of  citizens,  when  at  rest,  forms  the 
1  Contrat  social,  Bk.  I,  ch.  5. 


22  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

State; *  when  it  makes  laws  it  is  "the  sovereign."  For  pur- 
poses of  convenience  or  efficiency  it  may  choose  a  man  from 
one  family  to  become  ruler;  but  his  powers  always  remain 
subordinate  to  the  real  sovereign,  the  people.2 

Again,  when  they  have  decided  on  a  law  or  any  course  of 
action,  their  will  is  final.  The  "general  will,"  as  he  calls  it,  is 
the  ultimate  court  of  appeal.  He  declares  it  to  be  inalienable, 
indivisible,  impeccable.  Before  this  quintessence  of  negations 
all  other  authority,  especially  that  of  the  Church  and  of 
privileged  Orders,  must  bow  down,  so  that  there  may  be  no 
divisions  in  the  body  politic.  It  must  be  compact  in  order  to 
be  supreme;  and  that  supremacy  must  have  no  limits.  The 
newly  formed  nation  may  make  use  of  a  legislator  to  draw 
up  laws;  but  even  then  its  authority  is  dominant. 

Now,  in  this  sweeping  claim  we  have  the  foundation,  not 
only  of  modern  democracy,  but  also  of  nationality  in  a  com- 
plete and  conscious  sense.  The  influence  exerted  by  Rousseau 
on  the  development  of  the  national  idea  has  not,  I  think,  been 
sufficiently  emphasized.  Every  student  knows  that  Le 
Contrat  Social  is  the  source  of  French  democratic  notions; 
but  that  work  is  equally  the  fountainhead  of  modern  na- 
tionalism. Before  Rousseau,  writers  on  government  and  law 
had  been  comparatively  little  influenced  by  the  idea  of  the 
nation.  Montesquieu,  writing  only  some  fourteen  years  be- 
fore Rousseau,  scarcely  mentions  the  nation.  He  sometimes 
seems  to  feel  his  way  towards  that  idea  as  influencing  the 
character  of  laws ;  but  only  in  that  particular.  It  was  reserved 
for  Rousseau  to  set  forth  the  national  idea  with  a  force  and 
cogency  which  opened  up  a  new  era  both  in  thought  and 
deed. 

1  Again,  Bk.  II,  ch.  10:  "It  is  the  men  that  constitute  the  State." 

2  Dante,  in  the  De  Monarchid,  proclaimed  this  truth:  "For  citizens 
do  not  exist  for  the  Consuls,  nor  the  nation  for  the  King;  but,  on  the 
contrary,  the  Consuls  for  the  citizens,  the  King  for  the  nation." 


VIVE  LA  NATION  23 

The  Swiss  thinker  not  only  gave  birth  to  the  idea  of  the 
nation,  but  he  endowed  it  with  the  strength  of  an  infant 
Hercules.  The  French  people  could  scarcely  have  achieved 
the  miracles  of  the  new  age  had  they  not  been  doubly  in- 
spired. The  notion  of  liberty,  doubtless,  was  the  chief  im- 
pulse urging  them  forward;  but  with  it  there  then  worked  the 
powerful  feeling  of  nationality.  For  the  first  time  in  their 
history  all  Frenchmen  realized  their  essential  oneness.  That 
is  a  unique  occasion  in  the  life  of  a  people.  We  know  what 
it  meant  from  our  experience  in  August,  1914.  Then,  for 
the  first  time  hi  our  history,  the  peoples  of  the  whole  of  the 
British  Empire  were  enthusiastically  of  one  mind;  and  the 
mighty  unison  was  not  marred,  only  emphasized,  by  a  few 
thin  discordant  pipings.  Much  the  same  was  it  in  the  France 
of  1789.  Resolute  in  her  quest  for  liberty,  she  was  nerved  by 
the  consciousness  that  practically  all  her  children  were  one  at 
heart.  From  the  cramped  sphere  of  provincialism  they  rose 
by  one  bound  to  the  far  loftier  plateau  of  nationality.  There 
they  breathed  the  pure  air  of  freedom  and  were  exhilarated  by 
contact  with  others  whom  they  had  deemed  half  foreigners 
and  now  found  to  be  Frenchmen.  The  results  of  this  double 
inspiration  were  portentous.  Relatively  to  the  still  torpid 
peoples  of  the  Continent,  the  Frenchman  of  the  Revolution 
was  a  superman. 

After  that  brief  time  of  exhilaration,  which  inspired  Words- 
worth and  Coleridge  with  some  of  their  best  work,  the  then 
allied  ideas  of  liberty  and  nationality  were  destined  soon  to 
come  into  collision,  with  results  disastrous  to  the  cause  of 
progress.  We  who  are  living  amidst  a  cataclysm  such  as  the 
world  has  never  known  can  realize  the  extent  of  the  disaster; 
and  we  find  it  difficult  to  understand  the  buoyancy  of  heart, 
the  vigor  in  action,  of  the  year  1789,  when  the  two  powerful 
principles,  Liberty  and  Nationality,  pulled  together.  Then 
the  human  race  experienced  the  spring  tide  of  achievement. 


24  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

May  it  be  the  lot  of  us,  who  now  toil  through  the  dead  time 
of  the  neap  tides,  to  be  borne  ahead  once  again  on  that 
bounding  flood! 

The  dominance  of  the  national  idea  in  the  early  part  of 
the  French  Revolution  is  obvious  at  many  points.  Very 
significant  is  the  title  assumed  by  the  Tiers  Etat  (Commons) 
of  the  States  General.  That  body,  hitherto  divided  into  three 
distinct  Orders,  had  not  met  during  175  years:  and  the  Com- 
mons desired  to  break  with  the  past.  After  long  deliberations 
as  to  various  cumbrous  titles  that  had  been  proposed,  an 
obscure  member  called  out:  "Assemblee  nationale."  "Yes, 
yes,"  they  all  cried;  and  the  motion  was  carried,  despite  the 
grave  fears  of  Mirabeau  and  others,  who  foresaw  its  destruc- 
tive effect  on  the  monarchy.  The  name,  indeed,  recalled  the 
ambitious  claim  of  Sieyes  in  his  pamphlet  Qu'est-ce  que  le 
Tiers  fctat,  that  the  Commons  formed  the  nation;  the  Com- 
mons (said  he)  furnish  all  the  productive  classes,  from  profes- 
sors to  lacqueys;  therefore  they  are  the  nation.  This  term  he 
denned  thus:  "a  body  of  associates  living  under  a  common 
law  and  represented  by  a  single  legislature."  The  definition 
is  utterly  defective  because  mechanical;  it  would  include 
such  cases  as  the  peoples  of  the  old  Holy  Roman  Empire, 
or  of  the  Indian  Empire  of  to-day  where  there  is  no  real 
unity  of  sentiment.  But  this  cold,  mechanical  definition 
inspirited  the  deputies  of  France  to  seek  for  a  single  legisla- 
ture; and  so  what  had  been  merely  the  unprivileged  Order 
of  the  ancient  States  General  became  the  National  Assembly, 
the  organ  of  the  general  will  (June  17,  1789).  In  vain  did 
Louis  XVI  seek  to  force  the  deputies  back  into  the  three 
distinct  Orders.  In  vain  did  he  declare  that  if  they  could 
not  agree,  he  alone  would  effect  the  welfare  of  his  peoples.  He 
spoke  the  language  of  the  past.  No  longer  were  they  diverse 
peoples  sheltered  by  his  care.  The  thinking  part  of  France 
now  realized  that  the  nation  existed  apart  from  him.  Such, 


VIVE  LA  NATION  25 

too,  was  the  significance  of  the  famous  Tennis  Court  Oath  of 
June  20,  when  the  deputies,  without  a  single  reference  to 
the  King,  swore  never  to  part  until  they  had  made  a  constitu- 
tion. 

The  consequences  of  this  change  of  outlook  were  momen- 
tous. Even  in  the  first  and  very  moderate  draft  of  the  Rights 
of  Man,  which  Mounier  presented  to  the  National  Assembly 
on  July  27,  there  is  this  significant  clause:  "The  principle  of 
complete  sovereignty  resides  essentially  hi  the  nation.  No 
corporation,  no  individual,  can  exercise  authority  which  does 
not  emanate  expressly  from  it." 

The  essence  of  the  Revolution  lies  in  those  words.  They  en- 
throne the  nation  and  dethrone  the  King  of  France.  Thence- 
forth he  becomes  "the  hereditary  representative,"  as  he  is 
often  termed;  while  all  public  bodies  are  subjected  to  the 
nation.  The  Roman  Catholic  Church  is  forced  to  acknowl- 
edge the  supremacy  of  the  State;  and  the  abolition  of  all 
bodies,  like  the  old  Parlements,  which  contest  that  suprem- 
acy, is  a  foregone  conclusion.  With  the  Parlements  vanish 
the  Provinces  and  all  their  local  exemptions  and  rights.  From 
Brittany  to  Provence,  from  French  Flanders  to  Spanish 
Roussillon,  there  is  a  clean  sweep  of  all  the  local  privileges 
which  had  fettered  the  action  of  the  old  monarchy;  and  in 
the  spring  of  1790  France  stood  forth  united,  unshackled,  as 
she  never  had  been.  Against  myriads  of  local  or  social  abuses 
which  had  defied  the  absolute  monarchy,  the  nation  forthwith 
prevailed.  Some  of  its  early  champions  sought  to  moderate 
its  zeal.  Among  them,  Mounier  endeavored  to  arouse  the 
local  feeling  of  Dauphine,  where  he  and  the  provincial  Estates 
had  exercised  a  paramount  influence.  But  now  throughout 
France  there  was  but  one  cry:  "We  are  not  provincials;  we 
are  Frenchmen";  and  before  the  cry  "Vive  la  Nation"  down 
went  all  the  walls  of  privilege  and  local  custom. 

The  resistance  which  Mounier  offered  in  Dauphine  served 


26  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

to  inaugurate  those  federations  of  towns  and  villages  which 
helped  on  the  levelling  process.  The  first  of  these  unions  of 
citizens  with  those  of  neighboring  towns  took  place  at 
Etoile  on  the  Rhone,  in  Dauphine,  in  November,  1789.  There 
the  townsfolk  and  peasants  assembled,  some  12,000  strong, 
fully  armed  as  National  Guards,  and  took  the  following  oath: 
"We,  soldier-citizens  of  both  banks  of  the  Rhone,  fraternally 
assembled  for  the  public  welfare,  swear  before  high  heaven, 
on  our  hearts  and  on  our  weapons  devoted  to  the  defence  of 
the  State,  that  we  will  remain  for  ever  united.  Abjuring  every 
distinction  of  our  provinces  [Languedoc  and  Dauphin6], 
offering  our  arms  and  our  wealth  to  the  fatherland,  for  the 
support  of  the  laws  which  come  from  the  National  Assembly, 
we  swear  to  give  all  possible  succor  to  each  other  to  fulfil 
these  sacred  duties,  and  to  fly  to  the  help  of  our  brothers  of 
Paris,  or  of  any  town  of  France  which  may  be  in  danger,  in 
the  cause  of  liberty."  l  This  episode  is  of  high  significance. 
It  sounded  forth  the  call  to  national  unity  on  behalf  of  the 
peasants  and  small  traders;  and,  throughout  the  next  eight 
months,  similar  federations  of  districts  or  Departments 
helped  to  abolish  provincialism.  The  climax  was  reached  in 
the  national  Festival  of  Federation,  held  in  the  Champ  de 
Mars  on  July  14,  1790.  A  spectator,  the  denationalized 
German  baron,  "Anacharsis"  Clootz,  pointed  the  moral  of 
the  episode  by  a  reference  to  the  mass  meetings  of  Celtic  and 
Frankish  warriors  yearly  held  on  that  spot:  "It  carries  you 
back  two  thousand  years  by  an  indefinable  tone  of  antiquity: 
it  carries  you  forward  two  thousand  years  by  the  rapid 
progress  of  reason,  of  which  this  federation  is  the  precocious 
and  delectable  foretaste."  Certainly  these  federations  helped 
to  brand  on  the  French  the  feeling  of  indissoluble  oneness.  It 
is  easy  to  pass  a  law  for  political  union;  it  is  a  far  more  difficult 
thing  to  secure  a  union  of  hearts.  Our  Union  with  Ireland  in 
1  Hist,  parkmentaire,  IV,  p.  3. 


VIVE  LA  NATION  27 

1801  is  an  example  of  the  former;  the  French  Departmental 
System  of  1790  achieved  the  latter,  because  the  people  them- 
selves at  once  registered  the  edict  of  their  legislators.  Thence- 
forth Celtic  Brittany,  the  half-Flemish  north,  the  half- 
Spanish  Roussillon,  and  almost  wholly  German  Alsace  threw 
in  their  lot  for  ever  with  France. 

Yes,  for  ever.  This  present  war  is  in  part  the  outcome  of 
this  resolve  of  Alsace  and  North-east  Lorraine  to  be  French, 
not  German.  Whether  Germany  might  not  have  won  over 
the  Alsacians  if  her  treatment  had  been  less  brutal  is  an 
open  question.  But  the  outcome  is  that  Alsace  has  never 
been  Germanized,  and  that  a  province,  which  is  almost 
entirely  Teutonic  by  race,  is  still  almost  entirely  French 
at  heart.  It  was  the  magical  influence  of  the  great  idea 
incarnate  in  the  France  of  the  Revolution  which  won  that 
heart  for  the  French  nation. 

One  of  the  distinctive  features  of  those  federations  of 
1790  was  the  exaltation  of  law.  It  is  rather  difficult  in  Eng- 
land to  imagine  rustics  and  small  shopkeepers  assembling 
in  tens  of  thousands  for  the  glorification  of  law.  Generally, 
when  they  assemble  in  large  numbers  it  is  for  the  opposite 
purpose.  But,  when  one  remembers  that  in  France  the  old 
feudal  and  royal  edicts  had  been  the  detested  decrees  of  a 
class  or  of  a  domain,  one  can  see  why  the  populace  hailed  the 
dawn  of  a  regime  of  truly  national  law.  For  by  1790  law 
was  the  same  for  all  classes.  It  had  swept  away  the  dis- 
tinctive Orders.  It  had  abolished  the  old  game  laws,  corvees, 
gabelles,  and  other  means  of  oppression;  and  recently  it  had 
mapped  out  France  in  Departments  and  smaller  self-govern- 
ing areas,  with  nearly  4,300,000  "active"  citizens,  to  whom 
fell  the  duty  of  electing  all  the  officials.  Thus,  law  had  be- 
come what  Rousseau  had  declared  it  ought  to  be,  the  expres- 
sion of  the  general  will.  Therefore  it  occupied  a  place  hi  the 
new  political  trinity.  "The  Nation,  the  King,  the  Law," 


28  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

such  were  the  sacred  entities  in  the  new  Order. — The  Nation, 
the  source  of  all  political  energy;  the  King,  merely  its  first 
officer;  the  Law,  its  channel. 

Every  feeling  that  makes  the  heart  of  man  beat  high 
conspired  to  make  those  federations  scenes  of  inspiration 
and  strength.  They  were  the  social  contracts  of  the  young 
democracy.  Imagine  in  the  square  of  the  town  or  village 
an  altar  of  green  sods  erected  to  la  patrie;  the  patriarch  of 
the  village,  or  else  the  cure,  administers  the  patriotic  oath; 
children  dressed  in  white  are  taught  what  it  means;  and  the 
day  ends  in  dances  and  merry-making.  At  one  village  in 
the  Cevennes,  where  religious  passions  previously  ran  high, 
the  cure  and  the  Protestant  pastor  meet  and  embrace  at 
the  national  altar;  then  the  Roman  Catholics  conduct  the 
Protestants  to  church  and  listen  to  the  pastor's  address; 
next  the  Protestants  conduct  the  others  to  their  church  and 
hear  the  words  of  the  cure. 

On  other  federative  groups  there  descended  the  genius  of 
patriotic  doggerel.  We  read  of  one  occasion  when  the  cure 
composed  verses  on  the  spot  and  also  chanted  a  Hymn  to 
Liberty;  whereupon  the  mayor  felt  moved  to  reply  in  stanzas, 
the  purport  of  which  was  undiscoverable.  Worthy  folk! 
You  typify  French  patriotism  at  its  loftiest  pitch.  Did  fate 
permit  you  to  see  the  ghastly  sequel? 

In  view  of  all  the  scenes  that  followed,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  Thomas  Carlyle  poured  a  douche  of  his  cold  northern 
sarcasm  on  all  that  southern  demonstrativeness.  But,  after 
all,  were  those  federation  festivals  merely  "mighty  fireworks" 
or  a  "grand  theatricality"?  Surely  they  were  something  far 
deeper  than  that.  The  sensitive,  impressionable  Gauls 
need  to  visualize  their  political  creed;  and  they  hold  it  all  the 
more  strongly  for  having  exulted  about  it. 

The  strength  of  the  national  instinct  appeared  in  grim 
guise  when  war  broke  out  between  France  and  the  German 


VIVE  LA  NATION  29 

Powers.  The  causes  of  that  war  do  not  concern  us  here. 
What  concerns  us  is  that  it  was  a  measuring  of  strength 
between  an  armed  nation  on  the  one  side  and  two  artificial 
though  well-disciplined  States  on  the  other.  The  French 
Revolutionists  had  no  doubt  as  to  the  issue.  Hi-armed  and 
drilled  though  they  were,  they  believed  in  their  power  to 
overcome  the  professional  armies  drilled  in  the  school  of 
Eugene  and  Frederick.  Brissot,  the  bellicose  wire-puller  of 
the  Girondin  group,  desired  to  disguise  some  French  soldiers 
near  the  frontier  as  Austrians  to  sack  and  burn  French  vil- 
lages in  order  to  hurry  on  the  rupture;  and  on  a  far  higher 
plane,  Vergniaud,  the  great  Girondin  orator,  appealed  to 
the  National  Assembly  to  commence  a  crusade  which  would 
liberate  other  peoples  still  unfree.  Even  so  moderate  a 
thinker  as  the  Swiss  publicist,  Mallet  du  Pan,  prophesied 
in  the  Mercure  de  France,  in  January,  1792,  that  Austria 
and  Prussia  would  be  defeated  unless  they  could  emblazon 
on  their  banners  the  device,  "the  Charter  of  the  Nations"; 
for  that  alone  could  fitly  oppose  the  watchword  on  the  lips 
of  the  hosts  of  France,  "The  Rights  of  Man."  x  Of  course, 
the  German  Powers  did  not  adopt  Mallet's  advice.  Bruns- 
wick's manifesto,  issued  at  Coblentz  in  deference  to  the 
Emigres,  laid  stress  on  the  restoration  of  royalty  in  France  and 
the  punishment  of  all  rebels. 

This  was  the  first  of  the  many  blunders  of  the  German 
Allies  in  1792-3.  From  the  outset  they  exasperated  French 
national  feeling,  when  their  aim  should  have  been  to  separate 
the  moderates  from  the  extreme  Jacobins  then  in  power  at 
Paris.  They  ruined  the  French  monarchy  which  they  came 
to  rescue;  for  they  identified  the  cause  of  royalty  with  that 
of  the  invaders  who  were  coming  to  partition  France. 

After  the  fall  of  the  French  monarchy,  in  August,  1792, 
the  national  idea  acquired  a  force  never  known  before.  Pre- 
1  Mallet  du  Pan,  Mems.,  I,  249. 


30  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

viously  it  had  been  confused  by  the  lingering  sense  of  devo- 
tion to  the  King  and  Queen.  But,  after  the  overthrow  of 
the  monarchy  the  issue  was  clear.  French  democracy  and 
nationality  were  ranged  against  the  German  invaders  and 
royalism;  and  the  French  were  compelled  to  put  forth  all 
their  strength  and  energy.  In  August  and  September, 
1792,  they  had  practically  no  Government;  the  exchequer 
was  empty;  credit  had  vanished;  and  the  armies  were  for  a 
time  leaderless.  But  it  is  in  such  straits  that  patriotism 
becomes  a  burning  force  that  shrivels  up  quibbling  factions 
and  kindles  boundless  energy.  Only  when  a  nation  is  stripped 
of  all  external  aids  and  is  faced  with  absolute  ruin  does  it 
discover  its  reserves  of  strength.  If  they  are  utilized  in  time 
it  may  encounter  defeats,  but  it  will  not  perish.  The  spirit 
which  then  nerved  France  is  finely  expressed  hi  the  appeal 
of  the  young  poet,  Andre  Chenier:  "All  ye  who  have  a  father- 
land and  know  what  it  means;  ye  for  whom  the  words  'to 
live  free  or  die'  mean  something;  ye  who  have  wives,  children, 
parents,  friends  for  whom  ye  would  conquer  or  die — how  long 
shall  we  speak  of  our  liberty?  .  .  .  Come  forth.  Let  the 
nation  appear." 

It  did  appear — an  armed  nation.  Service  in  the  National 
Guards  had,  from  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution,  been 
one  of  the  recognized  duties  of  citizenship.  No  definite 
decree  declared  it  to  be  either  universal  or  compulsory; 
but  the  Constitution  of  1791  laid  it  down  that  all  "active 
citizens"  were  National  Guards.  The  National  Guards 
were  merely  citizens  called  to  uphold  the  force  of  the  State. 
For  the  present  they  did  not  form  an  organized  force.1  They 
therefore  held  a  rather  indefinite  position.  In  principle 
every  citizen  was  a  soldier;  only  he  was  not  drilled.  Prob- 
ably this  vague  state  of  things  resulted  from  the  conflict  of 
opinion  which  had  broken  out  in  the  National  Assembly 
1  Constitution  of  1791,  ch.  V,  §  4. 


VIVE  LA  NATION  31 

during  the  debates  of  December,  1789,  on  military  service. 
Dubois  Crance,  a  strong  democrat,  insisted  on  universal 
service:  "I  tell  you  that  in  a  nation  which  desires  to  be  free, 
which  is  surrounded  by  powerful  neighbors  and  harassed 
by  factions,  every  citizen  ought  to  be  a  soldier,  and  every 
soldier  a  citizen,  if  France  is  not  to  be  utterly  annihilated.  .  .  . 
How  is  it  possible  to  make  a  man  march  forth  to  battle  whose 
indolence  has  driven  him  into  the  ranks  .  .  .  who  in  fact 
has  sold  his  liberty  for  a  price,  side  by  side  with  the  man  who 
has  taken  up  arms  to  defend  liberty?  ...  It  is  necessary 
to  establish  a  truly  national  conscription,  which  should  in- 
clude every  one  from  the  second  man  in  the  Kingdom  down 
to  the  last  active  citizen."  The  Due  de  Liancourt,  Mira- 
beau,  and  others  resisted  this  proposal  as  contrary  to  the 
principles  of  liberty  and  of  the  Rights  of  Man,  besides  being 
prejudicial  to  a  complex  industrial  society;  and  the  Assembly 
decided  in  favor  of  voluntary  enlistment  for  the  regular 
army;  but  it  did  not  impose  any  rule  respecting  the  National 
Guards.1 

When  war  seemed  imminent  in  the  early  part  of  1792 
many  thousands  of  National  Guards  volunteered  for  service 
at  the  front  to  fill  up  the  gaps  in  the  regular  army  caused 
by  desertion.  Consequently  the  armed  forces  of  France  were 
in  a  chaotic  state  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  with  the  Ger- 
man Powers.  Great  efforts  were  made  in  July,  1792,  to 
attract  more  volunteers.  The  alarm  gun  on  the  Pont  Neuf 
was  fired  once  an  hour.  Bands  paraded  the  streets.  Speeches 
were  delivered  at  the  recruiting  tents;  and  thousands  of 
patriotic  youths  at  once  enlisted.  If  we  may  credit  the  very 
critical  estimate  of  von  Sybel,  these  efforts  produced  little 
result.  He  says  that  only  60,000  recruits  were  forthcoming 

1  Jung,  Dubois-Crancg,  I,  pp.  16-28,  quoted  by  Morse  Stephens, 
French  Rev.,  I,  383;  Procts  Verbaux  de  I'Assemblee  Nationale,  IX,  X,  Dec. 
12  and  16. 


32  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

between  July  n  and  September  20.  It  is  also  well  known 
that  the  French  success  at  Vahny  was  decided  by  the  steadi- 
ness of  the  troops  of  the  old  royal  army,  and  still  more  by  the 
timidity  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  who  never  pressed  home 
his  attack. 

All  this  may  be  granted;  and  the  admissions  somewhat 
dun  the  glamor  of  those  days.  Yet  it  is  undeniable  that 
the  enthusiasm  which  the  volunteers  brought  to  the  front 
was  a  weighty  factor  in  determining  the  issue  on  the  hill 
of  Vahny.  All  the  life  and  energy  were  on  the  side  of  the 
French.  Experience  and  mechanical  discipline  were  ranged 
under  the  banners  of  Prussia;  and  in  the  few  moments  when 
the  issue  seemed  doubtful  the  mighty  shout  of  "Vive  la 
Nation"  rooted  the  French  to  the  earth  and  carried  doubt 
and  dismay  to  the  hearts  of  the  invaders.  Well  might  Goethe, 
who  was  present  at  the  German  headquarters,  declare  that 
that  day  inaugurated  a  new  epoch  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  That  was  true.  It  inaugurated  the  era  of  militant 
democracy. 

Subsequent  events  served  to  dull  democracy  and  quicken 
militancy.  The  contrast  between  the  political  chaos  at 
Paris  and  the  conquering  march  of  the  French  into  Holland, 
Germany,  and  Italy  was  so  sharp  as  to  become  a  grave 
danger  to  an  impressionable  people.  Unable  to  achieve 
political  liberty  at  home,  they  overpowered  all  opposition 
abroad;  and  thus  the  very  men  who  had  hailed  the  war  of 
1792  as  a  crusade  on  behalf  of  the  liberty  of  enslaved  peoples 
were  soon  drawn  into  methods  inconsistent  with  their  polit- 
ical principles.  In  the  constitution  of  1791  they  declared 
solemnly  that  the  French  nation  would  never  undertake  a 
war  for  the  sake  of  making  conquests.  Yet  the  constitution 
of  1795  declared  that  all  lands  up  to  the  Rhine  and  the 
Alps  were  thenceforth  an  integral  part  of  France.  This 
solemn  declaration,  that  France  intended  to  fight  on  until 


VIVE  LA  NATION  33 

she  gained  her  "natural  limits,"  was  an  event  of  sinister  im- 
port, preluding  two  decades  of  war;  for  Waterloo  was  the 
final  retort  to  the  French  claim  for  the  Rhine  and  Alps. 

How  are  we  to  explain  that  extravagant  claim?  In  part, 
of  course,  by  that  luckless  statement  of  Caesar  that  those 
were  the  boundaries  of  Gaul.  But  the  new  Gospel  of  Nature 
here  reinforced  the  old  Caesarism.  Rousseau  in  his  essay, 
"A  Treaty  of  Perpetual  Peace,"  urged  that  natural  features, 
such  as  mountains  and  rivers,  seemed  to  mark  out  the  bounds 
of  the  nations  of  Europe;  and  (he  added)  "one  may  say  that 
the  political  order  of  this  part  of  the  world  is  in  certain  re- 
spects the  work  of  nature."  This  incautious  utterance  of 
the  master,  which  subordinated  men's  feelings  to  the  lie  of 
the  land,  was  exceedingly  useful  to  his  followers.  In  Novem- 
ber, 1792,  when  the  French  desired  to  annex  Savoy,  Bishop 
Gregoire,  in  his  report  on  that  topic,  made  use  of  similar 
arguments.  As  a  certain  number  of  Savoyards  petitioned 
for  union  with  France,  he  insisted  that  this  was  their  universal 
desire;  and  he  then  stated  that  "the  order  of  Nature  would 
be  contravened  if  their  Government  was  not  identical  [with 
ours]."  The  turn  of  the  Belgians  came  next,  early  in  1793. 
As  for  the  Germans  of  the  Rhineland,  they  were  not  consulted 
at  all.  And  thus  it  came  about  that  the  national  impulse 
in  France,  which  up  to  1791  promised  to  link  all  free  peoples 
in  a  friendly  federation,  soon  degenerated  into  a  warlike  and 
aggressive  impulse,  the  parent  of  rapine  abroad  and  of 
Caesarism  in  France  herself. 


LECTURE  III 
SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE 

"The  first  original  and  truly  natural  frontiers  of  States  are  un- 
questionably their  spiritual  frontiers." — FICHTE,  Addresses  to  the 
German  Nation,  No.  XII. 

IT  is  difficult  now  to  realize  the  divisions  and  helplessness 
of  Germany  in  the  eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  centuries. 
Split  up  into  some  three  hundred  different  domains,  for 
which  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  provided  no  effective  bond 
of  union;  distracted,  too,  by  the  endless  rivalry  of  the  chief 
States,  Austria  and  Prussia,  the  Germans  seemed  doomed 
to  subservience  to  their  better  organized  neighbors.  The 
energizing  and  new  grouping  of  these  torpid  fragments  was 
the  greatest  political  event  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Before  its  commencement,  there  was  no  desire  for  close 
union  on  a  national  basis.  The  ideals  of  the  leaders  of  Ger- 
man thought  were  international.  Very  characteristic  are 
the  words  penned  by  the  philosopher  Kant,  at  Konigsberg, 
in  his  tractate,  Perpetual  Peace,  1795.  "If  Fortune  ordains 
that  a  powerful  and  enlightened  people  should  form  a  Re- 
public— which  by  its  very  nature  is  inclined  to  perpetual 
peace — this  would  serve  as  a  centre  of  federal  union  for 
other  States  wishing  to  join,  and  thus  secure  conditions  of 
freedom  among  the  States  in  accordance  with  the  idea  of  the 
law  of  nations." 

In  that  passage  Kant  expressed  the  aspirations  of  his  age 
for  a  federative  and  pacific  union  of  nations.  The  idea  had 
been  cherished  hi  France  among  the  more  reasonable  of  the 
Girondins,  and  found  expression  in  the  hope  that  neighbor- 

34 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  35 

ing  States  would  form  Republics  which  would  link  on  to 
France  and  gradually  extend  the  bounds  of  liberty.  The 
German  thinker  warmly  adopted  this  programme  and  in- 
cluded it  among  the  conditions  conducive  to  the  abolition  of 
war.  If  it  had  come  about,  the  world  would  have  taken  a 
long  stride  forward  towards  the  international  ideal.  In  that 
case  France  would  have  passed  quickly  through  the  national 
phase,  impelled  onwards  towards  a  far  loftier  ideal,  that  of 
ministering  to  the  needs  of  humanity  at  large.  The  years 
1791-2  formed,  perhaps,  the  most  favorable  opportunity 
in  that  direction  that  the  world  has  ever  known.  For  at  that 
time  Europe  was  in  a  transition  stage.  With  the  exception 
of  England  and  France,  the  peoples  had  not  yet  awakened 
to  full  political  consciousness.  True,  they  had  thrilled  at  the 
news  of  the  French  Revolution;  but  the  first  message  that 
it  sent  forth  from  Paris  was  international.  The  motto — 
"Liberty,  Equality,  Fraternity" — was  for  all  peoples  on 
equal  terms;  and  all  seemed  likely  to  press  forward  to  the 
goal,  without  the  jostling  which  Nationalism  soon  engen- 
dered. In  1792-4  there  was  a  chance  that  the  Germans  of 
the  Rhineland  would  accept  the  French  connection,  if  it 
were  really  fraternal  and  not  too  paternal.  At  first  the 
German  reformers  fraternized  with  the  French  troops.  That 
eminent  savant,  Forster  of  Mainz,  went  up  to  some  French 
National  Guards  then  in  garrison  in  his  city,  and  exclaimed — 
"Long  live  the  Republic!"  to  which  there  came  the  dis- 
couraging reply,  "She  will  live  very  well  without  you." 

The  incident  is  characteristic  of  the  superiority  then 
affected  by  the  French  over  the  divided  and  benighted 
Germans.  That  feeling  had  long  permeated  the  Parisian 
factions  that  desired  a  war  of  propaganda.  So  far  back  as 
October,  1791,  the  first  leader  of  the  Girondins,  that  rest- 
less wire-puller,  Brissot,  had  attacked  the  German  Powers 
in  the  most  provocative  terms,  and  his  colleague,  Isnard, 


36  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

fired  off  the  following  salvos  on  November  29:  "A  people 
in  a  state  of  revolution  is  invincible.  .  .  .  Let  us  tell  Europe 
that,  if  the  Cabinets  engage  the  Kings  in  a  war  against  the 
peoples,  we  will  engage  the  peoples  in  a  war  against  the 
Kings" — this,  too,  at  a  time  when  the  Austrian  and  Prus- 
sian monarchs  had  withdrawn  their  former  veiled  threats 
of  intervention,  to  which,  indeed,  they  had  scant  means 
of  giving  effect.  Central  and  Southern  Europe  were  so 
wretchedly  weak  that  the  foremost  publicist  of  the  time, 
Mallet  du  Pan,  wrote  thus  of  the  chances  of  a  successful 
attack  by  France:  "Divided  into  a  multitude  of  separate 
governments,  Europe  offers  few  bases  for  a  common  resist- 
ance, and  the  first  great  nation  which  changes  the  face  of 
society  has  to  fear  only  dissociated  units."  l 

The  words  are  a  remarkable  forecast  of  the  collapse  of  the 
old  order  before  the  new;  and  the  sequel  was  to  show  the 
peril  that  besets  wars  of  propaganda.  Lofty  though  the 
motives  of  the  crusaders  may  be  at  the  outset,  they  are 
apt  speedily  to  degenerate  under  the  lure  of  conquest.  A 
strong  nation  which  overruns  weak  States  will  in  the  process 
reveal  the  truth  of  the  farseeing  remark  of  Montesquieu, 
that,  if  a  Republic  subdues  other  peoples,  its  own  liberty  is 
endangered  by  the  authority  which  it  entrusts  to  its  generals 
and  proconsuls.  In  the  campaigns  of  1793-9  France  tri- 
umphed too  easily.  Her  profoundly  national  system  too 
speedily  upset  the  European  equilibrium;  and  in  the  process 
the  liberator  merged  into  the  mere  conqueror.  The  results 
were  soon  felt  by  the  "liberated"  Germans  of  the  Rhine- 
land.  The  fraternal  embracings  of  the  first  few  days  soon 
gave  place  to  exactions,  confiscations,  forced  loans,  even  to 
plunder.  The  irreligious  customs  of  the  French  troops  com- 
pleted the  work  of  disillusionment;  and  when  those  harpies, 
the  military  contractors,  flew  on  the  spoil,  the  Germans 
1  Mallet  du  Pan,  Mtms.,  I,  251. 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  37 

experienced  all  the  miseries  of  the  conquered.  All  the  salaried 
posts  in  the  new  administration  were  given  to  French  offi- 
cials, often  of  a  very  corrupt  type.  The  soldiery  bettered 
their  example,  until,  in  1799,  a  Rhinelander  complained 
that  everybody  concealed  money  and  valuables  in  order  to 
save  something  from  the  orgies  of  plunder.  In  the  five 
years  after  the  French  occupation  of  1794-5  exactions 
amounting  to  £6,000,000  were  wrung  from  the  Rhineland; 
and  there  was  a  general  regret  for  the  earlier  time  of  undis- 
turbed slumber  under  equally  somnolent  translucencies 
and  abbesses. 

The  change  of  tone  in  German  literature  between  1789 
and  1799  is  remarkable.  In  August,  1789,  the  Swabian  poet, 
Schubart,  had  extolled  the  felicity  of  the  Germans  in  Alsace, 
who  shared  hi  the  blessings  of  the  French  Revolution,  while 
behind  them  (i.  e.  in  Germany)  cracked  the  whip  of  the 
despot.  But,  after  the  French  conquest  of  the  Rhineland, 
references  to  France  and  to  her  Revolution  become  cold  and 
critical.  In  the  writings  of  Goethe  there  are  comparatively 
few  references  to  the  public  sentiment  of  the  time;  for,  as 
he  explained  in  Wahrheit  und  Dichtung  (anno  1775),  "Our 
object  was  to  get  to  know  man;  we  were  content  to  let  people 
in  general  go  their  own  way."  This  aloofness  from  the  aims 
and  strivings  of  the  masses  is  a  noteworthy  feature  of  Goethe's 
character.  It  probably  explains  his  indifference  to  the  strug- 
gles of  his  countrymen  against  Napoleon,  which  sometimes 
has  been  ascribed  to  want  of  patriotism.  That  charge  is 
unjust;  for  there  are  persons  so  constituted  as  to  be  unable 
to  take  interest  in  the  collective  activities  of  mankind.  In 
their  eyes  the  soul  of  man  is  the  only  study  of  any  worth. 
The  strivings  of  the  many  weary  or  disgust  them.  They 
are  interested  in  the  problems  of  the  individual  life;  but 
popular  movements,  whether  present  or  past,  leave  them  cold. 
Such  was  the  cast  of  Browning's  mind.  Though  he  lived  in 


38  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

the  midst  of  the  most  romantic  of  national  movements,  that 
of  Italy,  he  has  left  no  poem  inspired  by  it;  whereas  Mrs. 
Browning,  who  possessed  the  collective  sense,  has  left  many 
such  poems.  Goethe,  like  Browning,  lacked  that  sympathy 
with  the  masses,  which  every  ardent  reformer  and  patriot 
must  possess.  Such  minds  do  not  vibrate  responsive  to  the 
appeal  of  the  many  in  the  present,  or  to  that  appeal  from  the 
past,  which  is  the  very  soul  of  history. 

In  Goethe's  writings,  as  in  those  of  Browning,  there  are 
only  scattered  references  to  public  affairs.  But  in  Hermann 
und  Dorothea  (1797)  there  is  this  passage:  "The  man  who, 
in  a  tottering  age,  is  unsteady  in  character  only  increases  the 
evil  and  spreads  it  further  and  further.  ...  It  is  not  for 
the  Germans  to  carry  on  the  terrible  Revolution,  and  to 
waver  hither  and  thither."  The  words  show  that  Goethe, 
for  all  his  cosmopolitan  leanings,  cherished  little  hope  for 
liberation  by  France.  In  his  opinion  the  revolutionary 
movement  had  gone  astray;  and  mankind  could  hope  for 
improvement  only  by  the  steady  development  of  all  that 
was  best  in  the  leading  nations. 

The  disillusionment  comes  out  most  clearly  in  the  works 
of  Schiller.  His  sensitive  spirit  thrilled  responsive  to  the 
collective  impulses  of  his  time.  Indeed,  his  works  form  a 
mirror  of  the  age.  His  first  play,  The  Robbers  (1779),  pro- 
duced in  his  twentieth  year,  belongs  to  the  poetry  of  revolt. 
Animated  by  his  defiance  of  law  and  custom,  all  spirited 
German  students  then  dreamt  of  overthrowing  the  petty 
tyrannies  around  them — a  topic  portrayed  in  The  Robbers 
with  school-boy  extravagance.  Later  on,  when  for  a  tune 
he  quitted  the  drama  for  the  domain  of  history,  his  thoughts 
still  turned  towards  topics  of  rebellion.  His  Revolt  of  the 
Netherlands  and  Thirty  Years'  War  deal  with  upheavals  that 
affected  many  peoples.  It  is  the  downfall  of  tyranny,  the 
progress  of  mankind  in  its  sterner  experiences,  that  interested 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  39 

Schiller.  Like  Lessing  and  many  other  German  thinkers  of 
that  age,  he  was  not  a  national  patriot;  he  was  a  cosmopolitan. 
Those  leaders  in  thought  and  literature  did  not  belong  to 
Jena,  Wolfenbiittel,  Weimar;  they  belonged  to  the  world  at 
large;  and  their  thoughts  touched  the  imagination  in  spheres 
far  removed  from  the  ducal  or  electoral  States  in  which  they 
were  conceived.  Those  writers,  cramped  though  their  sur- 
roundings were,  gave  to  the  world  a  literature  no  less  universal 
than  that  of  Voltaire,  Diderot,  and  the  Encyclopaedists.  How 
strange,  that  those  giants  of  the  eighteenth  century  should 
have  prided  themselves  on  the  effacement  of  national  bound- 
aries at  the  time  when  the  political  convulsion  partly  brought 
about  by  their  teaching  was  destined  to  parcel  out  the  peoples 
in  distinct  and  hostile  groups! 

As  an  example  of  Schiller's  contempt  for  a  merely  na- 
tional patriotism,  take  this  fine  passage  from  one  of  his 
letters,  dealing  with  the  aim  which  the  historian  ought  to  set 
before  him.  It  was  written  in  1789,  shortly  after  he  became 
Professor  of  History  at  Jena: — 

"This  is  the  problem;  to  choose  and  arrange  your  materials, 
so  that,  in  order  to  interest,  they  shall  not  have  the  need  of  decora- 
tion. We  moderns  have  a  source  of  interest  at  our  disposal  which 
no  Greek  or  Roman  was  acquainted  with,  and  which  the  patriotic 
interest  does  not  nearly  equal.  This  last,  in  general,  is  chiefly  of 
importance  for  unripe  nations,  for  the  youth  of  the  world.  But 
we  may  excite  a  very  different  sort  of  interest  if  we  represent  each 
remarkable  occurrence  that  happened  to  men  as  being  of  impor- 
tance to  man.  It  is  a  poor  and  little  aim  to  write  for  one  nation; 
a  philosophic  spirit  cannot  tolerate  such  limits,  cannot  bound  its 
views  to  a  form  of  human  nature  so  arbitrary,  fluctuating,  acciden- 
tal. The  most  powerful  nation  is  but  a  fragment;  and  thinking 
minds  will  not  grow  warm  on  its  account,  except  in  so  far  as  this 
nation  or  its  fortunes  have  exercised  influence  on  the  progress  of 
the  species." 


40  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

"Arbitrary,  fluctuating,  accidental";  these  terms  well  de- 
scribe the  life  of  the  average  German  State — a  mere  atom  in 
a  kaleidoscope.  How  could  one  feel  much  enthusiasm  about 
Wiirtemberg,  Anhalt,  or  the  little  county  of  Limburg-Styrum, 
with  its  standing  army  of  six  officers  and  two  privates!  Yet 
it  was  in  some  of  those  pigmy  societies  that  the  human  mind 
took  its  loftiest  flights;  and  it  is  open  to  question  whether 
small  States,  the  life  of  which  is  homely  and  the  burdens  light, 
do  not  favor  the  growth  of  the  intellect  far  better  than  the 
enormous  aggregations  of  the  present,  with  their  vast  and 
diffuse  aims,  their  complex  problems,  and  the  crushing  load 
of  taxation  and  military  service.  Contrast  the  cast-iron 
philosophy  and  brassy  literature  of  modern  Germany  with 
that  of  the  quaint  and  kindly  age  which  witnessed  the  birth 
every  year  of  some  masterpiece  ennobling  the  life  of  the  little 
town.  Which  is  the  greater  Germany?  That  of  Goethe  or 
that  of  Wilhelm  II? 

A  figure  equally  typical  of  the  serene  cosmopolitanism  of 
old  Germany  is  the  philosopher  Fichte  (1762-1814).  We  are 
concerned  now  only  with  his  ideas  on  national  development; 
but  in  a  later  lecture  I  shall  return  to  his  theory  of  the  State, 
which  contains  much  that  is  questionable,  even  dangerous. 
Here  I  wish  to  point  out  the  contrast  between  his  earlier 
and  later  teachings  in  reference  to  the  German  polity.  The 
most  important  work  of  his  earlier  period  is  the  series  of 
lectures  entitled  "Characteristics  of  the  Present  Age,"  which 
he  delivered  to  a  general  audience  at  Berlin  in  1804-5.  The 
lectures  are  remarkable  for  their  complete  neglect  of  the 
principle  of  nationality,  though  revolutionary  France  was 
largely  the  product  of  that  potent  force.  Fichte  discourses 
at  large  on  the  human  race  as  a  whole.  He  asks:  What  is 
the  plan  of  the  world?  What  is  the  fundamental  idea  of 
human  We  viewed  collectively?  In  Lecture  I  he  defines  it 
thus:  "The  End  of  the  life  of  mankind  on  earth  is  this — that 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  41 

in  this  life  they  may  order  all  their  relations  with  freedom 
according  to  reason."  l  Stated  with  Anglo-Saxon  bluntness, 
this  means  that  Reason  is  to  rule  in  human  affairs,  and  that 
men  ought  to  be  free  to  choose  the  methods  by  which  they 
act  reasonably.  Everywhere  in  his  lectures  he  considers 
Europe  as  a  whole.  There  is  no  need  to  follow  him  in  his 
tedious  mapping-out  of  the  different  ages  of  human  history, 
except  to  notice  his  conviction,  that  the  world  was  then  in 
the  third  age — that  of  liberation  from  external  authority. 
He  declares  the  age  to  be  one  of  unrestrained  licence  and 
selfishness;  but  he  hopes  that  the  race  will  ultimately  win 
its  way  back  to  justification  and  sanctification.  In  all  his 
tedious  disquisition  there  is  no  sign  that  he  perceives  the 
force  of  national  differences  and  of  the  diverse  parts  which 
different  nations  may  have  to  play.  With  serene  indifference 
to  such  distinctions,  he  assumes  that  somehow  mankind  will 
move,  or  be  moved,  onward  through  the  five  cycles.  In 
Lecture  XIV  he  says:  "The  Christian  Europeans  are  essen- 
tially but  one  people;  they  recognize  this  common  Europe 
as  their  one  true  Fatherland;  and,  from  one  end  of  it  to  the 
other,  pursue  nearly  the  same  purposes  and  are  ever  actuated 
by  similar  motives."  The  statement  proves  how  blind  cos- 
mopolitan philosophers  can  be  to  disagreeable  facts.  En- 
closing themselves  in  their  own  theories,  and  confusing  what 
is  with  what  ought  to  be,  minds  of  that  order  often  construct 
a  world  of  their  own,  and  rail  at  persons  who  remind  them 
of  the  existence  of  the  world  of  actualities.  Fichte,  in  his 
earlier  phase,  was  one  of  these  philosophizing  spiders,  living 
in  a  web  which  he  had  evolved  from  his  inner  consciousness, 
and  calling  it  the  world.  Consider  the  facts.  Napoleon 
had  overrun  Hanover  and  the  Kingdom  of  Naples  in  the 
endeavor  to  beat  down  the  British  Power.  He  had  turned 
Germany  upside  down  with  his  Secularizations,  and  the  war 
1  Fichte,  Characteristics  of  the  Present  Age  (Eng.  Transl.,  p.  5). 


42  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

was  clearly  about  to  become  world- wide;  for  Russia  and 
Austria  were  arming  against  the  great  Emperor,  who  reck- 
lessly defied  them.  Yet  Fichte  says  that  all  Christian  peo- 
ples recognize  Europe  as  their  common  Fatherland,  are  pur- 
suing nearly  the  same  purposes,  and  are  actuated  by  similar 
motives. 

Elsewhere,  however,  he  admits  that  these  Christian  States 
are  striving  perpetually  for  supremacy.  Sometimes  one 
prevails:  then  another;  and  (says  Fichte)  the  truly  enlight- 
ened man  will  always  owe  allegiance  to  the  one  which  pre- 
vails— a  startling  touch  of  worldly  prudence.  Only  the 
earth-born  souls  will  remain  citizens  of  the  fallen  State, 
recognizing  their  Fatherland  in  its  soil,  and  rivers  and  moun- 
tains, which  is  all  they  desire.  But  "the  sun-like  Spirit, 
irresistibly  attracted,  will  whig  its  way  wherever  there  is 
Light  and  Liberty.  And  in  this  cosmopolitan  frame  of 
mind  we  may  look  with  perfect  serenity  on  the  actions  and 
the  fate  of  Nations,  for  ourselves  and  our  successors,  even  to 
the  end  of  Tune." 

This  theory,  if  translated  into  practice,  works  out  thus: 
If  Prussia  prevails  over  Austria,  all  enlightened  Germans 
will  transfer  their  allegiance  to  her.  If  France  prevails 
over  Prussia,  these  neo-Prussians  will  become  Frenchmen 
at  heart.  If  France  falls,  and  there  ensues  a  complete 
Balance  of  Power  these  political  chameleons  will  run  about 
distracted,  seeking  in  vain  for  a  predominant  color.  Was 
Fichte's  fluid  cosmopolitanism  the  outcome  of  despair  at 
Germany's  helplessness  and  of  Napoleon's  omnipotence?  Or 
did  he  share  Goethe's  conviction  as  to  the  need  of  renovation 
by  "the  new  Charlemagne"?  It  is  difficult  to  say.  One 
thing  alone  is  clear,  his  utter  indifference  to  the  claims  of 
country.  Whether  France,  Prussia,  or  Austria  gained  the 
supremacy  was  nothing  to  him. 

No!    The  national  idea  in  Germany  was  first  set  forth 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  43 

by  a  man  who  dealt,  not  with  abstractions  but  realities,  not 
with  States  but  peoples.  While  Fichte  was  groping  his  way 
through  these  hazy  abstractions,  a  poet  and  historian  found 
his  way  to  firm  ground.  Schiller  gave  to  the  world  Wilhelm 
Tett  (1804). 

He  designed  it  as  "a  national  drama,  in  sympathy  with 
all  the  liberal  tendencies  of  the  age."  I  believe  that  he 
hoped  to  stir  up  a  truly  German  feeling,  and  thus  stay  the 
dry-rot  that  was  creeping  into  the  life  of  his  people.  With 
the  insight  of  a  poet  he  had  long  noted  the  strength  of  pa- 
triotism. The  national  revival  of  France,  effected  by  the 
Maid  of  Orleans,  had  inspired  his  drama  on  that  subject; 
and  in  1803-4  he  turned  his  thoughts  towards  the  German 
Swiss  of  the  Forest  Cantons.  The  inner  meaning  of  the 
play  lies  in  the  conflict  between  the  free  mountaineers  of  the 
Ur-Cantonen  and  the  greed  and  usurpation  of  the  House 
of  Hapsburg.  True,  the  human  interest  of  the  story  centres 
in  the  character  and  action  of  the  legendary  hero,  Tell. 
The  drama  must  have  heroes,  not  heroic  abstractions;  and 
Tell  is  a  fine  specimen  of  the  Swiss  mountaineer,  frank, 
generous,  unsuspicious,  no  meddler  in  politics,  and  slow  to 
act  against  recognized  authority.  He  is  the  central  figure  of 
the  drama;  but  he  is  not  the  moving  spirit  of  its  action.  That 
spirit  is  the  instinct  of  the  people.  Outraged  by  the  bar- 
barities of  the  Hapsburg  soldiery,  that  instinct  asserts  itself 
at  first  in  saving  this  or  that  defender  of  his  home;  further 
than  this  Tell  will  not  go.  He  represents  the  average  good- 
natured  mountaineer,  who  will  save  an  individual,  but 
does  not  understand  political  action,  so  that  he  is  reproached 
for  his  want  of  fervor  in  the  common  cause.  In  fact,  the 
instinct  of  the  people  wells  forth  most  fully  in  the  person 
of  a  woman.  Gertrud  is  the  moving  influence  of  the  piece. 
While  her  husband,  Werner  Stauffacher,  seems  likely  to 
endure  tamely  all  the  threats  and  insolence  of  the  Hapsburg 


44  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

officers,  she  counsels  resistance;  and  when  he  speaks  of 
the  horrors  of  war  she  replies: — 

"Look  forward,  Werner,  not  behind  you,  now." 

When  again  he  reminds  her  of  the  nameless  fate  that  may 
befall  her,  she  utters  these  lofty  words: — 

"None  are  so  weak,  but  one  last  choice  is  left. 
A  leap  from  yonder  bridge,  and  I  am  free." 

Spurred  to  action  by  his  wife's  heroism,  Stauffacher  takes 
counsel  with  other  men  of  Unterwalden;  and  they  resolve 
to  assemble  on  the  Rutli  rock  above  the  Lake  of  Lucerne, 
meeting  there  the  men  of  Schywtz  and  Uri.  In  that  primeval 
solitude,  and  under  cover  of  night,  they  assemble  to  renew 
the  ancient  bond  of  union  between  the  three  cantons.  Acts 
of  brutal  tyranny  by  the  minions  of  Austria  now  bring  to- 
gether men  long  sundered  in  times  of  peace.  They  listen  as 
Stauffacher  unfolds  to  them  the  story  of  their  Germanic 
parentage;  how,  driven  forth  by  famine  from  the  northern 
plain,  their  forefathers  forced  a  way  into  the  Swiss  mountains 
and  made  them  homes  in  diverse  valleys;  yet  ever  were  they 
mindful  of  their  Switzer  origin.  Now,  against  Hapsburg 
usurpation  they  must  make  common  cause,  not  only  as  free 
Switzers,  but  also  as  loyal  sons  of  the  old  Germanic  Empire. 
Before  they  swear  to  resist  Austria's  novel  claims,  a  priest, 
Rosselmann,  steps  into  the  ring  and  urges  them,  for  the  sake 
of  peace  and  quietness,  to  give  way  before  Austria.  One 
and  all,  they  scout  the  proposal  as  that  of  a  traitor;  and 
they  pass  this  decree: — 

"Whoe'er 

Shall  talk  of  tamely  bearing  Austria's  yoke, 
Let  him  be  stripped  of  all  his  rights  and  honors; 
And  no  man  hence  receive  him  at  his  hearth." 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  45 

After  this  drastic  treatment  of  the  pacifist  case,  they  pro- 
ceed to  renew  their  bond  of  union: — 

"We  swear  to  be  a  nation  of  true  brothers, 
Never  to  part  in  danger  or  in  death." 

(They  swear,  with  three  fingers  raised.) 
"We  swear  we  will  be  free  as  were  our  sires, 
And  sooner  die  than  live  in  slavery." 

(They  swear,  as  before.) 

What  is  this  but  a  Social  Contract  in  a  poetical  setting? 
Schiller  had  been  an  enthusiastic  student  of  Rousseau;  and 
he  believed  firmly  in  the  formation  of  political  societies  by 
the  action  of  the  people,  which  would  necessarily  lead  to 
liberty  and  harmony.  The  States  thus  formed  would  be 
strong  and  stable,  far  different  from  the  artificial  areas  ruled 
over  by  German  princelings.  The  new  Germanic  State  or 
States  would  guarantee  the  welfare  of  Germans  and  keep 
at  arm's  length  the  aggressor.  The  tone  of  the  drama  is 
throughout  intensely  German.  The  last  scenes  reveal  the 
peasants  free,  united,  and  happy,  while  the  House  of  Haps- 
burg  is  rent  asunder  by  revolt  and  by  the  murder  of  its 
chief. 

The  moral  of  it  all  is  clear.  Schiller  appeals  to  his  country- 
men to  forget  their  miserable  divisions  which  have  left  them 
a  prey  to  the  aggressions  of  Napoleon.  He  seems  to  say  to 
the  Germans  of  his  day:  "Will  you  not  forget  your  absurd 
differences?  Will  you  not  join  hands  across  the  political 
barriers,  and  unite  for  the  defence  of  your  honor  and  your 
dearest  interests?  Only  so  can  you  save  the  Fatherland  from 
subjection  to  an  insolent  usurper.  Your  princes  cannot,  or 
will  not,  save  you.  Your  own  right  hands,  your  own  good 
sense,  must  save  you  from  servitude  to  the  foreigner." 

This,  surely,  is  the  inner  meaning  of  the  drama.  It  de- 
scribes the  birth  of  a  nation,  and  as  such  it  is  regarded  by 


46  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

all  Switzers.  They  look  back  to  the  scene  on  the  Riitli  rock 
as  the  beginning  of  their  political  life.  Whether  that  event 
is  historical,  or  semi-historical,  or  legendary  is  of  small  ac- 
count. Even  if  it  be  legendary,  it  has  exerted  upon  the 
fortunes  of  Switzerland  an  influence  more  important  than 
that  of  cartloads  of  documents  of  unimpeachable  authen- 
ticity. It  is  one  of  those  episodes  which  make  the  heart  of  a 
people  beat  fast  with  pride  and  hope.  In  the  Swiss  House 
of  Parliament  at  Berne  the  Riitli  scene  has  been  painted 
large  on  the  wall  behind  the  President's  chair.  In  that  Parlia- 
ment there  are  men  who  speak  French,  German,  and  Italian; 
but  the  feeling  of  unity  aroused  by  the  contemplation  of  that 
scene  transcends  mere  diversities  of  tongue,  and  merges  the 
fragments  of  those  now  warring  peoples  in  a  fervidly  Swiss 
nationality,  which  bids  fair  to  outlast  even  the  divulsive 
influences  of  this  war.1  It  is  true  that  the  strain  just  now  on 
Swiss  nationality  is  very  severe;  and  the  sharp  tension  which 
prevails  between  the  German  and  the  Latin  portions  reveals 
the  strength  of  the  tie  of  language.  But  here  lies  the  interest 
of  the  case  of  Switzerland.  The  Swiss  cherish  a  collective 
sentiment  which  far  transcends  race  and  language,  a  senti- 
ment springing  from  pride  in  a  glorious  past  and  love  of  the 
mountains  around  which  they  cluster.  The  Swiss  will,  I 
believe,  remain  a  nation,  and  will  not  merge  into  the  three 
great  peoples  that  surround  them.  Their  keen  historic  sense, 
their  romantic  attachment  to  their  mountains  and  rivers, 
will  keep  them  united.  In  this  respect  they  are  the  "earth- 
born  souls"  at  whom  Fichte  scoffed;  and  this  clinging  to  the 
soil,  this  pride  in  their  achievements,  will,  I  venture  to  say, 
help  to  keep  Switzerland  a  united  whole.  In  this  sense  the 

1  Count  Mamiani,  Rights  of  Nations  [Eng.  edit.,  1860],  p.  44,  says  that 
the  Swiss  are  not  "in  the  ordinary  sense  properly  a  nation."  This  I 
deny.  For,  as  I  shall  show,  in  Lecture  VIII,  it  is  sentiment  and  will, 
not  language,  that  make  a  nation. 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  47 

legend  of  Wilhelm  Tell,  and  the  presentment  of  it  by  Schiller, 
form  a  national  asset  of  priceless  worth. 

For  Germany,  too,  Wilhelm  Tell  soon  became  preeminently 
the  national  drama.  The  instinct  of  the  people  caught  at 
the  truth  which  was  there  enshrined.  Thenceforth  Na- 
poleon was  regarded  as  the  national  enemy,  and  union  against 
him  as  the  paramount  duty  of  all.  The  patriotic  songs  in 
this  and  others  of  Schiller's  dramas  inspired  thousands  of 
youths  who  went  gladly  into  the  almost  hopeless  struggle 
against  the  great  Emperor.  As  was  finely  said  at  a  meeting 
in  memory  of  Schiller:  "Thousands  who  trembled  not  when 
the  earth  groaned  with  the  weight  of  the  despot's  mailed 
cavalry;  men  who  with  fearless  hearts  confronted  the  thunder 
of  his  artillery  ...  all  carried  with  them  into  the  struggle 
the  enthusiasm  kindled  by  Schiller's  poetry;  his  songs  were 
on  their  lips,  and  his  spirit  fought  with  them." 

During  the  years  1805-11  that  struggle  brought  nothing 
but  disaster  to  the  opponents  of  Napoleon.  The  organized 
might  of  the  French  Empire  seemed  likely  to  overbear  the 
rest  of  Europe;  and  if  one  investigates  the  causes  of  this 
superiority,  they  appear  to  be  these:  France  was  the  only 
great  nation  completely  permeated  with  the  new  national 
spirit,  and  also  thoroughly  organized  for  war.  The  British 
and  Spanish  peoples  were  patriotic,  but  were  ill-organized, 
while  in  Napoleon  France  found  the  most  ruthlessly  efficient 
organizer  of  all  time.  The  other  European  States  were  in  a 
chaotic  condition.  Austria  was  a  house  of  cards;  Prussia 
was  little  better;  Russia  was  honeycombed  by  corruption. 
In  fact,  after  the  death  of  Pitt  and  the  dismissal  of  Stein, 
Napoleon  was  confronted  by  mere  mediocrities  both  in  the 
Cabinet  and  in  the  field.  Or,  to  sum  up,  the  new  national 
spirit,  born  in  and  after  1804,  was  a  mere  infant  of  days  by 
comparison  with  the  splendid  adolescence  of  France.  The 
experiences  of  those  terrible  years  prove  that  the  justice  of 


48  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

a  cause  is  of  little  avail  unless  that  cause  .adapts  itself  to  the 
needs  of  the  time.  If  the  work  of  adaptation  be  slowly  and 
inefficiently  carried  out,  the  peoples  that  are  at  fault  will 
suffer  for  their  sins  of  omission.  One  of  the  sternest  lessons 
of  history  is  that  inefficient  and  slipshod  work,  even  if  it 
be  in  the  best  of  causes,  must  bring  disaster.  Peoples  are 
punished  for  slackness  and  inertia  as  much  as  they  are  for 
positive  crimes.  So  it  was  with  England,  Spam,  and  Prussia 
in  the  years  1804-12.  Until  they  found  out  Wellington, 
Scharnhorst,  Gneisenau,  and  Bliicher,  all  the  lofty  aspira- 
tions and  enthusiasms  were  of  little  avail. 

Out  of  the  darkness  of  despair  that  brooded  over  Prussia 
after  the  disaster  of  Jena,  one  voice  sounded  forth  in  words 
of  inspiration  and  hope.  When  she  lay  under  the  heel  of 
Napoleon;  when  Berlin  and  all  Prussian  cities  were  garrisoned 
by  French  troops,  Fichte's  easy  cosmopolitanism  fell  from 
him.  Like  all  noble  natures,  his  was  not  convinced  by  con- 
quest. In  those  dark  days  he  found  that  he  could  not  trans- 
fer his  allegiance  from  Berlin  to  Paris,  though  Paris  was 
incontestably  supreme,  and  Berlin  seemed  to  have  gone 
under  for  ever.  Even  before  the  campaign  of  Jena  he  ad- 
dressed the  Prussian  army  in  glowing  terms;  and  when  it 
streamed  away  eastwards  towards  the  Vistula  and  Niemen 
in  utter  rout,  his  patriotic  feelings  deepened,  as  will  those  of 
all  true  men  and  women  in  time  of  anxiety  or  disaster.  Then 
it  was  that  he  discovered  cosmopolitanism  to  be  only  a  fair- 
weather  creed.  After  the  Peace  of  Tilsit,  when  Prussia  lost 
half  her  lands  and  all  her  prestige,  Fichte  stood  forth  at 
Berlin,  and,  within  sound  of  the  drums  of  the  French  garri- 
son, deh'vered  his  "Addresses  to  the  German  Nation."  They 
purported  to  be  a  continuation  of  the  lectures  given  in  1804-5 ; 
but  they  breathe  an  utterly  different  spirit.  For  in  the  in- 
terval the  idea  of  nationality  laid  hold  of  the  popular  imagina- 
tion; and  now,  too,  when  the  fabric  of  the  Prussian  State 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  49 

had  fallen  in  ruin,  Fichte  saw  the  German  nation.  Pre- 
viously he  had  discoursed  about  States:  now  his  theme  was 
far  more  definite,  more  human.  In  face  of  the  Napoleonic 
ascendancy,  what  were  Prussia  and  Austria,  Saxony  and 
Bavaria?  As  those  miserable  divisions  had  invited  disaster, 
so,  too,  a  close  union  might  bring  salvation.  The  topic  was 
dangerous,  as  Fichte  was  well  aware:  "I  know  the  risk  (so 
he  wrote  to  Beyme  in  January,  1808).  I  know  that  a  bullet 
may  strike  me  down  as  well  as  Palm.1  But  that  is  not  what 
I  fear;  and,  for  the  aim  which  I  have  in  view,  I  too  would 
gladly  die." 

His  aim  was  to  convince  Germans  everywhere  that  their 
present  ruin  was  due  to  selfishness.  Egotism  had  divided 
them  up  into  myriads  of  petty  States  and  kept  them  divided; 
so  that,  what  with  political  barriers  and  class  divisions,  they 
never  caught  a  glimpse  of  wide  and  generous  aims.  He  called 
his  age  the  age  of  giant  selfishness,  which  had  developed  to 
the  utmost  on  all  sides  and  was  about  to  destroy  itself.  The 
description  is  apt  if  applied  to  Germany;  for,  if  the  Germany 
of  that  tune  was  the  result  of  petty  selfishness,  Napoleon  was 
also  the  incarnation  of  colossal  acquisitiveness.  In  the  game 
of  grab,  into  which  European  politics  had  degenerated  since 
the  accession  of  Frederick  the  Great,  all  trust  and  confidence 
had  vanished,  and  thus  the  great  robber-baron  beyond  the 
Rhine  was  able  to  prey  on  the  thieving  knights  and  footpads  of 
Germany.  As  yet  there  was  no  sign  of  effective  union;  for 
how  can  there  be  a  firm  union  among  thieves?  Fichte  was 
correct  in  his  diagnosis  of  the  disease  which  paralyzed  Europe 
in  1804-7.  Egotism  and  greed  had  made  of  it  mere  political 
rubble,  and  the  cement  of  public  confidence  was  nowhere  to 
be  found.  Distrust  must  give  way  to  trust  (said  Fichte); 
the  old  jealousy  between  German  States  must  vanish  in 

1  Palm,  a  Niirnberg  bookseller,  was  shot  by  Napoleon's  order  for  the 
crime  of  selling  a  patriotic  pamphlet. 


SO  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

view  of  the  urgency  of  their  universal  interests;  in  place  of 
the  class  feeling,  which  had  weakened  Prussia,  there  must 
arise  a  national  feeling,  based  on  the  perception  of  kindred 
aims  and  duties.  Selfishness  (said  he)  is  self -destructive;  for, 
when  it  has  run  its  full  course,  no  firm  foundation  is  left. 
That  vice  had  ruined  Germany.  How  must  she  be  recon- 
structed? 

Fichte's  answer  is  not  altogether  clear.  It  does  not  sound 
forth  with  the  trumpet  tones  of  conviction  by  which  Mazzini 
thrilled  Italy  hi  the  thirties.  The  German  philosopher  had  not 
the  abounding  faith  and  enthusiasm  of  the  Italian  prophet. 
Further,  he  was  hampered  by  the  endeavor  to  express  every- 
thing in  abstract  terms,  while  Mazzini  spoke  straight  to  the 
heart  of  the  people.  The  cloudiness  of  Fichte's  views  also  re- 
sulted from  his  being  a  pioneer  of  thought  in  this  direction — 
witness  his  definition  of  a  nation  (Lecture  VI) — "A  nation  is 
the  whole  community  of  persons  living  in  social  intercourse, 
ever  propagating  itself  in  a  natural  manner,  and  existing 
collectively  under  a  certain  special  law  of  the  development  of 
the  divine  out  of  it." 

This  nebulous  circumlocution  in  no  sense  advances  our 
knowledge  of  the  subject;  and  it  must  be  confessed  that  the 
Addresses  are  often  both  dull  and  confused.  Especially  tire- 
some are  Lectures  IV- VII,  which  demonstrate  the  Germanic 
nature  of  the  Germans  with  an  iteration  that  seems  wholly 
needless  to-day,  however  much  it  was  needful  then  to  awaken 
their  dormant  national  sentiment.  After  these  digressions 
Fichte's  narrative  straightens  and  broadens.  Very  effective 
is  the  reference  to  the  ancient  Germans,  who  refused  to  face 
the  possibility  of  being  Romanized  and  were  resolved  at  all 
costs  to  order  their  lives  hi  their  own  way.  Coming  to  the 
present  he  lifts  the  idea  of  the  nation  to  an  eminence  whence 
it  may  radiate  hope  to  the  myriads  of  Germans  who  had 
vegetated  in  little  States,  one  and  all  now  subject  to  Napoleon. 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  51 

The  following  passage  in  Lecture  VIII  must  have  been  a 
revelation  to  all  who  could  grasp  its  meaning: — 

"Nation  and  Fatherland  in  this  sense,  as  bearer  of  and  securer 
for  immortality  in  this  world,  and  as  that  which  alone  here  below 
can  be  eternal,  far  transcend  the  State  in  the  usual  sense  of  that 
term.  .  .  .  This  [the  State]  aims  only  at  security  of  rights,  internal 
peace,  a  livelihood  to  everyone,  and  preservation  of  material  exist- 
ence during  Heaven's  pleasure  by  means  of  toil.  All  this  is  only 
the  means,  condition,  preparation  for  that  which  patriotism  essen- 
tially aims  at,  the  blossoming  of  the  eternal  and  divine  in  the  world. 
For  that  very  reason,  as  being  the  supreme,  final,  and  independent 
authority,  must  govern  the  State  itself,  while  limiting  it  in  the 
choice  of  means  for  its  next  object,  internal  peace.  With  this  object 
in  view,  the  natural  freedom  of  the  individual  must  be  restricted 
in  many  ways;  and,  if  one  has  no  other  intention  and  ami  than  this, 
it  would  be  well  to  restrict  it  within  the  narrowest  limits  possible." 

Idealism  here  tails  off  into  realism.  Fichte's  celestial  arc 
ends  in  a  Prussian  drill-yard.  In  later  passages  he  insists  on 
the  need  of  conscription  and  the  drastic  restriction  of  in- 
dividual liberty.  Of  course,  there  were  powerful  motives 
why  he  should  urge  the  claims  of  Fatherland.  It  had  been 
ruined  by  individual  selfishness,  both  of  princes  and  classes. 
Now,  says  Fichte,  all  Germans  must  think  first  of  the  nation 
and  of  the  duties  which  they  owe  to  it.  No  longer  must  they 
shift  their  responsibilities  on  to  someone  else.  Every  man 
must  realize  his  duty  and  perform  it  manfully.  For  this 
purpose  he  will  nerve  himself  by  catching  a  glimpse  of  what 
the  future  may  bring  to  the  German  nation.  He  will  resolve 
that  the  Fatherland  shall  be  absolutely  independent  of  alien 
rule.  Just  as  the  eye  can  be  trained  to  feel  disgust  at  dirt 
and  disorder,  so,  too,  the  political  vision  of  Germans  can  be 
quickened  until  they  will  reject  all  thought  of  subjection  to 
the  foreigner.  In  order  to  fire  them  with  the  heroism  neces- 


52  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

sary  for  driving  out  the  French,  Fichte  faces  the  problem  of 
the  motive  power  dormant  in  the  will  of  man.  How  shall 
the  ordinary  citizen  be  nerved  to  the  self-abandonment  that 
can  accomplish  wonders  of  bravery?  That  is  the  problem. 
Evidently,  no  ordinary  motive  will  suffice.  Or,  to  quote  his 
words:  "Not  the  spirit  of  quiet  civic  obedience  to  the  con- 
stitution and  the  laws.  No;  but  the  burning  flame  of  the 
higher  patriotism  which  conceives  the  nation  as  the  embodi- 
ment of  the  eternal,  to  which  the  high-minded  man  joyfully 
devotes  himself;  while  the  base-minded  man,  who  only  exists 
for  the  other,  must  be  compelled  to  devote  himself." 

Developing  this  thought,  Fichte  seeks  to  fortify  the  hero- 
ism, even  of  the  high-minded  man,  by  the  following  inspiring 
thought.  Such  an  one  will  prize  his  nation  above  all  else; 
for  it  is  only  the  nation  which  can  assure  the  continuity  of  his 
work.  He  will  value  his  lif e,  not  for  the  sake  of  mere  existence, 
but  for  the  amount  of  work  which  he  can  accomplish;  and, 
as  the  nation  is  the  guardian  of  that  work  and  its  guarantor 
for  the  future,  he  will  value  its  safety  far  above  his  own.  For 
the  nation,  then,  he  will  gladly  lay  down  his  life,  so  that, 
as  far  as  in  him  lies,  he  may  assure  the  survival  of  the  larger 
life  which  alone  lends  significance  to  his  own.1  The  thought 
is  like  that  which  Kipling,  by  a  flash  of  genius,  has  enshrined 
in  one  glorious  line: — 

"Who  dies  if  England  lives?" 

It  is  obvious  that  Fichte's  doctrine  as  to  the  absolute 
sovereignty  of  the  nation  over  the  lives  of  all  its  members 
was  and  is  liable  to  great  abuse.  Fichte's  glowing  words 
must  not  blind  us  to  the  risk  of  entrusting  the  nation  for  ever 
with  unlimited  powers  of  life  and  death.2  Noble  though  his 

1  Fichte,  Lecture  VIII. 

2  See  Lord  Acton's  remarks  [Essays  on  Liberty,  p.  228]  on  the  Machi- 
avellian traits  in  Fichte's  teaching. 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  53 

theory  may  be  when  the  question  is  of  expelling  the  foreigner, 
it  becomes  pestilential  when  that  task  is  achieved,  and  the 
nation  of  death-defying  heroes  look  forth  upon  less  redoubt- 
able neighbors.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  was  the  temptation 
that  lured  Revolutionary  France  into  wars  of  conquest.  A 
similar  temptation  has  lured  the  Germany  of  William  I 
into  the  mad  ways  of  William  II. 

In  the  tune  of  Fichte  the  only  question  was  that  of  regain- 
ing the  independence  of  Germany.  But  how  was  it  to  be 
regained?  Not  by  force;  that  was  impossible  when  the  French 
held  all  the  fortresses.  By  moral  means,  then, — says  Fichte 
(Lectures  IX-XI) — by  education;  for  that  is  the  only  domain 
in  which  Napoleon  leaves  the  Germans  free.  The  philosopher 
points  out  that  in  many  respects  German  education  has  been 
utterly  defective.  It  has  been  narrow  and  uninspiring;  it 
has  left  its  pupils  cold  and  selfish;  so  that,  despite  all  the 
teaching,  they  have  not  followed  its  higher  precepts  and 
warnings,  but  have  gone  on  following  the  impulses  of  their 
own  natural  selfishness.  Hitherto  education  has  neither 
instructed  nor  inspired.  But  its  true  function  is  to  inspire. 
The  true  educator  will  not  be  satisfied  with  instructing.  He 
will  seek  to  uplift  the  moral  nature  of  his  students.  He  will 
set  forth  so  glowing  a  picture  of  the  ideal  life  that,  before  it, 
cold  selfishness  will  melt  away.  The  moral  order  of  the  uni- 
verse will  appear  in  so  radiant  a  vision  that  the  petty  egotism 
of  the  individual  will  vanish.  And  not  only  the  wealthy 
and  middle  classes  are  to  be  thus  inspired.  All  classes  will 
be  influenced  by  the  wider  and  nobler  education  of  the  future. 
"We  desire  to  inspire  Germans  by  a  feeling  of  unity  which 
may  throb  through  all  their  limbs."  At  this  point,  as  he 
catches  a  vision  of  what  a  better  training  may  effect,  he  doffs 
his  academic  stiffness  and  exclaims  in  the  inspired  words  of 
Ezekiel:  "Come  from  the  four  winds,  O  breath,  and  breathe 
upon  these  slain,  that  they  may  live.  So  I  prophesied,  as  He 


54  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

commanded  me;  and  the  breath  came  into  them,  and  they 
lived,  and  stood  up  upon  their  feet,  an  exceeding  great  army." 

As  to  the  educational  methods  to  be  adopted,  Fichte 
strongly  recommended  those  of  the  Swiss  reformer,  Pestalozzi. 
They  were  adopted,  and,  after  the  infusion  of  German 
method,  they  were  found  to  be  of  great  service.  Elementary 
education,  therefore,  received  an  impetus  of  great  value  in 
Prussia;  and  this  development,  together  with  the  reforms  of 
Stein,  Scharnhorst,  and  Hardenberg,  laid  the  basis  for  the 
healthier  polity  of  the  future.  In  the  academic  sphere  equal 
progress  was  made  by  the  establishment  of  the  thoroughly 
national  Universities  of  Berlin  and  Breslau  (1809-11).  An 
enlightened  patriotism  watched  over  them  from  the  start. 
The  King  gave  a  royal  palace  so  that  Berlin  might  have 
suitable  University  buildings;  and  from  the  nearly  bankrupt 
Treasury  150,000  dollars  a  year  were  awarded  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  new  institution.  Hitherto,  for  the  most  part, 
German  Universities  had  existed  in  small  towns  remote  from 
political  life;  and  in  them  there  was  evolved  the  type  of  pro- 
fessor depicted  by  Carlyle  in  the  person  of  Diogenes  Teu- 
felsdrockh,  Professor  of  Things  in  General  in  the  University 
of  Weissnichtwo.  Readers  of  Sartor  Resartus  will  remember 
that  Teuf elsdrockh  in  the  early  part  of  his  career  was  mainly 
occupied  with  the  cognate  employments, — "to  think  and 
smoke  tobacco."  These  led  him  only  to  the  Everlasting 
No.  But  in  lucid  intervals  he  gradually  fought  his  way 
towards  the  Everlasting  Yes — "The  chief  end  of  life  is  not 
thought  but  action.  .  .  .  Up!  Up!  Whatsoever  thy  hand 
findeth  to  do,  do  it  with  thy  might." 

This  surprising  change  mirrors  that  which  came  over  the 
life  of  Germany  in  the  decade  1804  to  1813.  The  time  of 
divisions,  of  sloth,  of  pleasurable  self-seeking  passed  away; 
and  in  its  place  there  came  a  time  marked  by  terrible  suffering 
and  poverty,  but  irradiated  by  the  noblest  deeds  of  self- 


SCHILLER  AND  FICHTE  55 

sacrifice  and  heroism.  For  the  most  inspired  poet  and 
philosopher  had  spoken  to  that  people  in  words  that  burned. 
Schiller  showed  what  the  heroism  of  unlettered  mountaineers 
could  effect  in  a  great  and  inspiring  cause.  Fichte,  too,  after 
emerging  from  dreamland,  came  out  into  the  world  of  reality 
and  helped  to  lead  his  countrymen  thither.  Emerging  from 
their  holes  and  corners,  they  discovered  their  essential  one- 
ness; and,  as  happened  to  Frenchmen  twenty  years  earlier, 
the  uplif  t  from  a  narrow  provincialism  to  a  sense  of  national- 
ity endowed  them  with  a  buoyancy  and  vigor  never  known 
before.  Arndt,  Korner,  and  others  composed  national  songs 
that  stirred  the  blood;  and  from  the  Universities  there  came 
professors  and  students,  resolved  to  win  the  freedom  and 
independence  which  Fichte's  glowing  words  had  made  an 
essential  of  life.  He,  too,  formerly  so  unpractical,  sealed  the 
new  doctrine  with  his  life-blood;  for  he  died  of  a  fever  caught 
while  his  wife  and  he  tended  the  wounded  in  hospital — an 
episode  as  significant  as  any  in  the  drama  of  the  War  of 
Liberation. 


LECTURE  IV 
THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING 

"  C'est  de  PEspagne  que  1'Europe  apprit  que  Napoleon  pouvait 
etre  vaincu,  et  comme  il  pouvait  1'etre." — TALLEYKAND,  Mtmoires, 
I,  389- 

THE  rising  of  the  German  people  against  Napoleon  in  1813 
is  for  ever  memorable,  not  only  for  a  heroism  finally  crowned 
with  well-merited  triumph,  but  also  for  the  work  of  intellec- 
tual and  moral  preparation,  which  endowed  their  national 
movement  with  solid  backing  and  permanent  results.  On 
turning  our  thoughts  towards  the  Spanish  Peninsula  we  are 
conscious  of  an  entire  change  of  conditions,  both  external  and 
internal.  The  Spaniards  are  sometimes  reproached  with 
having  drawn  from  that  same  time  of  testing,  the  years  1808- 
13,  none  of  the  beneficent  influences  that  renewed  and  en- 
riched the  life  of  the  German  nation.  To  explain  the  causes  of 
this  divergence  is  one  of  my  aims  in  this  lecture. 

Firstly,  Germany  held  an  honored  place  in  the  intel- 
lectual movement  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Her  leading 
men,  even  some  of  her  rulers,  were  in  full  sympathy  with 
"Illuminism,"  which  promised  peacefully  to  banish  ignorance 
and  to  make  of  mankind  one  happy  family.  They  welcomed 
the  French  Revolution;  and  only  after  the  perversion  of  its 
aims  did  Teuton  and  Gaul  come  into  serious  conflict.  Even 
when  racial  animosities  were  embittered  by  the  Napoleonic 
occupation,  the  leaders  of  thought  in  Germany  continued 
their  efforts,  albeit  with  aims  that  were  distinctly  national, 
not  international  as  of  yore.  Consequently,  eighteenth- 

56 


THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING  57 

century  culture  did  much  to  invigorate  the  new  life  of  Central 
Europe. 

Far  different  was  the  condition  of  Spain.  She  had  stood 
apart  from  the  intellectual  movement,  which  found  exponents 
among  a  mere  handful  of  her  sons.  Consequently  there  were 
no  influential  groups  of  savants,  no  inspiring  traditions,  on 
which  the  Spanish  revival  could  be  based;  and,  as  we  shall 
see,  the  strange  shifts  to  which  their  patriots  were  reduced 
prevented  any  well-considered  plan  of  action. 

Of  all  these  difficulties  the  fundamental  cause  was  the 
aloofness  of  Spain  from  Europe.  Her  aloofness  explains 
not  only  her  intellectual  separation,  but  also  her  exclusive 
nationalism.  The  divergence  of  her  interests  from  those 
of  her  neighbors  is  due  to  her  insularity.  Though  seas 
connect,  mountains  divide;  and  the  Pyrenees  form  the  most 
rigid  barrier  in  Europe.  No  land-power  has  much  influenced 
the  life  of  Spain,  because  no  land-power  has  ever  been  able 
to  control  it  for  long.  In  the  Dark  Ages  conquerors  from  the 
North,  Vandals  and  Visigoths,  swept  over  and  even  tried  to 
hold  the  Peninsula.  But  the  effort  of  the  latter  people  to 
rule  it  from  Toulouse  broke  down,  just  as  a  similar  attempt  of 
Charlemagne  broke  down.  The  rugged  and  impervious 
barrier  of  the  Pyrenees  accounts  for  the  failure.  Spam  either 
defied  her  would-be  conquerors  from  the  North,  or  else  she 
absorbed  them. 

On  the  other  hand,  her  Mediterranean  coasts  almost 
invite  the  invader;  and  she  was  in  succession  all  but  subdued 
by  Carthaginians,  Romans,  and  Moors.  But  there  again,  as 
Livy  remarked,  the  extremes  of  climate,  the  barren  plateau 
in  the  interior,  and  the  wonderful  tenacity  of  the  Spaniards  in 
defending  their  towns  rendered  complete  conquest  almost 
impossible.  The  Moors,  even  at  the  height  of  their  power, 
never  crushed  the  defenders  of  the  northern  fastnesses,  who 
little  by  little  pushed  back  the  invaders,  and  in  the  process 


58  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

fashioned  the  national  character  to  its  extremes  of  valor, 
bigotry,  and  pride.  Later  on,  the  French  monarchs  were  to 
experience  the  toughness  of  the  Spanish  nature,  and  Henri  IV 
summed  up  their  enterprises  in  the  phrase:  "In  Spain  small 
armies  will  be  beaten,  large  armies  will  starve."  The  mem- 
ories of  conquest  of  the  New  World  and  of  invincibility  in 
their  own  peninsula  stiffened  the  neck  of  the  Spaniards  even 
in  the  days  of  their  decline.  Robert  Southey,  during  his 
travels  in  Spain  in  1794-5,  relates  that  a  Spanish  manufac- 
turer who  had  sought  to  introduce  wheelbarrows  into  his 
works  could  not  persuade  his  men  to  use  them.  All  kinds  of 
vehicles  were  meant  for  beasts  of  burden,  not  for  Spaniards! 
The  experience  of  the  Italian  poet,  Alfieri,  was  the  same.  He 
declared  the  Spaniards  to  be  the  only  people  of  Europe 
"possessed  of  sufficient  energy  to  struggle  against  foreign 
usurpation." 

Such  was  the  people  whom  Napoleon  sought  to  harness 
to  his  conqueror's  car.  In  the  encyclopaedic  studies  of  his 
youth  there  is  a  serious  gap.  Nowhere  does  he  seem  to  have 
studied  national  character.  It  was  one  of  the  defects  of 
eighteenth-century  thought  to  ignore  differences  of  race. 
Man  was  considered  as  man;  and,  though  Rousseau  echoed 
some  of  the  cautions  which  Montesquieu  had  given  forth  as 
to  those  differences,  the  French  Revolutionists  paid  little 
heed;  and  Napoleon  certainly  erred  in  assuming  that  men 
would  in  general  respond  to  the  same  appeals.  In  his  official 
correspondence  is  included  one  letter  (dated  March  28,  1808) 
which  cautions  Murat  against  ignoring  the  national  energy  of 
the  Spaniards;  but  that  letter  is  a  later  invention.  In  the 
genuine  letters  there  appear  no  signs  even  of  ordinary  cau- 
tion, as  to  the  risk  of  provoking  the  Spaniards.  So  far  as  we 
can  judge,  Napoleon  shared  the  belief,  common  in  France 
since  the  days  of  Choiseul,  that  they  were  a  decadent  people, 
negligible  as  a  political  force. 


THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING  59 

This  extreme  confidence  was,  perhaps,  natural  after  his 
conquest  of  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia  in  the  campaigns 
of  1805-7.  England  had  blundered  badly  on  land;  and 
the  Emperor  hoped,  by  means  of  the  new  Russian  alliance, 
and  thanks  to  the  enforced  assistance  of  the  Spanish  navy, 
to  reverse  the  victory  of  Trafalgar  and  overthrow  even  her 
naval  power.  Spain,  then,  he  regarded  as  a  tool  in  the  world- 
wide strife.  Early  hi  March,  1808,  when  Barcelona  was 
scarcely  held  down  by  the  troops  of  General  Duhesme,  the 
Emperor  wrote  to  Murat:  "There  is  no  discontent  whatever 
at  Barcelona.  General  Duhesme  is  a  gossip.  ...  On  the 
whole,  the  people  are  well  disposed,  and  when  we  have  the 
citadel,  we  have  everything."  Napoleon  was  then  at  Paris. 
He  had  never  been  hi  Spain;  yet  he  claimed  to  know  about  the 
Spaniards  better  than  the  French  generals  then  in  that  coun- 
try. On  April  26,  while  at  Bayonne,  he  wrote  to  Murat,  at 
Madrid:  "It  is  tune  for  you  to  show  fitting  energy.  I  expect 
you  will  not  spare  the  Madrid  mob,  if  it  stirs,  and  that  you 
will  have  it  disarmed  immediately."  On  April  29  he  wrote  to 
the  Tsar  Alexander  I:  "These  family  quarrels  [those  of 
Charles  IV  of  Spain  with  the  Heir  Apparent,  Ferdinand] 
cause  me  some  trouble;  but  I  will  soon  be  free  to  arrange  the 
great  affair  with  Your  Majesty."  [The  "great  affair"  was 
the  partition  of  Turkey,  in  which  the  Spanish  fleet  was  to  be 
serviceable.]  After  Murat's  troops  had  shot  down  hundreds 
of  the  men  of  Madrid  hi  the  patriotic  rising  of  May  2,  the 
Emperor  complimented  him  on  his  energy,  and  announced 
to  him  the  signature  of  a  treaty  with  the  senile  Charles  IV 
at  Bayonne,  whereby  the  latter  resigned  to  him  (Napoleon) 
all  rights  to  the  throne  of  Spam.  The  Estates  of  Spain 
would  assemble  at  Bayonne  to  take  suitable  measures!  All 
the  genuine  letters  of  the  time  show  no  sign  of  apprehension  of 
a  national  rising  in  Spain.  They  are  those  of  a  general  who 
believes  that  he  has  that  people  by  the  throat.  Because 


60  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

French  troops  occupy  Madrid,  Barcelona,  all  the  chief 
northern  fortresses,  and  those  of  Portugal;  because  also  very 
many  of  the  Spanish  troops  are  absent  either  in  Portugal  or 
in  Holstein,  he  deems  the  Spanish  problem  at  an  end.  For 
him  Spain  is  the  royal  family,  the  Court,  the  grandees  who 
form  the  Estates.  If  he  can  bully  the  rightful  successor, 
Ferdinand,  into  a  renunciation  of  his  rights;  if  he  can  intern 
in  France  both  Charles  IV  and  Ferdinand;  if  he  can  cajole  the 
Spanish  grandees  into  a  recognition  of  his  own  claims — then 
he  is  master  of  Spain. 

He  left  out  of  count  one  all-important  factor — the  nation. 
So  soon  as  the  astounding  news  from  Bayonne  became  known, 
every  town,  every  province  of  Spain  rejected  his  sover- 
eignty with  scorn  and  loathing.  In  vain  did  Charles  and 
Ferdinand  advise  submission  to  the  usurper; *  in  vain  did 
the  Junta,  composed  of  the  leading  men  of  Madrid,  inculcate 
the  duty  of  obeying  the  new  ruler;  in  vain  did  the  Holy 
Inquisition  preach  the  same  degrading  course;  in  vain  did 
responsible  persons  and  thinkers  point  out  the  madness  of 
opposing  the  master  of  the  Continent.  The  people  rejected 
the  counsels  of  authority,  religion,  experience,  and  reform. 
With  an  impulse  which  was  both  furious  and  sustained,  both 
local  and  universal,  they  rushed  at  the  French  forces  and 
reduced  them  suddenly  to  the  defensive.  District  by  dis- 
trict, province  by  province,  they  rose  separately,  yet  with 
astounding  unanimity.  The  rising  did  not  begin  in  Madrid; 
for  the  turbulent  in  that  city  had  been  cowed  by  the  cannon 
and  cavalry  of  Murat.  How  the  same  thought  or  instinct 
laid  hold  of  the  whole  of  Spain  within  a  few  days  is  a  mystery. 
The  episode  reminds  us  of  the  incalculable  forces  which  now 
and  again  have  aroused  the  tribes  of  Arabia  or  of  the  Soudan 
to  united  action.  Indeed,  the  Spanish  Rising  is  a  recurrence 
to  the  ways  of  primitive  man,  or  at  least  of  the  mediaeval 
1  Ann.  Register  [1808],  p.  214. 


THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING  61 

levies  when  the  faithful  mustered  to  fight  the  Moors.  Then, 
as  in  1808,  the  impulse  was  general,  yet  the  action  was 
provincial.  Above  all,  it  was  action  by  the  populace.  In 
many  places  those  who  had  advised  submission  to  the  French 
were  butchered  without  mercy,  and  patriotic  Juntas  were 
chosen  by  acclamation  to  arrange  for  the  defence  of  each 
province. 

Especially  noteworthy  was  the  action  of  that  of  Asturias. 
That  little  province  of  the  North-West  was  the  first  to  or- 
ganize a  Junta  which  took  decisive  action.  With  splendid 
audacity  that  single  Junta  declared  war  against  Napoleon; 
and  those  who  notice  the  connection  of  the  instinct  of  na- 
tionality with  the  historic  sense  will  remember  that  in  the 
long  warfare  against  the  Moors,  Asturias  had  been  the  last 
hope  of  Spanish  freedom.  Now  it  was  to  be  the  first  hope  of 
the  coming  national  independence.  That  Junta  took  an- 
other important  step.  It  despatched  two  deputies  to  London 
to  beg  help  from  the  British  people.  Legally,  Spam  was  at 
war  with  us,  as  she  had  been  since  1804.  But  Asturias 
recked  little  of  legality  at  such  a  time.  Neither  did  our  great 
statesman,  Canning.  The  warm  welcome  accorded  by  our 
people  to  the  Asturian  deputies  revealed  to  him  as  by  a  flash 
the  change  that  had  just  come  over  the  spirit  of  the  age. 
Hitherto  (as  Sheridan  finely  said)  "Bonaparte  had  run  a 
victorious  race  because  he  had  contended  against  princes 
without  dignity,  ministers  without  wisdom,  and  countries 
where  the  people  were  indifferent  as  to  his  success."  Clearly 
a  new  age  had  dawned  when  a  provincial  Council  dared  to 
throw  down  the  gauntlet  to  the  great  Emperor. 

I  have  failed  to  find  in  the  British  archives  an  account 
either  of  Canning's  interview  with  the  two  delegates  or 
of  the  Cabinet  meeting  where  the  decision  was  formed  to 
help  the  Spanish  people.  It  must  have  been  formed  very 
quickly;  for  on  June  15  Canning  spoke  as  follows  in  the 


62  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

House  of  Commons:  "We  shall  proceed  upon  the  prin- 
ciple that  any  nation  of  Europe  that  starts  up  to  oppose  a 
Power,  .  .  .  the  common  enemy  of  all  nations,  whatever  be 
the  existing  political  relations  of  that  nation,  it  becomes  in- 
stantly our  essential  Ally."  In  pursuance  of  this  definitely 
national  policy,  Great  Britain  on  July  4  ordered  the  cessation 
of  hostilities  with  Spain;  and  there  ensued  an  informal  but 
binding  alliance  with  the  Spanish  people.  There  was  an 
inner  fitness  in  this  compact;  for  it  bound  together  the  only 
States  which  then  were  conterminous  with  nations.  Na- 
poleonic France  had  far  outleaped  her  natural  bounds. 
The  British  and  Spanish  peoples  now  undertook  to  restrain 
her  within  just  limits;  and  the  potency  of  the  national  im- 
pulse is  seen  in  the  rally  of  every  people  in  Europe  to  their 
side  in  the  years  1812-14. 

The  Anglo-Spanish  Alliance  is,  therefore,  a  turning  point 
in  the  long  struggle  against  Napoleon.  Up  to  the  year  1807 
he  had  embodied  the  genius  and  strength  of  Revolutionary 
France;  and  her  strength  (at  once  democratic  and  national) 
far  exceeded  that  of  the  torpid  and  artificial  States  around 
her.  But  now,  from  motives  of  ambition,  he  went  out  of 
his  way  to  interfere  with  a  people  that  only  asked  to  be 
left  alone;  and  his  conduct  aroused  in  it  a  hatred  that  noth- 
ing could  quench.  Consequently,  the  national  impulse, 
which  had  helped  France  to  overthrow  the  moribund  States 
of  Italy  and  Germany,  now  began  to  operate  against  her; 
and  even  the  military  genius  of  Napoleon  could  not  make 
up  for  the  downward  drag  which  this  fatal  incubus  entailed. 
No  campaigns  were  so  much  detested  by  the  French  sol- 
diery as  those  in  Spam;  and  that,  not  so  much  because  they 
had  to  face  Wellington  and  the  Spanish  climate,  as  on  ac- 
count of  the  savage  hatred  which  they  encountered  from 
the  Spaniards  themselves.  The  outcome  of  that  hatred 
will  appear  in  the  following  passages,  taken  from  the  first 


THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING  63 

Proclamation  of  the  Supreme  Junta.  After  recounting 
some  successes  of  the  Spaniards  and  advising  a  war  of  par- 
tisans, the  appeal  thus  refers  to  the  memory  of  the  glorious 
past. 

"France  has  never  domineered  over  us,  nor  set  her  foot  in  our 
territory.  We  have  many  times  mastered  her,  not  by  deceit,  but 
by  force  of  arms;  we  have  made  her  Kings  prisoners,  and  we  have 
made  that  nation  tremble;  we  are  the  same  Spaniards;  and  France 
and  Europe  and  the  world  shall  see  that  we  are  not  less  gallant 
than  the  most  glorious  of  our  ancestors." 

The  proclamation  then  states  that  when  their  lawful  King, 
Ferdinand,  is  restored 

"the  Cortes  will  be  assembled,  abuses  reformed,  and  such  laws  be 
enacted  as  the  circumstances  of  the  time  and  experience  may 
dictate  for  the  public  good  and  happiness — things  which  we 
Spaniards  know  how  to  do,  which  we  have  done  as  well  as  other 
nations,  without  any  necessity  that  the  vile  French  should  come 
to  instruct  us;  and,  according  to  their  custom,  under  the  mask  of 
friendship  and  wishes  for  our  happiness,  should  contrive  to  plunder 
us,  to  violate  our  women,  to  assassinate  us,  to  deprive  us  of  our 
liberty,  our  laws,  and  our  King,  to  scoff  at  and  destroy  our  holy 
religion.  .  .  ." 1 

That  is  an  official  document.  As  for  the  pamphlets  of 
the  time,  let  this  suffice.  It  is  a  retort  to  Napoleon's  offer 
of  reforms,  beginning  with  the  usual  formula:  "Napoleon, 
Emperor  of  the  French,  King  of  Italy,  Protector  of  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine,"  etc.  The  counterblast  be- 
gins:— 

"Yes!    Napoleon,  that  is  Napo-dragon,  Apollyon,  Ruler  of  the 
Abyss,  King  of  the  monsters  of  Hell,  heretics,  and  heretic  princes, — 
Abominable  Beast,  Protector,  Head  and  Soul  of  the  Confederation 
1  Ibid.,  pp.  218,  219. 


64  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

of  the  Rhine,  that  is  of  the  seven  heads  and  ten  horns  of  the  beast, 
which  bear  blasphemies  against  God  and  the  Saints.  .  .  ." 

Thus  religion  was  now  invoked  against  the  French.  For 
this  the  Emperor  had  himself  to  thank.  As  if  his  Spanish 
business  were  not  enough,  he  in  that  same  springtime  de- 
spoiled the  Pope  of  four  provinces.  In  consequence,  Pius 
VII  anathematized  his  despoiler,  and  urged  the  Spaniards 
to  arise  like  David  and  slay  Goliath.  The  Spanish  Rising 
therefore  partook  of  the  nature  of  a  crusade.  Their  armies 
were  placed  under  the  protection  of  saints,  and  in  some 
cases  relics  of  saints  went  with  them  to  battle,  thereby  in- 
flaming the  Spanish  nature  to  its  utmost. 

All  these  aids  were  needed;  for  in  a  military  sense  Spam 
was  almost  defenceless.  Her  regular  troops  were,  in  the 
main,  absent;  her  capital  and  chief  fortresses  were  held 
by  the  French;  there  was  no  one  centre  of  union  for  the 
various  provinces,  which  soon  fell  to  quarrelling  about 
the  allocation  of  the  money  and  stores  sent  from  England. 
Indeed,  Spain  was  in  a  worse  plight  than  France  was  be- 
fore the  Battle  of  Valmy;  but  the  same  potent  impulse 
nerved  the  defenders;  and,  fortunately  for  the  Spanish 
patriots,  Napoleon's  eagerness  to  seize  the  fleet  at  Cadiz 
(including  the  French  ships  that  escaped  from  Trafalgar) 
led  him  prematurely  to  press  on  a  large  French  force  to- 
wards that  port.  It  was  surrounded,  overborne,  and  com- 
pelled to  surrender  at  Baylen  (July,  1808).  What  Valmy 
had  been  to  France,  Baylen  was  to  Spain,  a  proof  that  she 
could  overcome  troops  hitherto  deemed  invincible. 

In  one  respect  the  Spanish  victory  at  Baylen  was  a  mis- 
fortune. It  filled  the  Spaniards  with  intolerable  conceit. 
When  Joseph  Bonaparte  and  the  French  troops  fell  back 
behind  the  line  of  the  Ebro,  the  perfervid  imagination  of 
the  South  saw  hi  fancy  the  standards  of  Spain  soaring  over 


THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING  65 

the  Pyrenees  and  entering  the  plains  of  Guienne.  Napier 
relates  that  the  Spanish  officers  remarked  to  those  of  Sir 
John  Moore's  army:  "  We  are  much  obliged  to  our  friends, 
the  English;  we  thank  them  for  their  good  will;  we  shall 
escort  them  through  France  to  Calais;  .  .  .  they  shall  not 
have  the  trouble  of  fighting  the  French;  and  we  shall  be 
pleased  to  have  them  as  spectators  of  our  victories."1  This 
lofty  spirit  went  before  a  terrible  fall.  In  the  autumn  and 
winter  of  1808  Napoleon  burst  in  on  these  cackling  fowl 
and  scattered  them  to  the  winds.  Yet,  even  so,  Spain  was 
not  conquered.  After  every  defeat  she  rose,  still  defiant. 
The  defence  of  her  walled  towns,  especially  Saragossa,  was 
sublime;  and  that  defence  was  conducted  by  the  people 
themselves,  no  less  than  by  the  military.  Fifty  French 
cannon  during  forty  days  played  upon  its  walls  and  massive 
monasteries  before  the  eagles  of  Napoleon  floated  over  the 
ruins  of  the  capital  of  Aragon. 

It  was  both  the  weakness  and  the  strength  of  the  Spaniards 
that  their  national  sense  was  largely  provincial.  It  was 
their  weakness  because  the  provinces  rarely  worked  well 
together.  The  different  Juntas  were  absurdly  jealous  as 
well  as  greedy.  Besides,  owing  to  the  occupation  of  Madrid 
by  the  enemy,  there  was  no  possibility  of  direction  from  a 
central  point.  Further,  the  haughty  and  suspicious  nature 
of  the  Spaniards  rendered  cordial  co-operation  with  Wel- 
lington extremely  difficult.  Hence  the  Duke,  after  Talavera, 
left  them  alone  and  operated  from  Portugal  as  a  base.  Not 
until  Napoleon's  Grand  Army  perished  in  Russia  was  there 
a  chance  of  beating  the  French  in  Spain.  But  then,  in  1813, 
after  numerous  defeats  had  rendered  the  natives  more  rea- 
sonable, all  the  forces  of  the  Peninsula  pulled  well  together. 
The  results  were  phenomenal,  and  French  domination  van- 
ished in  the  brief  campaign  of  Vittoria. 
1  Napier,  I,  84. 


66  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Nevertheless,  the  provincial  sentiment  also  strengthened 
the  Spanish  cause;  for  when  one  province  was  lost,  the  others 
resisted  none  the  less  stoutly;  and  the  task  of  the  French 
in  holding  down  a  population  that  scorned  surrender  in- 
creased with  every  success.  As  Marshal  Jourdan  wrote: 
"The  more  soundly  the  Spanish  armies  were  beaten,  the 
more  eagerly  did  that  people  rush  to  arms;  the  more  the 
French  gained  ground,  the  more  dangerous  did  their  po- 
sition become."  The  broken  and  inhospitable  nature  of 
the  country  singularly  favored  the  partisan  warfare  of 
the  defenders,  so  that,  provided  Wellington  held  a  large 
French  force  to  the  West,  and  all  the  other  provinces  per- 
severed, the  ultimate  failure  of  the  French  was  inevitable. 
Even  the  genius  of  Napoleon  could  not  break  down  the 
alliance  of  the  Spanish  national  spirit  with  the  great  Sea 
Power.  Moreover,  the  display  of  this  tenacious  vitality 
in  a  land  hitherto  deemed  moribund  created  a  profound 
impression  amidst  every  nation  of  the  world. 

Spain  derived  little  permanent  benefit  from  all  this  ex- 
penditure of  energy;  and  the  reason  for  this  disappointing 
finale  seems  to  be  that  the  Spanish  movement  differed  in 
toto  from  that  of  France  nineteen  years  before.  In  its  es- 
sence the  French  Revolution  was  a  revolt  of  the  brain  of 
France  against  a  cramping  system  which  she  had  long  out- 
grown. In  1808  it  was  not  the  brain,  but  the  heart  of  Spain 
which  led  to  action;  and  the  action  was  directed  solely  against 
foreign  invaders  or  usurpers.  The  Spanish  Rising  offers 
an  example  of  nationalism  in  its  most  passionate  form. 
It  is,  on  a  large  scale,  the  action  of  a  family,  which  seeks 
to  expel  intruders  who  have  violated  its  hospitality.  In 
such  a  case  we  do  not  expect  the  family  immediately  to 
set  about  the  reform  of  its  internal  economy.  Long  before 
the  events  of  1789  France  (if  we  may  pursue  our  simile) 
had  been  outgrowing  its  ancestral  abode,  and  the  call  for 


THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING  67 

reconstruction  and  refitting  was  imperative.  The  case  of 
Spain  was  utterly  different.  Therefore,  to  reproach  the 
Spaniards  for  not  making  so  good  a  use  as  the  French  of 
the  opportunity  offered  by  an  outburst  of  national  zeal 
is  manifestly  unfair. 

Nevertheless,  the  Spaniards  did  attempt  to  make  some 
changes,  though  hi  a  somewhat  hurried  and  one-sided  way. 
The  defects  of  their  procedure  resulted  from  two  dominant 
facts.  They  had  to  legislate  at  Cadiz;  and  at  that  city, 
within  sound  of  the  roar  of  Marshal  Soult's  guns,  deputies 
of  the  unconquered  provinces  could  assemble  freely;  but 
refugees  from  the  large  portions  of  territory  held  by  the 
French  were  accepted  as  representatives  of  those  unfor- 
tunate towns  and  districts.  Naturally,  such  a  haphazard 
assemblage  did  not  evince  qualities  of  prudence  and  good 
sense,  but  rather  of  passion  and  prejudice.  Naturally,  too, 
it  was  violently  anti-French;  and  yet  this  very  body,  almost 
of  necessity,  borrowed  from  France  the  groundwork  for 
the  new  constitution.  As  the  English  constitution  was  too 
vague  to  appeal  to  Continental  reformers,  those  of  Cadiz 
fell  back  upon  the  example  set  by  the  French  Constituent 
Assembly  in  1791.  They  restricted  the  functions  of  their 
future  King  within  narrow  limits;  and,  copying  the  phrase- 
ology of  the  Rights  of  Man,  they  declared  that  "sovereignty 
resided  essentially  in  the  nation."  In  this  view  of  things, 
Ferdinand  VII,  when  restored,  would  be  merely  the  first 
magistrate  of  the  land.  Further,  the  men  of  Cadiz  swept 
away  Feudalism  root  and  branch,  dissolved  the  monastic  Or- 
ders, and  abolished  the  Inquisition.  This  servile  imitation  of 
the  French  legislators  of  1789-91  at  once  produced  sharp 
friction;  and  Ferdinand,  after  his  restoration  hi  1814,  found 
it  easy  to  abrogate  this  imported  constitution.  Thus  the 
misuse  of  the  national  idea  by  a  few  extremists  at  Cadiz, 
was  destined  to  work  infinite  harm  both  to  Spain  herself 


68  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

and  to  the  cause  of  democracy  and  nationality  so  unwisely 
championed.  But  it  is  only  fair  to  remember  that  that 
cause  had  not  a  fair  chance  amidst  the  storms  and  excite- 
ments of  so  wholly  exceptional  an  epoch. 

Despite  its  obvious  faults,  the  Spanish  constitution  of 
1812  aroused  much  enthusiasm  among  neighboring  peoples. 
During  the  period  of  reaction  and  despair  which  followed  the 
downfall  of  Napoleon,  the  "Carbonari"  of  France  and  Italy 
and  the  "  Liberates "  of  Spain  continued  to  strive  for  the 
strange  compromise  of  1812;  and  it  took  tangible  form  during 
a  few  months  in  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Italy  at  the  time  of  the 
democratic  risings  of  1820-2.  Those  risings  failed;  for  the 
Austrian  and  other  autocratic  rulers  (Louis  XVIII  among 
them)  intervened  to  crush  them;  but  the  memories  of  popular 
liberty  in  Spain  during  the  years  1812-3  lived  on;  and,  amidst 
the  gloom  of  the  time  of  reaction,  the  Spanish  constitution  of 
those  years  aroused  fond  recollections  and  hopes  for  the 
future.  Especially  was  this  so  in  Naples  and  Sicily,  where  the 
Spanish  movement  of  the  Napoleonic  time  helped  on  that 
which  is  associated  with  the  names  of  Mazzmi  and  Gari- 
baldi. 

If  the  Spanish  movement  of  1808-13  bears  only  a  super- 
ficial resemblance  to  that  of  revolutionary  France,  still  more 
did  it  diverge  from  that  of  Germany.  We  have  already 
noticed  one  cause  of  that  divergence,  but  others  will  now  oc- 
cur to  us.  Napoleon  imposed  his  supremacy  on  the  Germans 
piecemeal  and  with  some  measure  of  caution.  On  the  neck  of 
the  proudest  people  of  Europe  he  forced  his  yoke  with  sudden 
and  almost  contemptuous  insolence.  Consequently,  while 
the  uprising  of  the  Germans  was  not  unlike  the  mounting  of  a 
tide  over  sandbanks,  that  of  the  Spaniards  resembled  an 
explosion.  The  difference  was  also  due  to  diversities  of 
national  character  and  environment.  The  Spaniard  was 
proud  and  resentful;  the  German  of  the  eighteenth  century 


THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING  69 

was  torpid  and  diffident.  During  four  centuries  the  Spaniards 
had  formed  a  nation.  The  average  Teuton  could  neither 
remember  nor  imagine  a  time  when  all  his  people  were  united. 
The  political  helplessness  of  Germany  led  her  sons  to  a 
humorous  depreciation — witness  these  lines  of  Goethe's 
Faust,  when  the  boon  companions  hi  Auerbach's  cellar  troll 
the  catch: — 

"The  Holy  Roman  Empire  now 
How  holds  it  together?" 

And  again: — 

"Thank  God,  every  morn, 

To  rule  the  Roman  Empire,  that  you  were  not  born. 
I  bless  my  stars  at  least  that  mine  is  not 
Either  a  Kaiser's  or  a  Chancellor's  lot." 

No  Spaniard  would  ever  have  sung  those  lines  about  the 
compact  and  glorious  kingdom  which  had  conquered,  and 
still  ruled  over,  the  greater  part  of  the  New  World.  Nature, 
which  had  made  the  Spaniards  a  nation,  seemed,  until  the 
year  1812,  to  doom  the  Germans  to  division  and  helpless- 
ness. During  the  winter  of  1807-8  Prussia's  boldest  son, 
Fichte,  did  not  counsel  revolt,  only  a  system  of  national 
education  with  a  view  to  some  eventual  revolt.  The  German 
movement  therefore  was  no  flash  of  passion,  but  rather  the 
growth  of  an  intellectual  and  moral  conviction  that  Germany 
must  some  day  form  a  nation.  In  the  spread  of  that  belief, 
which  became  contagious  when  Napoleon's  Grand  Army 
reeled  back  frostbitten  from  Russia,  lie  the  unique  interest 
and  the  exceptional  fruitfulness  of  the  German  movement. 
Heralded  by  a  poet  and  a  philosopher,  it  uplifted  the  people 
and  bore  them  to  a  higher  plane  of  existence.  The  national 
policy  of  the  years  1808-13  began  by  improving  and  inspiring 
the  individual;  it  ended  by  making  an  intelligent  and  valiant 
nation. 


70  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

The  blaze  of  wrath  which  flashed  forth  in  Spain  in  1808 
could  not  mature  her  national  life.  That  life  was  scorched, 
not  ripened.  No  literary  work  of  any  note  was  forthcoming; 
and,  apart  from  the  abolition  of  Feudalism,  no  lasting  re- 
forms resulted  from  the  sudden  and  premature  efforts  of  that 
tune.  For  lack  of  preparation  or  wise  guidance  the  national 
movement  at  Cadiz  and  Madrid  went  astray,  and  ended  in 
political  reaction.  The  case  of  Spain,  therefore,  proves  that 
an  appeal  to  the  past,  and  to  a  pride  rooted  in  that  past,  may 
incite  a  people  to  great  exertions;  but,  whatever  their  military 
results,  they  will  have  no  effect  on  its  development,  and  may 
drag  it  backwards.  In  short,  nationality  in  its  crudest  form  is 
merely  an  appeal  to  the  emotions  or  passions  and  may  arrest 
the  progress  of  a  people  that  indulges  them.  Under  wise  and 
strict  control,  as  in  the  Germany  of  those  years,  it  may  further 
the  cause  of  progress.  In  the  case  of  revolutionary  France, 
and  still  more  of  Spain,  nationality  was  a  narrowing  influence, 
begetting  intolerance  towards  neighbors  and  promoting  the 
interests  of  despotism  at  home. 

These,  I  think,  are  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  a 
survey  of  the  Spanish  movement  in  its  wider  issues.  But 
now  let  us  consider  it,  finally,  in  its  bearing  on  the  Napoleonic 
Wars.  In  that  respect  its  importance  can  scarcely  be  over- 
rated. The  spectacle  of  a  nation  challenging  to  mortal  con- 
flict a  powerful  enemy  that  occupied  her  chief  cities  and  had 
niched  away  her  King  stirred  the  blood  of  all  nations,  as  does 
the  sight  of  gallant  little  Serbia  holding  up  against  two 
military  Empires  on  the  North  and  her  perfidious  neighbor 
on  the  East.1  Moreover,  the  success  of  the  Spanish  efforts  in 
the  summer  of  1808  at  Baylen  and  Saragossa  roused  an  excite- 
ment unequalled  in  that  generation.  The  spell  of  invincibility 
that  had  long  protected  the  French  and  bewildered  their  foes 
was  broken,  and  forlorn  peoples  caught  a  gleam  of  hope. 
1  These  words  were  spoken  early  in  November,  1915. 


THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING  71 

Germany,  then  writhing  under  the  heel  of  Napoleon,  ceased 
to  despair.  In  October,  1808,  the  writer,  Varnhagen  von 
Ense,  visiting  his  confrere,  Jean  Paul  Richter,  heard  him  say 
that  he  never  doubted  that  the  Germans  would  one  day  rise 
against  the  French  as  the  Spaniards  had  done.  "The  Span- 
iards were  the  refrain  to  everything,  and  we  always  returned 
to  them."  The  statesman,  Stein,  actually  prepared  for  a 
popular  rising  in  Prussia  like  that  of  Spain,  and  when  found 
out  was  driven  from  office  and  from  Prussia  by  the  order  of 
Napoleon.  Austria,  whose  subjects  had  fought  against  the 
French  hopelessly  and  nervelessly,  early  in  1809  made  a  really 
national  effort.  In  April  the  Archduke  Charles  issued  this 
stirring  appeal:  "The  liberty  of  Europe  has  taken  refuge 
under  your  banners.  Your  victories  will  loose  its  fetters,  and 
your  brothers  in  Germany,  yet  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy, 
long  for  their  deliverance." 

These  hopes  and  aspirations  were  directly  the  outcome 
of  the  Spanish  Rising.  It  is  true  that  neither  Spain  nor 
Austria  succeeded  in  those  years.  The  Spaniards  displayed 
no  skill  in  organization  and  proved  to  be  very  exasperating 
allies.  The  Austrian  Government  and  its  generals  behaved 
with  their  usual  want  of  energy  and  enterprise.  In  both 
lands  the  spirit  of  the  people  far  excelled  the  conduct  of 
Governments  and  generals.  But  such  a  symptom  bodes 
ill  for  the  enemy.  For  ultimately  the  energy  and  deter- 
mination of  the  people  will  find  leaders  to  give  full  effect 
to  its  resolves;  and  that  happened  in  1813-5.  By  that 
time  the  new  national  f eelings  of  Spain  and  Germany  were 
incarnated  in  formidable  armies  led  by  the  ablest  of  their 
generals. 

During  the  four  intervening  years,  generally  marked  by 
defeat,  the  fortitude  of  all  patriots  was  tried  to  the  utter- 
most. It  may  be  well  to  recall  the  feelings  of  those  dark 
days  when  the  Napoleonic  supremacy  seemed  irresistible. 


72  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

In  May,  1809,  the  Quarterly  Review  thus  described  the  situa- 
tion:— 

"A  more  tremendous  system  never  appeared  for  the  desolation 
and  subjection  of  the  world.  Every  country  was  to  be  compelled 
in  succession  to  furnish  men  for  the  plunder  and  conquest  of  others. 
If  any  one  nation  presumed  to  be  dissatisfied,  the  population  of 
another  was  to  be  driven  to  arms  to  oppress  it.  ...  Napoleon's 
vast  designs  have  been  executed  with  the  most  lavish  profusion  of 
human  blood.  He  cares  neither  for  distance,  famine,  nor  dis- 
ease. ...  It  is  indifferent  to  him  how  many  thousands  of  his 
troops  drop  from  mere  fatigue  and  want.  It  is  sufficient  that 
enough  reach  the  point  of  action  to  accomplish  his  purposes.  If 
he  disperses  the  enemy,  he  gains  a  new  extent  of  population  to 
drive  into  his  ranks,  and  to  make  the  instruments,  however  un- 
willing, of  new  depredations.  Being  consumed  so  fast,  there  is  no 
time  for  mutiny  and  b'ttle  demand  for  pay.  For  a  certain  time, 
therefore,  this  terrible  engine  of  war  acts  in  his  favor  with  dread- 
ful energy,  though  it  is  one  which  may  ultimately  recoil  upon 
himself." 

Five  weary  years  were  to  elapse  before  the  spirit  of  na- 
tionality was  completely  embattled.  Then  it  overthrew 
the  great  Emperor.  In  that  tune  of  awakening  the  people 
of  Spain  hold  a  foremost  place;  for  they  dared  to  beard  the 
conqueror  in  his  prime.  Before  they  knew  that  England 
would  help  them  they  challenged  the  master  of  the  Continent, 
Thus,  once  again,  Europe  showed  the  diversity  of  racial 
impulses  that  go  to  make  up  its  life.  The  balance  of  that  life 
has  been  in  succession  restored  by  races  as  far  removed,  as 
widely  dissimilar,  as  the  Franks,  Dutch,  English,  Swedes, 
Poles,  Spaniards,  and  Russians.  The  motives  prompting 
these  efforts  were  very  different.  Byron  thus  outlined  the 
Spanish  Rising:  "Pride  points  the  way  to  Liberty."  That  is 
true.  The  proud  and  passionate  resentment  of  the  Spaniards 
led  the  more  phlegmatic  peoples  of  the  North  into  the  crusade 


THE  SPANISH  NATIONAL  RISING  73 

that  finally  overthrew  the  might  of  Napoleon.  So  long  as  the 
British  and  Spaniards  held  firmly  together,  he  could  not  con- 
quer Europe;  for  it  is  of  the  very  nature  of  World-Policy  that, 
sooner  or  later,  it  provokes  world-wide  resistance.  All  honor 
to  the  two  nations  that  first  dared  to  offer  an  unbending 
resistance. 


LECTURE  V 
MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY 

"Every  people  has  its  special  mission,  which  will  co-operate 
towards  the  fulfilment  of  the  general  mission  of  Humanity.  That 
mission  constitutes  its  nationality.  Nationality  is  sacred." — 
Mazzini,  1834. 

OTIR  previous  studies  have,  I  think,  pointed  to  the  con- 
clusion, that  no  popular  movement  has  led  to  results  of 
lasting  importance,  unless  it  proceeded  from  some  forma- 
tive thought.  If  it  be  true,  as  Carlyle  says,  that  the  end 
of  man  is  action,  not  thought,  it  is  equally  true  that  the 
beginning  of  all  action  is  a  thought;  and  the  usefulness  of 
the  action  corresponds  to  the  correctness  of  the  thought. 
Only  where  the  thinkers  have  led  the  masses,  and  led  them 
aright,  has  the  resulting  movement  been  well  sustained 
and  healthful  hi  its  effects.  Where,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Spanish  Rising  of  1808,  the  impulse  has  been  that  of  out- 
raged pride  and  dignity,  unconnected  with  the  deeper  con- 
victions of  the  mind,  little  has  come  of  it.  An  explosion 
of  terrific  force  took  place,  but  thereafter  everything  tended 
to  settle  down  in  nearly  the  same  condition  as  before.  That 
is  nationality  in  its  elemental  form,  an  almost  blind  im- 
pulse, which  cannot  lead  to  continued  progress,  and  may 
even  retard  progress. 

But  now  we  turn  to  a  land  where  the  popular  impulse 
found  wise  and  inspiring  leaders.  A  cynic  once  called  the 
Italian  national  movement  "the  poetry  of  politics."  The 
taunt  veiled  a  truth;  for  that  movement  initiated  not  only 
the  poetry  but  the  philosophy  of  modern  politics. 

74 


MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY  75 

Nearly  all  movements  start  as  a  protest  against  a  wrong; 
and  the  Italian  movement  is  no  exception  to  the  rule.  The 
people  of  the  Peninsula  struggled  against  the  barriers  im- 
posed on  them  by  the  Treaties  of  Vienna  of  1814-5,  which 
divided  and  enslaved  them.  A  consciousness  of  their  one- 
ness had  grown  among  them  during  the  Napoleonic  regime, 
when  unity  of  administration  and  comradeship  in  arms 
evoked  a  sense  of  manliness  and  citizenship.  As  Mrs.  Brown- 
ing phrased  it: — 

"Children  use  the  fist,  until  they  are  of  age 
To  use  the  brain,  .  .  . 
And  so  we  needed  Caesars  to  assist 
Man's  justice,  and  Napoleons  to  explain 
God's  counsel." 

In  1815  came  the  cruel  awakening.  On  a  neck  straighten- 
ing with  national  pride  there  now  fell  the  yoke  of  two  kings, 
a  Pope,  four  dukes,  and,  worst  of  all,  the  military  despotism 
of  Austria  in  the  North  and  North-East.  It  was  in  vain 
that  Italians  resisted.  Austria,  encamped  in  her  Quad- 
rilateral, and  strengthened  by  her  Italian  satraps,  defied 
all  the  puny  efforts  of  the  subject  race.  In  vain  did  the 
Carbonari  strike  down  a  general  here,  a  police  officer  there, 
they  could  not  drive  out  the  white  coats  of  Austria.  All 
the  tyrants  made  common  cause;  and,  if  one  of  them  were 
in  danger,  the  Hapsburgs  sent  down  their  legions  to  restore 
"order."  As  the  mandatory  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  Austria 
repressed  not  only  every  movement  of  the  people  but  every 
proposal  of  an  Italian  ruler  to  admit  them  to  the  least  share 
in  the  Government.  She  would  neither  reform  herself  nor 
let  any  Italian  State  reform  itself,  for  fear  that  her  rule 
might  seem  the  more  odious  by  the  contrast.1  In  fact, 
the  House  of  Hapsburg  now  became  the  chief  barrier  to 
1  Farini,  The  Raman  State,  I,  ch.  I. 


76  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

national  aspirations  in  Europe;  and  its  Chancellor,  Met- 
ternich,  occupied  the  position  formerly  occupied  by  Napoleon 
as  the  deadliest  enemy  of  nationality.  The  Hapsburgs  held 
down  their  Magyar  and  Slavonic  subjects;  they  barred  the 
way  to  an  effective  union  of  the  German  States;  above  all, 
they  played  the  watch-dog  to  the  sheepfolds  in  which  the 
Italians  were  penned  up.  Austria  strove  to  stifle  thought 
in  her  dominions,  as  appeared  in  the  injunction  of  the  Em- 
peror Francis  to  the  professors  of  the  University  of  Pavia: 
"Your  duty  is  less  to  make  learned  men  than  faithful  sub- 
jects." Consequently,  every  Italian  patriot  longed  to  drive 
the  Austrians  beyond  the  Alps.  On  this  topic  there  was 
practical  unanimity.  On  all  else  there  were  grave  differ- 
ences. 

Putting  aside  smaller  groups,  we  may  single  out  from 
the  patriots  three  parties:  (i)  Those  who  desired  the  su- 
premacy of  the  Pope;  (2)  those  who  championed  the  cause 
of  the  House  of  Savoy;  (3)  Republicans  who  desired  the 
end  both  of  monarchy  and  of  the  Temporal  Power  of  the 
Popes,  in  order  to  frame  an  Italian  Republic. 

The  first  party  pointed  to  the  services  which  the  Popes 
had  often  rendered  to  the  Italian  cause,  e.  g.  to  the  Holy 
League  which  Julius  II  formed  in  1510  for  the  expulsion 
of  the  foreigners  from  Italy.  Naturally  enough,  they  left 
out  of  count  the  occasions  when  the  Papacy  had  sided  with 
foreigners  against  the  Italian  cause;  and  the  armed  support 
which  was  consistently  claimed  from  Austria  by  Gregory 
XVI  during  his  pontificate  (1831-46),  alienated  the  respect 
of  all  patriots.  Nevertheless,  the  mystical  devotion  of  a 
priest,  Gioberti,  pointed  to  the  Papacy  as  the  rallying  point 
for  Italians.  This  was  the  theme  of  his  book,  The  Moral 
and  Civil  Supremacy  of  the  Italians  (1843),  a  work  which 
made  a  deep  impression  and  contributed  largely  towards 
the  election  of  a  reforming  Pope,  Pius  IX,  in  1846. 


MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY  77 

The  second  party  had  its  headquarters  at  Turin,  and 
refused  to  admit  a  Papal  hegemony.  Even  after  the  advent 
of  a  popular  and  reforming  pontiff,  they  held  to  the  belief 
that  the  House  of  Savoy  alone  could  bring  union  or  complete 
unity  to  the  Peninsula.  They  pointed  to  the  deep-seated 
abuses  of  clerical  government  in  the  Papal  States,  where 
only  ten  per  cent  of  the  people  could  read;  also  to  the  fact 
that  those  States,  stretching  from  the  Adriatic  to  the  Tyr- 
rhene Sea,  cut  off  the  North  from  the  South  of  Italy,  and 
barred  the  way  to  political  union.  Finally,  they  claimed 
that  their  royal  house,  traditionally  brave  and  patriotic, 
was  the  natural  champion  of  Italy  against  Austria,  and 
therefore  the  only  hope  of  freedom  and  independence.  The 
monarchists  of  Piedmont  did  not  at  first  openly  aim  at 
national  unity;  for  such  an  avowal  would  have  exposed  the 
House  of  Savoy  to  the  charge  of  mere  ambition.  Ostensibly, 
then,  their  aim  was  to  federalize  Italy  under  the  aegis  of  that 
dynasty;  but  the  bolder  spirits,  headed  by  Cavour,  always 
kept  unity  before  them  as  the  goal.  Such  a  consummation 
was  anathema  to  Gioberti  and  the  neo-Guelfs.  Looking 
to  the  Pope  as  head  of  a  future  Italian  federation,  they 
perforce  rejected  the  idea  of  Italian  unity.  Nationalism, 
however,  was  the  very  breath  of  life  to  a  third  party,  the 
Mazzinians,  or  Young  Italy. 

Joseph  Mazzini,  born  at  Genoa  hi  1805,  matured  his 
precocious  intelligence  in  the  decades  following  Waterloo, 
when  Italy  underwent  the  torture  of  division  and  servitude. 
Endowed  with  a  highly  sensitive  nature,  he  hated  the  kings 
and  dukes  who  divided  and  held  down  his  people.  As  he 
wrote  in  1831:  "There  is  not  one  of  these  princes  who  has 
not  signed  a  compact  with  Austria  in  the  blood  of  his  sub- 
jects; not  one  whose  past  life  is  not  a  violent  and  insurmount- 
able barrier  between  him  and  the  future  of  his  people."  As 
for  Charles  Albert,  King  of  Sardinia,  his  timidity  and  vacil- 


78 

lation  finally  brought  him  into  the  position  of  a  renegade 
to  the  patriotic  cause;  and  the  young  enthusiast  even  con- 
nived at  an  attempt  at  his  assassination.  A  theist  by  con- 
viction, Mazzini  detested  the  Papacy  on  religious  no  less  than 
political  grounds.  Further,  the  failure  of  the  "moderates" 
in  1831,  and  their  cowardly  abandonment  by  Louis  Philippe, 
filled  him  with  contempt  for  constitutional  monarchy  and 
all  political  compromises.  Accordingly,  during  his  tune  of 
exile  at  Marseilles  in  the  autumn  of  that  year,  he  matured 
the  republican  organization  known  as  Young  Italy. 

The  name  indicates  its  character.  Despairing  of  the  men 
of  advanced  years,  who  were  nearly  all  "moderates";  de- 
spairing, too,  of  all  help  from  France  and  England,  where 
dull  moderation  sat  enthroned,  Mazzini  appealed  in  burning 
words  to  the  youth  of  Italy  to  raise  the  red,  white,  and  green 
flag  for  the  Republic  and  for  national  unity.  In  the  first 
document  of  the  Association  he  explained  what  he  meant 
by  a  nation  and  also  the  Italian  nation:  "By  the  nation 
we  understand  the  totality  of  Italians  bound  together  by  a 
common  pact  and  governed  by  the  same  laws."  This  defini- 
tion marks  a  great  advance  on  that  of  Fichte  and  all  pre- 
vious thinkers.  The  only  objection  to  it  is  the  emphasis 
which  it  lays  on  Rousseau's  idea  of  a  common  pact,  which 
is  certainly  not  essential  to  the  forming  of  a  nation. 

Equally  significant  are  the  boundaries  of  the  future  Italian 
State.  They  will  be  from  the  River  Var,  in  Nice,  to  Trieste 
on  the  North-East,  and  will  comprise  the  Trentino;  also 
"the  islands  proved  Italian  by  the  language  of  the  inhabi- 
tants." This  description  would  include  Corsica  and  several 
islands  of  the  Adriatic;  but  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  Mazzini 
did  not  claim  for  Italy  the  Dalmatian  coast-line,  which  he 
knew  to  be  Slavonic,  not  Italian.  Though  there  is  a  veneer 
of  Italian  culture  in  some  of  the  towns  on  the  coast,  yet 
the  great  body  of  the  population  is  Slavonic,  closely  akin 


MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY  79 

to  the  Serbs,  or,  in  the  North,  to  the  Croats.  It  is,  therefore, 
certain  that  Mazzini,  if  he  were  now  alive,  would  heartily 
approve  of  Italy  attacking  Austria  in  order  to  recover  the 
Trentino  and  Trieste;  but  he  would  disapprove  of  those 
eager  patriots  who  hanker  after  the  Dalmatian  coast  because 
it  once  belonged  to  Venice.  In  his  eyes  the  historic  argu- 
ment weighs  light  as  against  the  instincts  of  the  people 
concerned.  We  can  imagine  his  scorn  at  the  argument 
that  Italy  must  have  Dalmatia  because  she  has  no  good 
harbor  in  the  Adriatic.  He  decides  the  question  on  the 
ground  of  nationality,  not  on  the  naval  considerations  which 
have  so  often  worked  mischief.  He  claims  for  Italy  only 
those  islands  where  the  inhabitants  are  Italian.  Thus  his 
nationalism  is  thoroughly  fair  as  between  Italians  and  Slavs. 
He  leaves  the  Slavonic  islands  and  all  the  lands  East  of 
the  Adriatic  to  the  Slavs;  and,  if  the  Italians  are  wise  enough 
to  recognize  that  those  islands  and  all  the  Dalmatian  coast 
are  properly  Slavonic,  not  Italian,  Europe  will  avoid  com- 
plications that  may  in  the  future  lead  to  war. 

Mazzini  then  explained  that  Italy  ought  to  be  a  Repub- 
lic, because  there  were  no  truly  monarchical  elements  in  the 
Peninsula,  and  her  best  epochs  were  those  of  republican  rule. 
Further,  an  Italian  monarchy  would  be  reduced  to  bargain 
with  and  imitate  other  Courts;  whereas  Mazzini  detested 
compromise  with  and  imitation  of  foreigners,  as  certain 
to  weaken  and  degrade  Italy's  mission  to  mankind.  His 
soaring  idealism  also  rejected  both  the  federal  schemes  and 
insisted  on  unity  as  the  aim  of  Italian  strivings.  The  Pope 
in  the  centre,  the  two  kings  at  the  extremities,  the  Aus- 
trians  in  the  North-East  and  their  four  ducal  satraps — all 
must  go,  because  they  hindered  that  absolutely  free  inter- 
course of  the  people  which  was  essential  to  the  full  develop- 
ment of  the  Italian  Family.  To  divide  it  up  under  eight 
different  governments  would  be  equivalent  to  tying  the 


8o  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

body-politic  with  so  many  ligaments  fatal  to  the  free  circu- 
lation of  the  blood. 

Mazzini  had  boundless  faith  in  human  nature  and  its 
lofty  destinies.  In  his  view  the  life  of  the  human  race  was 
essentially  one.  True,  there  were  great  differences  between 
this  and  that  race.  He  never  held  Fichte's  early  opinion, 
that  all  the  nations  were  alike,  and  followed  the  same  aims. 
He  regarded  them  as  members  of  the  great  human  family, 
not  rivals  engaged  in  ceaseless  competition  and  strife.  He 
also  hoped  that,  if  the  members  were  allowed  free  play,  they 
would  come  to  see  their  true  interests  towards  each  other 
and  to  the  family  of  which  they  formed  a  part.  But,  said 
he,  they  could  not  see  this  truth  if  they  led  a  cramped  and 
artificial  existence.  Therefore,  Italy  must  attain  to  her 
free  life,  not  for  any  selfish  purpose;  certainly  not  in  or- 
der to  invade  and  despoil  her  neighbors,  but  rather  that 
she  may  minister  to  their  welfare.  She  will  gam  unity 
for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  her  mission  to  other 
nations. 

As  to  the  nature  of  that  mission  Mazzini  nowhere  gave 
a  definite  answer.  In  the  programme  of  Young  Italy  he 
pointed  out  that  Europe  was  undergoing  a  series  of  changes 
destined  to  transform  European  Society  into  large  and 
compact  masses.  The  large  States,  or  federations  of  States, 
were  absorbing  small  States;  large  towns  were  growing  at 
the  expense  of  small  towns  or  villages:  the  big  factory  was 
superseding  the  small  workshop  and  cottage  industries. 
What  would  be  the  upshot  of  it  all?  Would  the  new  ag- 
glomerations be  peaceful  or  aggressive,  healthy  or  noxious? 
That  was  an  urgent  question,  and  it  still  is.  How  Italy 
could  help  to  solve  these  political  and  social  problems  Maz- 
zini does  not  explain.  Later  on,  he  felt  his  way  towards 
a  partial  answer.  Meanwhile  he  insisted  on  Italy  gaining 
an  unfettered  existence.  This  he  defined  as  follows:  "With- 


MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY  81 

out  unity  of  religious  belief  and  unity  of  social  pact;  without 
unity  of  civil,  political,  and  penal  legislation,  there  is  no  true 
nation." 

The  ideal  is  lofty.  Unity  of  religious  belief  is  hard  to 
attain  and  keep  in  the  modern  world;  and  it  is  strange  that 
one  who  had  broken  away  from  the  Roman  Catholic  Church 
should  postulate  it  as  essential.  Again,  legal  unity  is  desir- 
able, but  scarcely  attainable  without  doing  violence  to  local 
customs.  Mazzini's  requirements  would  also  rule  out  Swit- 
zerland from  the  list  of  nations.  Yet,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
Swiss  form  a  nation.  His  aim,  doubtless,  was  to  hold  up  a 
lofty  ideal  which  should  inspire  Piedmontese,  Venetians, 
Tuscans,  Romans,  and  Neapolitans  with  a  passion  for  self- 
sacrifice.  Nothing  short  of  utter  self-sacrifice  could  nerve 
them  to  the  colossal  task  of  breaking  their  eight  prison- 
houses  and  forming  a  national  home.  What  a  task!  To 
expel  Austria,  to  destroy  the  Temporal  Power  of  the  Papacy, 
and  to  dethrone  six  Italian  sovereigns.  What  wonder  that 
he  pitched  his  aims  high!  The  fault  of  all  his  predecessors 
lay  in  their  proneness  to  bargain  and  compromise — tactics 
which  gained  some  outside  help  but  stifled  the  enthusiasm 
of  Italia's  sons.  Mazzini  sought  to  arouse  that  enthusiasm. 
It  throbs  in  every  sentence  of  the  oath  which  Young  Italy 
imposed  at  initiation: — 

"In  the  name  of  God  and  of  Italy.  In  the  name  of  all  the 
martyrs  of  the  holy  Italian  cause  who  have  fallen  beneath  foreign 
and  domestic  tyranny.  ...  By  the  love  I  bear  to  the  country 
that  gave  my  mother  birth,  and  will  be  the  home  of  my  chil- 
dren. ...  By  the  blush  that  rises  to  my  brow  when  I  stand  before 
the  citizens  of  other  lands,  to  know  that  I  have  no  rights  of  citizen- 
ship, no  country,  and  no  national  flag.  By  the  memory  of  our 
former  greatness,  and  the  sense  of  our  present  degradation.  By 
the  tears  of  Italian  mothers  for  their  sons  dead  on  the  scaffold,  in 
prison,  or  in  exile.  By  the  sufferings  of  the  millions — I  swear  to 


82  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

dedicate  myself  wholly  and  for  ever  to  strive  to  constitute  Italy  one 
free,  independent,  republican  nation." 

Such  was  the  enterprise  undertaken  by  a  group  of  penni- 
less Italian  exiles  at  Marseilles  in  the  autumn  of  1831.  They 
aimed  at  arousing  Italians,  whether  in  Italy  or  South  Amer- 
ica,1 to  a  sense  of  duty  to  the  nation;  and  out  of  their  slender 
means  they  started  a  journal,  Young  Italy.  When  expelled 
from  France  by  Louis  Philippe's  Government,  they  sought 
refuge  in  Switzerland;  and  a  few  of  them  attempted  a  raid 
into  Piedmont  which  completely  failed.  In  fact,  most  of 
their  undertakings  were  so  ill-timed  and  imprudent,  as  to 
lead  to  a  useless  effusion  of  blood.  But  nothing  could  long 
daunt  Mazzini.  Whether  hunted  about  Switzerland,  or 
vegetating  in  distress  among  Italian  organ-grinders  in  Hatton 
Garden,  he  (with  the  exception  of  some  dark  hours  of  doubt 
and  despair)  maintained  a  firm  resolve  to  persevere  in  his 
quest. 

This  fixed  determination  was  fed  from  diverse  sources. 
His  nature,  though  intensely  nervous  and  far  from  strong, 
was  singularly  buoyant.  It  rallied  soon,  even  after  trials 
and  reverses  that  depressed  men  of  sounder  physique.  His 
mind,  too,  possessed  that  sharp  edge,  that  rigid  grip,  which 
fortified  him  against  disappointment.  Under  soft  and  almost 
feminine  features  there  worked  a  powerful  brain,  a  steel-like 
will.  Moreover,  his  personality  brought  him  troops  of 
friends.  His  conversation  charmed  and  delighted  all  who 
came  near  him.  Men  so  diverse  in  character  as  Carlyle, 
George  Meredith,  and  Joseph  Cowen  of  Newcastle,  acknowl- 
edged the  spell  of  his  presence.  Meredith,  in  Vittoria, 
speaks  ecstatically  of  his  "large,  soft,  dark,  meditative  eyes, " 
which  drew  in  the  soul  of  the  observer  into  the  midst  of  a 

1  In  Uruguay,  Joseph  Garibaldi  [born  at  Nice  in  1807]  was  won  back 
for  the  Italians  by  Mazzini's  propaganda. 


MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY  83 

"capacious  and  vigorous  mind";  of  his  smile  which  "came 
softly  as  a  curve  in  water,"  which  "seemed  to  flow  with 
and  to  pass  in  and  out  of  his  thoughts,  to  be  a  part  of  his 
emotion  and  his  meaning  when  it  shone  transiently  full. 
For,  as  he  had  an  orbed  mind,  so  he  had  an  orbed  nature." 
Mrs.  Hamilton  King,  in  that  inspired  poem,  The  Disciples, 
tells  enthusiastically  how 

"  the  orb  of  that  great  human  soul 
Did  once  deflect  and  draw  this  orb  of  mine 
Until  it  touched  and  trembled  on  the  line 
By  which  my  orbit  crossed  the  plane  of  his." 

And  Swinburne,  in  A  Song  of  Italy,  hails  him  as  the  first  of 
her  liberators.  He  hymns  the  Italians  as: 

"Thy  children,  ev'n  thy  people  thou  hast  made, 

Thine,  with  thy  words  arrayed, 
Clothed  with  thy  thoughts,  and  girt  with  thy  desires, 
Yearn  up  towards  thee  like  fires." 

Not  that  Mazzini  was  devoid  of  faults  of  character.  They 
were  the  excess  of  his  qualities,  but  some  of  them  were  seri- 
ous. His  convictions  were  so  intense  as  to  blind  him  often 
to  the  good  advice  of  others.  Hence  he  was  often  intolerant 
towards  those  who  differed  from  him.  But  these  defects 
belong  rather  to  Mazzini,  the  man  of  action,  than  to  Mazzini, 
the  thinker;  and  we  are  concerned  solely  with  his  political 
thought,  not  with  his  many  abortive  conspiracies  or  even 
with  his  highest  achievement,  the  administration  of  the 
Roman  Republic  of  1849. 

In  this  sphere  of  thought  he  had  one  great  advantage  over 
his  German  predecessors.  They  were  so  obsessed  by  the 
idea  of  the  State  as  to  work  their  way  tardily  and  doubt- 
fully to  the  idea  of  the  nation.  This  was  natural.  In  modern 


84  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Germany  the  Prussian  State  overshadowed  everything  else; 
and  under  it  the  German  nation  loomed  nebulous.  There- 
fore, the  German  thinkers  on  nationality  (except  during  the 
ill-starred  democratic  efforts  of  1848-9)  tended  to  Prussianize 
their  notions  and  often  became  hide-bound  bureaucrats. 
Not  so  with  the  Italians.  They  were  not  overshadowed 
by  the  Sardinian  State;  and  they  detested  every  other  State 
of  the  Peninsula.  Consequently,  the  political  thought  of 
Italy  was  free  from  the  distracting  influence  of  the  State 
idea.  The  Italian  thinkers,  including  Balbo,  Cavour,  Ma- 
miani,  and  Gioberti,  saw  the  nation  clearly;  and  for  them 
the  State  was  merely  the  concrete  embodiment  of  the  na- 
tional idea.  In  Germany  the  national  idea  was  Prussianized, 
to  its  infinite  harm.  The  Italian  idea  was  never  in  danger 
of  being  Sardinianized;  though  Mazzini,  amidst  the  disap- 
pointments of  old  age,  declared  that  to  have  been  its  fate. 

During  his  manhood,  Mazzini  not  only  saw  clearly,  but 
believed  absolutely  in,  the  nation.  The  story  of  Italy's 
past  as  well  as  her  natural  tendencies  to  unity  combined 
to  nurture  in  him  a  profound  belief  in  her  future.  In  common 
with  all  thinkers  who  have  exercised  a  lasting  influence  on 
their  fellows,  he  was  pre-eminently  a  man  of  faith;  and  his 
creed  for  Italy  aroused  a  unique  fervor,  because  it  formed 
part  of  a  far  wider  creed — the  Gospel  of  Humanity.  No- 
where does  he  describe  the  creed  in  set  terms.  No  prophet 
ever  does.  But  we  catch  a  glimpse  of  his  meaning  in  these 
words: — 

"When  in  my  earliest  years  I  believed  that  the  initiative  of  the 
third  life  of  Europe  would  spring  from  the  heart,  the  action,  the 
enthusiasm,  and  the  sacrifices  of  our  people,  I  heard  within  me  the 
grand  voice  of  Rome  sounding  once  again;  its  utterances  treasured 
up  and  accepted  with  loving  reverence  by  the  peoples,  and  telling 
of  moral  unity  and  fraternity  in  a  faith  common  to  all  Human- 
ity. ...  I  saw  Rome  in  the  name  of  God  and  a  republican  Italy 


MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY  85 

substituting  a  Declaration  of  Principles  for  the  sterile  Declaration 
of  Rights;  .  .  .  and  I  saw  Europe,  weary  of  scepticism,  egotism, 
and  anarchy,  accept  the  new  faith  with  acclamations." 

The  Genoese  republican  here  speaks  almost  with  the  tongue 
of  the  old  monarchist  of  Florence.  This  neo-Roman  creed 
is  a  modern  version  of  the  De  Monarchid  of  Dante.  Rome 
(not  the  city  of  the  Popes  but  the  centre  of  a  world-republic) 
calls  the  peoples  about  her  to  listen  to  the  voice  of  faith  and 
authority,  faith  in  the  perfectibility  of  man,  authority  in- 
herent in  the  genius  of  the  eternal  City.  A  dream,  you  will 
say.  Well!  a  glorious  dream.  It  inspired  Mazzini  to  struggle 
on  through  a  life  full  of  disaster,  until,  as  he  breathed  his 
last  at  Pisa  in  1872,  his  ideals  lay  shattered  by  collision  with 
coarse  reality.  That  faith  must  have  been  intense  which 
impelled  him  forward,  and  which,  working  through  him, 
impelled  many  thousands  of  Italians  to  endure  prison,  exile, 
torture,  and  execution  for  the  cause.  An  intense  faith  like 
his  evades  mere  analysis.  Cold  criticism  misses  the  soul  of 
it.  If  we  ask — What  do  you  mean  by  your  neo-Romanism? — 
we  receive  an  inadequate  answer.  The  disciple  may  reply — 
Rome  has  twice  given  laws  to  the  world,  once  through  the 
matchless  organization  of  the  old  Empire,  and  again  through 
the  decrees  of  the  Church;  therefore  she  is  destined  a  third 
time  to  initiate  an  era  for  mankind.  "Not  proven,"  the 
logician  will  say.  "Contrary  to  the  tendencies  of  Vatican 
policy,"  the  historian  will  say.  Mazzini  and  his  disciples 
ignored  both  objectors.  The  eye  of  faith  saw  Rome  rid  her- 
self of  Vaticanism  and  with  magical  power  gather  Italians 
about  her  in  order  to  revivify  the  life  of  all  peoples. 

The  conception  was  not  wholly  visionary.  Mazzini  was 
convinced  that  French  democrats  at  the  time  of  the  great 
Revolution  had  gone  utterly  astray.  That  is  the  meaning 
of  his  phrase,  "the  sterile  Declaration  of  Rights,"  a  reference 


86  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

to  the  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  drawn  up  by  the 
Constituent  Assembly  in  August-September,  1789.  In  its 
place  Rome,  the  true  birth-place  of  law,  was  to  sound  forth 
a  Declaration  of  the  Duties  of  Man. 

This  is  the  bed-rock  of  Mazzinian  doctrine.  Let  us  test 
it.  He  declares  the  French  Rights  of  Man  to  be  sterile; 
and  elsewhere  he  terms  that  programme  false,  hurtful,  the 
mother  of  selfishness  and  strife.  Thus,  in  Faith  and  the 
Future  (1835): — 

"Right 1  is  the  faith  of  the  individual.  Duty  is  the  common 
collective  faith.  Right  can  but  organize  resistance;  it  may  destroy, 
it  cannot  found.  Duty  builds  up,  associates,  and  unites;  it  is 
derived  from  a  general  law,  whereas  Right  is  derived  only  from 
human  will.  There  is  nothing,  therefore,  to  forbid  a  struggle 
against  Right.  Any  individual  may  rebel  against  any  Right  of 
another  individual  which  is  injurious  to  him;  and  the  sole  judge 
between  the  adversaries  is  force;  and  such,  in  fact,  has  frequently 
been  the  answer  which  societies  based  upon  Right  have  given 
to  their  opponents.  Societies  based  upon  Duty  would  not  be  com- 
pelled to  have  recourse  to  force.  Duty,  once  admitted  as  the  rule, 
excludes  the  possibility  of  struggle,  and  by  rendering  the  individual 
subject  to  the  general  aim,  it  cuts  at  the  very  root  of  those 
evils  which  Right  is  unable  to  prevent.  .  .  .  The  doctrine  of 
Rights  puts  an  end  to  sacrifice  and  cancels  martyrdom  from  the 
world." 

Such  is  the  moral  elevation  of  this  teaching  that  we  are 
apt  at  first  to  overlook  its  good  sense.  But  students  of  the 
French  Revolution,  who  look  beneath  the  surface  of  events, 
will  realize  the  truth  of  Mazzini's  criticism.  The  fact  that 
the  reformers  of  1789  laid  stress  only  upon  the  Rights  of  Man 
produced  at  once  the  wrong  kind  of  impression  both  on  the 

1  Mazzini  in  this  passage  uses  the  term  "Right"  as  equivalent  to 
"The  theory  of  individual  Rights." 


MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY  87 

deputies  and  the  people  at  large.  They  were  led  to  regard 
politics  as  a  struggle  in  which  you  seize  what  you  can  for 
your  class  and  yourself.  In  the  course  of  such  a  struggle  the 
rights  of  others  are  disregarded;  they  resist;  and  the  only 
method  of  deciding  the  issue  is  in  the  last  resort  by  tumult 
or  by  civil  war.  To  emphasize  the  rights  of  the  individual 
in  the  summer  of  1789,  when  the  old  order  was  vanishing 
amid  the  flare  of  burning  castles,  was  the  very  worst  training 
for  the  young  French  democracy;  for  it  accentuated  the  ego- 
tism of  the  time,  which  needed  to  be  kept  under  restraint.  In 
the  absence  of  the  old  authority,  the  only  method  of  pre- 
serving order  was  a  sense  of  civic  duty,  which  would  pre- 
scribe first  and  foremost  a  feeling  of  regard  for  the  common 
weal,  a  conviction  that  the  new  democratic  system  must  be 
based  on  the  loyalty  and  self-restraint  of  the  masses.  Some 
deputies  (e.  g.  the  Abbe  Gregoire  and  Camus)  realized  this 
all-important  truth.  Mounier's  committee  on  the  constitu- 
tion proposed  an  article  (coming  just  after  the  definition  of 
Rights)  which  thus  defined  duty:  "The  duty  of  everyone 
consists  in  respecting  the  rights  of  others."  But  the  Assembly 
struck  out  this  article  and  also  another  phrase  binding  them 
to  prescribe  the  Duties  of  Man.  A  motion  of  Camus  to  that 
effect  was  defeated  on  August  4  by  570  votes  to  433.  One 
member  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  duties  of  man  spring 
naturally  from  his  rights — a  disastrous  blunder,  which  was  to 
cost  France  dear.1  Its  result  was  seen  in  the  rampant  in- 
dividualism of  the  following  months,  when  politics  degener- 
ated into  a  game  of  grab  and  the  Revolution  into  a  tug-of-war 
between  hostile  parties.  The  tendencies  towards  anarchy 
were  quickened;  and  seeing  that  anarchy  leads,  sooner  or 
later,  to  a  military  despotism,  Mazzini  scarcely  exaggerated 
when  he  summed  up  the  dynamics  of  the  time  hi  this  sug- 
gestive formula:  "The  French  Revolution,  having  begun 
lHist.  parlementaire  de  la  Rev.  franqaise,  II,  177,  222. 


88  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

with  a  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man,  could  end  only  in 
a  man,  Napoleon." 

The  French  Revolution,  running  in  this  vicious  circle, 
fatally  prejudiced  the  success  of  the  democratic  experiment. 
Mazzini  maintained  that  it  merely  closed  an  old  era,  the  era 
of  individualism,  and  did  not  initiate  the  new  era,  the  era 
of  collective  energies  inspired  by  duty.  This,  then,  was 
to  be  the  mission  of  Italy.  Looking  back  over  her  annals, 
blood-stained  but  ennobled  by  the  unceasing  self-sacrifice 
of  her  best  sons,  he  believed  that  so  much  suffering  must  lead 
to  a  noble  consummation.  Community  in  suffering  had 
weakened  the  old  local  feelings:  the  glory  of  dying  for  la 
patria  had  aroused  generous  feelings  which  would  banish 
political  egotism.  Italy,  therefore,  was  the  chosen  land  of  the 
future;  and  from  Rome  would  sound  forth  the  gospel  of  duty 
which  Paris  had  stifled.  This  is  the  essence  of  Mazzini's 
faith — no  blind  instinct,  but  a  belief  based  on  knowledge 
of  the  past.  France  had  lost  her  opportunity.  England  was 
a  land  of  timid  compromise.  From  Italy,  when  fully  aroused, 
would  come  the  life-giving  message,  that  all  the  peoples  were 
bound  together  by  the  sacred  tie  of  duty  towards  Humanity. 

Mazzini  believed  that  this  inspiring  ideal  would  widen 
the  outlook  of  Italian  patriots.  They  must  be  true  patriots 
in  order  to  deaden  petty  local  jealousies.  But  they  would 
not  cast  the  slough  of  provincialism  in  order  to  encase  them- 
selves in  the  mail  of  patriotism.  The  idea  of  duty  must 
reign  in  the  national  sphere.  The  Italian  Republic  of  the 
future  must  consult,  not  its  own  interests  primarily,  but  those 
of  all  nations,  an  ideal  which  would  finally  sterilize  national 
rivalries.  Or,  as  he  developed  the  theme  in  his  Duties  of 
Man  (1858),  family  duty  saves  a  man  from  being  hide-bound 
in  egotism;  the  national  idea  ought  to  exorcize  merely  family 
or  clan  selfishness;  while  duty  to  mankind  will  raise  national 
patriotism  on  to  that  higher  level  where  wars  of  aggrandize- 


MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY  89 

ment  become  impossible.    As  he  pithily  phrased  it:  "You  are 
men  before  you  are  citizens  or  fathers."  1 

On  the  other  hand,  he  reminded  those  who  sneered  at 
patriotism,  and  put  their  trust  only  in  cosmopolitanism, 
that  theirs  was  a  futile  creed.  How  can  you  attain  to  the 
vague  and  vast  ideal  of  Humanity  unless  you  have  midway 
some  intermediate  form  of  association?  How  can  individuals, 
as  mere  units,  move  the  world?  Of  course,  the  thing  is 
impossible  save  to  a  handful  of  idealists.  The  masses  must 
have  something  tangible  to  work  on.  To  take  a  parallel  case. 
The  nation  can  effectively  exist  only  where  men  are  first 
banded  together  in  towns  and  counties.  Because  narrow- 
minded  people  cannot  see  beyond  their  town  or  county,  you 
do  not  therefore  abolish  the  organization  of  the  town  or 
county.  You  retain  that  organization  and  seek  to  widen 
their  outlook,  so  that  the  Yorkshireman  or  the  Devonshire- 
man  may  attain  to  the  nobler  pride  of  being  an  Englishman. 
During  long  ages  tribe  fought  with  tribe,  county  with  county, 
then  Scots  with  English.  But  the  tendency,  though  painfully 
slow,  is  sure,  which  endows  men  with  the  wider  vision;  and 
then  these  local  strifes  of  Irish  and  English,  Venetians  and 
Genoese,  Lombards  and  Tuscans,  seem  absurd.  They  die  of 
themselves  because  men  have  gained  the  broader  view,  and 
use  these  local  sentiments  as  means  of  attaining  to  a  higher 
level  than  would  be  possible  if  they  sought  to  reach  it  by  a 
single  bound.  The  cosmopolitan,  who  sneers  at  his  country 
and  raves  about  Humanity,  is  like  a  man  who  disdains  the  use 
of  stairs  and  seeks  to  leap  to  the  first  floor.  Such  efforts 
have  always  failed.  To  ignore  the  tremendous  force  of 
nationality,  and  grasp  at  a  vague  cosmopolitanism  by  means 
of  groups  and  unions,  is  to  bridge  the  torrent  by  gossamer,  as 
recent  events  have  shown.  No!  The  true  line  of  advance  is, 
not  to  sneer  at  nationality  and  decry  patriotism,  but  to  try  to 
1  Mazzini,  Duties  of  Man  [Everyman  edit.],  ch.  5. 


90  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

utilize  those  elemental  forces  by  imparting  to  them  a  true 
aim,  instead  of  the  false  aim  which  has  deluged  Europe  with 
blood. 

No  part  of  Mazzini's  teaching  is  sounder  than  that  which 
deals  with  the  necessity  of  recognizing  the  patriotic  instinct 
as  fundamental  to  human  nature,  and  also  of  educating  and 
directing  it  to  nobler  ends  than  those  to  which  it  has  so  often 
been  perverted.  To  the  Italian  workingmen,  some  of  whom 
were  running  after  cosmopolitan  will-o'-the-wisps,  he  gave 
this  wise  advice:  "Do  not  be  led  away  by  the  idea  of  improv- 
ing your  material  conditions  without  first  solving  the  na- 
tional question.  You  cannot  do  it."  And  again:  "In  labor- 
ing, according  to  true  principles,  for  our  country  we  are 
laboring  for  Humanity.  Our  country  is  the  fulcrum  of  the 
lever  which  we  have  to  wield  for  the  common  good.  If  we 
give  up  this  fulcrum,  we  run  the  risk  of  becoming  useless  both 
to  our  country  and  to  Humanity."  * 

On  the  question  of  assuring  political  unity  to  his  divided 
and  oppressed  countrymen,  Mazzini  accepted  no  compro- 
mise. He  would  not  hear  of  a  federalized  Italy,  vegetating 
under  the  shadow  of  the  Vatican.  On  the  surface  that 
scheme  of  Gioberti  (outlined  above)  seemed  easy  to  realize; 
and  in  1846,  when  the  reforming  Pope  Pius  IX  was  elected,  its 
chances  seemed  roseate.  Gioberti  appealed  to  history  and 
tradition  as  proving  that  Italians  needed  a  large  measure  of 
freedom  of  action  in  local  affairs;  and  he  summed  up  his  con- 
tention in  these  impressive  words:  "To  suppose  that  Italy, 
divided  as  she  has  been  for  many  centuries,  can  peacefully 
submit  to  the  rule  of  one  man  is  mere  folly.  To  desire  that  it 
should  come  about  by  violent  means  is  a  crime." 

Well!  The  folly  has  been  committed.  The  crime  has 
been  perpetrated.  The  impossible  has  come  to  pass.  Thanks 
to  the  fiery  zeal  kindled  by  Mazzini;  thanks  also  to  the  sword 
1  Mazzini,  Duties  of  Man,  pp.  54,  55. 


MAZZINI  AND  YOUNG  ITALY  91 

of  Victor  Emmanuel,  the  diplomacy  of  Cavour,  and  the  self- 
sacrificing  heroism  of  Garibaldi,  Italy  is  united,  though  not 
in  the  form  of  a  Republic.  The  causes  of  the  failure  of  the 
Republic  do  not  concern  us  here.  The  ideal  of  Mazzini  was 
unattainable,  but  not  because  the  Italians  rejected  it.  On 
the  contrary,  they  rallied  to  it  enthusiastically  and  in  large 
numbers.  In  the  early  half  of  1849,  when  Mazzini  was  the 
leading  Triumvir  of  the  Roman  Republic,  with  Garibaldi  as 
virtual  commander  of  the  troops;  when  also  brave  Manin  and 
the  Venetians  kept  the  banner  of  the  Republic  flying  against 
the  shot  and  shell  of  Austria,  there  was  some  ground  for 
hoping  that  the  cause  of  Young  Italy  would  survive.  All 
depended  on  the  action  of  the  young  French  Republic;  and 
if  that  Government  had  granted  the  support  which  Mazzini 
at  first  expected,  France  and  Italy  might  have  expelled 
Austria's  white  coats,  as  they  did  ten  years  later.  The  fate 
of  Young  Italy  was  sealed  when  the  French  Republic  (or 
rather  its  President,  Louis  Napoleon)  attacked  the  Roman 
Republic,  while  Austria  wore  down  the  defenders  of  Venice. 
The  Italian  Republic  was  crushed  by  foreign  intervention; 
and  the  Judas  of  the  time  was  Louis  Napoleon. 

Nevertheless,  though  Young  Italy  lay  crushed  in  the 
summer  of  1849;  though  Mazzini  and  Garibaldi  barely 
escaped  with  their  lives;  though  French  bayonets  supported 
the  Pope  at  the  Vatican,  and  the  white  coats  of  Austria 
terrorized  the  North,  Italy  did  not  die.  She  lay  stunned  and 
bleeding  under  the  heels  of  the  autocrats,  Napoleon  III  and 
Francis  Joseph.  But  she  had  caught  life-giving  words  that 
were  more  potent  than  the  bayonet  and  the  gibbet.  Garibaldi 
had  shown  that  her  sons  could  fight  on  equal  terms  with  the 
best  troops  in  Europe.  The  "honest  King,"  Victor  Em- 
manuel, was  a  centre  of  hope;  and  his  Minister,  Cavour, 
sought  by  all  possible  means  to  remedy  the  disasters  of  1849 
by  pitting  France  against  Austria.  He  succeeded;  and  the 


92  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Italian  monarchy  of  to-day  is  largely  the  outcome  of  his 
masterly  statecraft.  Even  Cavour  and  Victor  Emmanuel, 
however,  would  not  have  succeeded  but  for  the  faith  and 
enthusiasm  kindled  by  Mazzini.  Men  who  are  nerved  by  a 
conviction  of  the  justice  and  beneficence  of  then*  cause  are 
not  daunted  by  one  or  two  disasters.  As  Mazzini  wrote  after 
the  surrender  of  Rome  to  the  French:  "What  was  failure  to 
men  who  were  imbued  with  our  beliefs?  " 

That  faith  was  rooted  more  deeply  than  in  a  merely  na- 
tional patriotism.  The  men  of  Young  Italy  shed  their  blood, 
not  merely  that  their  country  might  gain  the  unity  she  so 
much  needed,  but  in  order  to  assure  her  civilizing  mission  to 
mankind  at  large.  They  caught  a  vision  of  other  peoples 
freed  and  regenerated.  In  words  which  are  prophetic,  if  not 
for  his  day,  then  perhaps  for  ours,  Mazzini  thus  outlined  the 
future:  "The  map  of  Europe  will  be  remade.  The  countries 
of  the  peoples  will  arise,  defined  by  the  voice  of  the  free,  upon 
the  ruins  of  the  countries  of  kings  and  privileged  castes. 
Between  these  countries  there  will  be  harmony  and  brother- 
hood. .  .  .  Then  each  of  you,  strong  in  the  affections  and  aid 
of  many  millions  of  men  speaking  the  same  language  and 
educated  in  the  same  historic  tradition,  may  hope  by  your 
personal  effort  to  benefit  the  whole  of  Humanity." 

Yes:  the  map  of  Europe  is  now  to  be  remade.  The  re- 
making can  proceed  on  two  methods;  either  on  force  or 
on  a  sense  of  duty;  either  on  the  military  results  and  the 
calculations  deduced  therefrom,  or  according  to  the  dic- 
tates of  justice  and  enlightened  common  sense.  If  the  peace 
of  the  year  1916  or  1917  be  merely  the  law  of  the  strongest, 
expressed  in  terms  of  their  actual  losses  and  hoped-for  gains, 
it  will  be  the  parent  of  future  wars.  If,  however,  the  settle- 
ment be  dictated  by  a  deep  sense  of  public  duty  both  towards 
the  present  and  future  generations,  then  the  future  may  prove 
to  be  that  which  the  prophetic  eye  of  Mazzini  discerned. 


LECTURE  VI 
THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS 

THERE  is  a  homely  saying,  "It  takes  all  kinds  of  people  to 
make  the  world."  And  this,  which  is  said  of  individuals, 
is  equally  true  of  the  peoples.  The  richness  of  the  life  of 
Europe  is  due  mainly  to  the  variety  of  its  races  and  to  their 
strong  individuality.  Their  competition  in  the  spheres  of 
thought  and  action,  even  their  collisions  in  war,  are  healthier 
than  the  stagnation  produced  by  the  dead  uniformity  of  the 
life  of  pre-reform  China.  Even  to-day,  surely,  it  is  true: 

"Better  fifty  years  of  Europe  than  a  cycle  of  Cathay." 

To  dash  off  the  characteristics  of  the  European  peoples 
would  lead  merely  to  smart  epigrams,  and  I  will  not  attempt 
it.  It  is  impossible  to  assess  correctly  the  peculiarities  even 
of  the  subdivisions  of  the  great  family  which  we  are  now 
attempting  to  study.  But  there  is  a  general  likeness  about 
all  the  Slavs,  especially  those  who  still  remain  in  the  great 
plain  of  East  Europe. 

Those  wind-swept  steppes,  where  winter  fastens  a  relent- 
less grip  for  five  months  and  then  breaks  into  a  brief  spring 
and  an  almost  torrid  summer,  beget  extremes  of  character. 
The  long  and  bitter  cold  fosters  the  virtues  of  toughness 
and  endurance,  also  of  firm  comradeship.  For  the  millions 
of  Russian  peasants  life  is  a  stern  struggle,  and  only  by  hold- 
ing stoutly  together  in  their  Mir,  or  village  commune,  have 
they  survived.  The  drought  of  summer  is  equally  to  be 
dreaded.  A  prey,  therefore,  to  extremes  of  climate,  the 
peasant  develops  a  tenacity  unequalled  except  among  races 

93 


94  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

that  struggle  against  the  sea;  and  there  is  in  the  landsman  of 
the  East  more  of  resignation  and  melancholy  than  is  found 
among  the  seamen  of  the  West.  When  the  Muscovite  has 
fought  on  to  the  very  end  and  knows  he  is  beaten,  he  lies 
down  and  dies  with  the  fatalism  of  the  Asiatic.  The  Slavs, 
essentially  an  emotional  people,  have  been  moulded  by  this 
life  of  extremes.  Both  they,  then*  literature,  and  their  music 
are  intense  and  passionate;  but  an  undertone  of  melancholy 
pervades  even  their  outbursts  and  their  excesses.  It  is  the 
grund-motiv  of  the  Russian  winter. 

Their  great  enemy  of  peace  time  is  also  their  best  friend 
in  war  tune.  From  the  dawn  of  history  in  the  days  of  Herodo- 
tus the  dwellers  in  the  great  plains  have,  with  the  aid  of  this 
fearsome  ally,  worsted  all  invaders.  Darius,  the  Tartars, 
the  Poles,  Charles  XII  of  Sweden,  Napoleon  (shall  I  add 
Hindenburg?)  recoiled,  shattered.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
plain-dwellers  have  been  remarkable  for  a  certain  want  of 
enterprise  in  war.  In  campaigns  far  from  home  they  have 
rarely  been  formidable,  except  against  Turks  and  Tartars. 
Russia,  while  strong  for  defence,  is  weak  for  offence.  She 
resembles  Antaeus  rather  than  Hercules.  Her  people  and  her 
Government  lack  the  resourcefulness,  foresight,  and  organ- 
izing capacity  needful  for  the  success  of  distant  expeditions. 
Professor  Brandes  goes  so  far  as  to  say:  "Passivity  shows 
itself  in  their  public  and  private  life,  in  the  submission  to  the 
powers  that  be.  ...  Though  the  Russians  are  a  brave  and 
a  remarkably  steadfast  people  in  war,  they  are  the  most 
peaceful  and  unwarlike  people  in  the  world."  1 

This  is  a  little  exaggerated;  for  Russian  Tsars  have  given 
rein  to  warlike  ambitions;  and  their  people  have  followed 
them;  but  the  people  themselves  cling  to  their  homes,  to 
their  creed,  and  to  the  old  ways.  From  the  tune  when  the 
Greek  colonists  of  the  North  Euxine  gazed  with  terror  on  the 
1  G.  Brandes,  Impressions  of  Russia,  p.  26. 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS  95 

Scythian  tribes  moving  about  in  their  quaint  caravans, 
those  barbarians  were  far  less  formidable  than  they  appeared. 
Only  when  pressed  from  the  East,  in  the  Dark  Ages,  did 
they  or  their  successors  send  forth  swarms  that  overran 
Europe.  Considering  her  vast  bulk,  Russia  has  played  a 
curiously  small  part  in  European  history.  Her  natural  trend 
was  towards  Asia  rather  than  Central  Europe;  and  she  rarely 
moved  westwards  except  after  attacks  from  the  west. 

The  first  event  that  thoroughly  aroused  her  from  Oriental 
torpor  was  the  invasion  of  Napoleon  in  1812.  Untaught  by 
his  failure  to  break  down  the  resistance  of  the  Spaniards, 
he  strove  to  wear  them  out  in  the  South- West  and  the  Mus- 
covites in  the  North-East,  though  in  both  cases  he  con- 
fronted an  enraged  people,  unconquerable  if  only  they  would 
persevere.  The  life  of  Russia  was  widespread,  impalpable, 
scattered  through  myriads  of  villages,  each  of  which,  thanks 
to  the  Mir,  was  a  self-sufficing  unit.  So  soon  as  these  units 
were  resolutely  of  one  mind,  the  only  thing  left  for  the  in- 
vader was — to  decamp. 

Among  the  many  perversities  of  that  curious  book,  Power 
and  Liberty,  Tolstoi  hit  upon  an  undoubted  truth,  that 
Napoleon's  Grand  Army  had  to  leave  Moscow  because  the 
peasants  burnt  their  corn  and  fodder  rather  than  let  the 
French  have  it.  The  triumph  was  essentially  a  national 
triumph;  and  the  spirit  of  the  Russian  troops  led  even  single 
individuals  to  attack  the  French  during  the  long  retreat. 
In  a  military  sense,  the  Russian  pursuit  was  often  tardy  and 
ineffective;  but  General  Whiter  did  his  work  thoroughly; 
and  the  Russian  people  have  never  lost  the  feeling  of  pride 
in  that  overthrow  of  the  great  Emperor.  It  was  in  Spain 
and  Russia  that  he  encountered  forces  beyond  even  his  power, 
the  strength  of  a  truly  national  resistance. 

As  in  Spain,  however,  the  new  patriotism  was  soon  diverted 
into  reactionary  paths.  The  Tsar,  Alexander  I,  drifted  away 


96  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

from  the  Liberalism  of  his  youth;  and,  worst  of  all,  he  did 
not  keep  troth  with  the  Poles.  That  gifted  people  had  done 
and  suffered  much  for  Napoleon;  and  in  1814-5  Alexander 
held  out  to  them  the  hope  of  a  national  kingdom  under  his 
suzerainty.  The  autonomous  Kingdom  of  Poland  soon 
vanished,  and  Alexander's  suzerainty  became  a  despotism. 
Since  then  there  has  been  no  real  union  of  sentiment  between 
Poles  and  Russians,  and  the  latent  hostility  of  the  Poles  to 
Russia  is,  perhaps,  the  chief  of  the  weaknesses  of  that  Em- 
pire. That  huge  organism  has  never  been  thoroughly  unified. 
It  is  an  agglomerate,  in  which  the  Great  Russians  of  the  North 
and  North  Centre  predominate;  but  their  hard  and  practical 
nature  consorts  ill  with  the  more  sensitive  Little  Russians 
of  the  South,  the  Poles  of  the  West,  and  the  Finns  of  the 
North- West.  Whether  these  peoples  will  ever  cordially  unite 
is  one  of  the  problems  of  the  future.  Certainly,  the  autocracy 
has  failed  to  unite  them.  Perhaps  this  war,  and  after  the  war, 
democracy,  will  accomplish  the  feat.  Russian  enthusiasts 
are  confident  that  democracy  will  succeed  where  despotism 
has  failed.  In  this  respect  the  development  of  Russia  pre- 
sents a  signal  contrast  to  that  of  Prussia  and  Germany,  which 
has  been  vitally  connected  with  the  House  of  Hohenzollern. 
That  House  has  unified  the  German  people,  and,  since  uni- 
fication, has  drilled  them  with  Prussian  rigor.  Whatever 
be  the  faults  of  the  Tsardom,  it  has  not  cast  all  the  Russians 
into  the  same  mould;  but  perhaps  the  failure  to  unify  them 
results  from  the  lack  of  cohesion  which  has  always  marked 
the  Slav  peoples.  They  have  attained  to  a  racial  feeling,  but 
not  to  the  wider  feeling  which  may  be  termed  national. 

The  centrifugal  tendencies  of  the  Slavs  of  the  Austrian 
Empire  are  also  very  marked.  Limiting  our  attention  here 
to  the  South  Slavs,  we  notice  that  the  awakening  of  their 
national  sentiment  somewhat  preceded  that  of  the  Russians. 
Nature  and  the  current  of  events  had  alike  been  unfavorable 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS  97 

to  the  South  Slavs.  Their  furthest  off-shoots  on  the  South- 
West  had  settled  in  the  mountainous  country  a  little  to  the 
North-East  and  East  of  the  Adriatic.  Those  living  north  of 
Trieste  and  around  Laybach  are  termed  Slovenes;  those 
further  East  are  Croats;  those  to  the  South-East,  Serbs. 
The  Slovenes  are  almost  completely  cut  off  from  the  Adriatic 
by  a  thin  but  tough  belt  of  Italians  around  Trieste;  and  the 
Croats  and  Serbs,  who  stretch  as  far  as  that  sea,  have  long 
been  severed  from  it  politically  by  the  Venetian  Republic 
and  by  its  heir,  Austria.  Those  Powers  kept  a  tight  hold  on 
the  coast  line  and  rigorously  subjected  the  Slavonic  popula- 
tion. It  has  never  been  Italianized,  still  less  Austrianized. 
These  Slavs,  cut  off  from  effective  use  of  the  sea,  and  divided 
between  Hapsburg,  Venetian,  and  Ottoman  rule,  remained 
in  a  state  of  torpor  until  about  the  time  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, when  the  blows  dealt  by  the  Republican  armies  to  Venice 
and  Austria  awakened  the  Slovenes  and  Croats.  Already  the 
latter  had  resisted  the  attempts  of  the  Magyars  to  denation- 
alize them.  In  the  Hungarian  Diet  the  proud  nobiles  began 
to  use  the  Magyar  tongue  instead  of  Latin.  The  Croat 
deputies  resisted;  and  in  1805  the  Bishop  of  Agram  advocated 
the  use  of  the  Slavonic  tongue  in  public  speech  and  documents. 
Thus  the  national  sentiment  of  the  South  Slavs  was  first 
excited  by  Magyar  aggressions  at  the  expense  of  their  mother- 
tongue. 

Next,  the  blows  of  Napoleon  fell  on  the  House  of  Haps- 
burg. After  Austerlitz  he  compelled  Austria  to  cede  East 
Venetia,  Istria,  and  part  of  Dalmatia  to  his  new  Kingdom 
of  Italy.  After  the  campaign  of  Wagram,  he  forced  her  to 
give  up  the  lands  which  he  styled  the  Illyrian  Provinces, 
and  they  formed  part  of  the  French  Empire  during  the  years 
1809-13.  Marshal  Marmont,  the  new  Governor,  introduced 
the  Code  Napoleon  and  many  of  the  benefits  of  the  French 
administration.  The  effects  were  very  marked.  These 


98  NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

South  Slavs,  previously  divided  and  misgoverned,  now  en- 
tered into  a  large  and  generous  polity.  The  French  encour- 
aged the  official  use  of  the  Slovene  and  Croat  languages, 
which  had  previously  been  proscribed;  and  a  new  national 
feeling  was  aroused  by  newspapers  and  books  written  in  the 
vernacular.  Such  was  the  gratitude  of  these  downtrodden 
peoples  to  the  French  Emperor  that  the  poet  Vodnik  sang 
his  praises  in  an  ode,  entitled  Risen  Ittyria:  "Napoleon  has 
said  'Awake:  arise,  Illyria.'  She  wakes,  she  sighs — 'Who 
recalls  me  to  the  light?  O  great  hero,  is  it  thou  who  wakest 
me?  Thou  reachest  to  me  thy  mighty  hand;  thou  liftest  me 
up.'  .  .  .  'Resting  one  hand  on  Gaul,  I  give  the  other  to 
Greece  that  I  may  save  her.  At  the  head  of  Greece  is  Corinth ; 
in  the  centre  of  Europe  is  Illyria.  Corinth  is  called  the  eye  of 
Greece.  Illyria  shall  be  the  jewel  of  the  whole  world. ' "  On 
the  fall  of  Napoleon,  the  Slovenes  again  reverted  to  Austria, 
and  the  Croats  to  Hungary.  Again  the  Magyars  began  their 
attempts  to  Magyarize,  but  encountered  an  equally  obstinate 
resistance,  the  Croat  and  Serb  provinces  declaring  their  equal- 
ity of  rights  with  the  Hungarian.  They  were  sister  provinces, 
not  daughter  provinces.1 

When  part  of  an  oppressed  people  gains  the  boon  of  self- 
expression  it  is  natural  that  the  other  part,  which  is  still 
gagged,  should  struggle  ceaselessly.  Already  the  Serbs 
had  striven  valiantly  against  Turkish  tyranny.  They  never 
despaired  of  casting  off  their  vassalage  to  the  infidel;  for  deep 
in  their  hearts  was  the  memory  of  the  glorious  days  of  King 
Dushan,  who,  about  1350,  ruled  over  all  the  lands  from  Philip- 
popolis  to  Agram,  and  southwards  as  far  as  Corinth.  Serbia 
was  then  the  most  powerful  State  of  South-East  Europe, 
and  owned  ports  on  the  ^Egean  and  Adriatic.  At  the  capital, 
Uskub,  Dushan  held  a  splendid  Court,  Greeks,  Bulgars, 

1L6ger,  Austria-Hungary,  p.  440:  Seton- Watson,  The  Southern  Slav 
Question,  pp.  25-9. 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS  99 

even  the  proud  Magyars  bowing  before  Serb  supremacy. 
This  promising  civilization  fell  at  one  blow.  The  Turks 
burst  upon  it  and  levelled  it  to  the  ground  at  the  Battle  of 
Kossovo  (1389).  A  legend,  preserved  ever  since  in  ballad 
form,  tells  how  the  fate  of  Serbia  and  of  Christendom  was 
decided  by  the  treachery  of  a  Serb  chieftain,  Vuk  Branko- 
vich,  who,  at  the  crisis  of  the  struggle,  rode  over  to  the  infidels 
with  12,000  panoplied  horsemen.  Whether  true  or  not,  that 
story  struck  deep  into  the  hearts  of  the  Serbs.  During  five 
centuries  of  slavery  the  exploits  of  Dushan  and  Milosh  were 
handed  down  by  minstrels  (gosslari),  who  secretly  assembled 
the  peasants  and  sang  to  them  of  the  great  days  when  Serbs 
gave  the  law  to  Bulgar  and  Greek,  and  fell  beneath  the  Mos- 
lem yoke  only  because  of  treachery  within  the  fold.  Thus 
a  consciousness  of  superiority  lingered  on,  inspiring  the  belief 
that,  if  ever  they  had  a  chance,  they  would  beat  back  the  in- 
fidel to  Asia  and  renew  the  ancient  glories  of  Uskub.  A  people 
that  cherishes  those  historic  memories  can  never  be  alto- 
gether enslaved.  The  fire  of  patriotism,  though  choked 
down,  will  smoulder  on;  and  a  spark  may  bring  it  to  a  flame. 

That  spark,  as  we  have  seen,  was  blown  eastwards  from 
Italy  and  Croatia.  The  exploits  of  Napoleon  and  the  fall 
of  Venice  and  Austria  sent  a  thrill  through  the  Slavonic 
world;  and  the  Serbs  challenged  the  supremacy  of  the  Turks. 
At  that  time  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  rent  asunder  by 
revolts  of  local  pashas  and  of  that  privileged  military  caste, 
the  Janissaries.  The  Serb  peasants  therefore  won  many  suc- 
cesses; and  the  invasion  of  Turkey  by  the  Russians  in  1809 
promised  for  a  time  to  lead  to  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks 
from  Europe.  In  1812  the  Russians  had  to  withdraw  in 
order  to  meet  Napoleon's  Grand  Army;  but,  as  formerly  in 
1791,  they  had  spread  far  and  wide  the  hope  that  the  great 
Slav  brother  would  free  his  "little  brothers,"  the  Roumans, 
Bulgars,  and  Serbs.  By  the  treaty  of  1812  Russia  wrested 


TOO          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

from  the  Turks  the  boon  of  autonomy  for  the  Roumans, 
together  with  certain  privileges  for  the  Serbs.  These  last 
were  soon  revoked  by  the  ever  faithless  Turks,  who  sought 
to  cow  the  Serbs  by  impaling  or  brutal  floggings.  They 
failed.  An  enterprising  Serb  peasant,  Milosh  Obrenovich, 
proclaimed  a  general  rising  on  Palm  Sunday,  1815,  worsted 
the  enemy  and  extorted  the  right  to  bear  arms. 

In  the  sequel  the  Ottomans  might,  perhaps,  have  over- 
whelmed the  Serbs  but  for  the  risings  of  the  Greeks,  the 
revolts  of  the  Janissaries,  and  the  Russian  invasion  of  1829. 
The  rapid  advance  of  the  Russians  as  far  as  Adrianople 
spread  dismay  among  the  Turks;  and  Sultan  Mahmud  II 
made  peace  with  Russia,  conceding  among  other  things 
further  rights  to  the  Serbs.  Thus  a  second  tune  Russia  be- 
friended the  Slavs  of  the  Balkans,  and  they  (the  Bulgars 
included)  acknowledged  her  as  their  champion.  In  1842 
Serbia  (now  enlarged)  refashioned  her  popular  Assembly,  so 
that  what  had  been  merely  a  mass  meeting  of  warriors  be- 
came an  organized  representative  body.  Thus  the  Serbs 
were  the  first  of  the  lesser  Slav  peoples  to  develop  constitu- 
tional rule,  albeit  of  a  very  crude  and  primitive  type.  This 
fact  is  far  more  significant  than  the  sanguinary  strifes  be- 
tween the  rival  Houses  of  Karageorge  and  Obrenovich. 
Those  struggles,  culminating  in  the  murder  of  King  Alexander 
in  1903,  are  relics  of  a  barbarous  past;  but  they  have  not 
very  seriously  retarded  the  progress  of  the  people  at  large. 
That  progress  is  what  really  matters;  and  the  acts  by  which 
a  community  of  peasants  step  by  step  won  its  freedom  from 
the  warlike  Turks  and  then  gradually  attained  to  self-govern- 
ment bespeak  not  only  tenacious  bravery,  but  also  a  political 
capacity  of  no  mean  order.  In  the  nineteenth  century  na- 
tionalism which  is  limited  solely  to  military  exploits  counts 
for  little.  As  Napoleon  once  remarked,  the  civilian  is  a 
wider  man  than  a  mere  warrior,  because  "the  method  of 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS  101 

the  soldier  is  to  act  despotically;  that  of  the  civilian  is  to 
submit  to  discussion,  truth,  and  reason."  Similarly,  a  people 
which  excels  in  the  affairs  of  peace  must  in  the  long  run 
surpass  one  which,  like  the  Turks,  devotes  itself  almost  ex- 
clusively to  war.  In  fact,  nothing  is  more  remarkable  than 
the  manner  in  which  the  Christian  peoples  of  the  Balkans 
though  often  defeated  and  massacred,  have  slowly  but 
surely  outstripped  their  Ottoman  conquerors  and  perse- 
cutors. It  is  because  the  latter  have  relied  upon  force,  while 
their  subjects  have  applied  the  new  national  enthusiasm  to 
all  sides  of  the  widening  life  of  to-day.  The  futility  of  rely- 
ing merely  upon  armed  might  nowhere  appears  more  clearly 
than  in  the  changed  relations  of  the  Turks  and  their  victims. 
The  fortunes  of  those  subject  peoples,  however,  depended 
largely  upon  their  champion,  Russia.  In  that  Empire,  es- 
pecially at  the  old  capital,  Moscow,  pride  of  race  has  always 
been  strong.  If  Petrograd  was,  as  its  founder  claimed,  the 
eye  by  which  Russia  looked  out  on  Europe,  Moscow  was 
the  eye  of  faith,  which  discerned  in  Muscovy  the  means  of 
national  uplifting.  There  are  always  two  currents  of  thought 
in  Russia,  the  cosmopolitan,  strong  at  Petrograd,  which  has 
tended  to  rely  on  Germany  and  France;  the  other,  all-powerful 
at  Moscow,  which  circles  about  things  Muscovite,  and 
claims  that  they  alone  will  save  Russia.  The  former  party 
tend  to  depreciate  Slavonic  customs  and  sometimes  vent 
their  despair  in  such  an  outburst  as  that  of  Turgenieff: 
"What  have  we  Russians  invented  but  the  knout?"  The 
others,  strong  in  faith  and  contemptuous  of  foreign  ways, 
retort:  "Yes:  whenever  it  rains  at  Paris,  you  put  up  your 
umbrellas  at  Petersburg."  The  men  of  faith  point  out  that 
in  1812  the  might  of  Napoleon  collapsed  before  the  patriotic 
endurance  of  Russian  peasants;  and  in  that  time  of  trial  the 
nation  proved  its  capacity  both  to  save  itself  and  save 
Europe.  Away,  then,  with  servile  imitation  of  the  foreigner! 


102          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Away  with  the  German  customs  and  notions  imported  by 
Peter  the  Great  and  Catharine! 

Such  was  the  creed  of  a  group  of  students  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Moscow.  They  sought  "to  found  an  independent 
national  culture  on  the  basis  of  popular  conceptions  and 
Byzantine  orthodoxy,  forsaken  since  the  time  of  Peter  the 
Great."  x  In  the  main  they  relied  on  the  Mir  and  the  com- 
munal customs  connected  with  it;  also  on  the  Greek  Church 
as  the  true  exponent  of  Christian  tradition.  They  forswore 
the  use  of  French  and  German  in  favor  of  the  hitherto 
despised  vernacular.  At  first,  i.  e.  early  in  the  thirties,  the 
movement  had  no  political  significance;  but  Nicholas  I  soon 
used  it  to  further  his  reactionary  policy;  and  the  tendency 
of  a  narrow  nationalism  to  play  into  the  hands  of  a  despot 
was  illustrated  in  Russia  more  promptly  and  banef  ully  than 
perhaps  anywhere  else.  Thanks  to  the  Slavophiles  of  Mos- 
cow, Nicholas  was  able  to  subject  the  teaching  of  philosophy 
to  the  clergy  of  the  Greek  Church  and  that  of  history  to  the 
supervision  of  the  public  censor.  Foreign  books  and  news- 
papers were  as  far  as  possible  excluded;  and  Russia  entered 
upon  the  path  of  political  and  religious  reaction. 

A  similar  degradation  befell  a  somewhat  cognate  move- 
ment. Panslavism  can  boast  a  revolutionary  origin.  It 
was  first  proclaimed  at  Paris  by  a  Russian,  Bakunin,  who 
is  also  the  father  of  Nihilism.  A  Russian  student,  he  sat 
at  the  feet  of  Hegel  at  Berlin,  and  finally  settled  in  the 
French  capital,  where  he  associated  with  many  Polish  exiles. 
At  a  banquet,  held  in  1847  to  commemorate  the  Polish  rising 
of  1830,  he  spoke  passionately  in  favor  of  a  federative  union 
of  all  Slavs.  Such  a  scheme  implied  the  grouping  together, 
not  only  of  the  Russians  and  Poles,  but  of  the  Checs  and 
Slovaks  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  and  of  the  South  Slavs 
oppressed  by  Austria  and  Turkey.  As  a  revolutionary  pro- 
1  Russia  before  and  after  the  War,  p.  138. 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS  103 

gramme  this  scheme  of  Bakunin  surpassed  all  the  political 
schemes  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Its  complete  realization 
would  involve  the  destruction,  not  only  of  Austria  and 
Turkey,  but  also  of  the  Empire  of  the  Tsars;  for,  as  was 
said  by  Herzen,  one  of  the  Russian  revolutionaries:  "When 
we  win  Constantinople,  then  the  iron  sceptre  of  Peter  the 
Great  must  break;  for  it  cannot  be  lengthened  to  reach  to 
the  Dardanelles."  l  The  Russian  anarchists,  then,  hoped  by 
arousing  a  Slavonic  enthusiasm  among  all  branches  of  that 
widely  scattered  race  to  break  up  three  great  Empires  and 
spread  revolution  far  and  wide.  In  its  origin  Panslavism 
was  rather  an  anarchic  than  a  merely  national  movement. 
In  this  respect  it  contrasts  with  the  Pangerman  movement, 
which  has  always  been  intensely  national. 

Panslavism,  however,  gradually  shed  its  revolutionary 
slough  and  became  almost  a  conservative  force.  The  steps 
by  which  this  came  about  are  obscure;  and  we  need  merely 
note  that  hi  the  critical  years  1875-7  Panslavists  and  Slav- 
ophiles tended  to  merge.  Both  sections  sought  to  force  the 
Tsar,  Alexander  II,  to  draw  the  sword  against  Turkey;  and, 
despite  his  clinging  to  peace,  they  prevailed.  In  the  period 
of  reaction  which  set  in  under  Alexander  III  Panslavism  and 
the  Slavophile  movement  proper  were  the  twin  steeds  yoked 
to  the  autocrat's  car.  Both  proved  to  be  equally  amenable 
to  the  yoke;  and  the  reactionary  Ministers  of  Petrograd 
succeeded  so  skilfully  in  manipulating  Panslavism  that  wags 
have  wittily  dubbed  it  "the  romanticism  of  red  tape." 
The  phrase  crystallizes  the  tendencies  of  the  Slavs  towards 
emotionalism  in  politics,  which,  in  practice,  inclines  them 
towards  submission  to  the  powers  that  be  in  Church  and 
State. 

Another  weakness  of  the  Slavs  is  their  wide  dispersion. 
The  Germans  and  Magyars  thrust  a  solid  mass  between  the 
1  Ibid.,  p.  308. 


104          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

North  and  South  Slavs  of  the  Austrian  Empire;  so  that,  even 
in  the  cataclysm  of  1848-9,  the  two  halves  of  that  people 
failed  to  unite.  For  all  their  eager  fraternizing  in  a  great 
Slavonic  Congress  at  Prague  in  the  spring  of  1848, 1  the  South 
Slavs  soon  ranged  themselves  on  the  side  of  the  Hapsburgs 
and  helped  to  re-establish  that  dynasty.  It  is  curious  that 
those  years  witnessed  the  rise  both  of  the  Panslavonic  and 
Pangerman  ideas,  the  former  at  Prague,  the  latter  at  the 
German  Parliament  assembled  at  Frankfurt;  but  nothing 
came  of  either  of  them.  Democracy  and  nationality  then 
hindered  each  other,  and  found  no  support  from  any  powerful 
State.  Their  ignominious  collapse  subjected  those  formative 
ideas  two  decades  later  to  the  domination  of  Realpolitik;  of 
Gortchakoff  in  Russia,  of  Bismarck  in  Prussia. 

Not  that  the  call  which  in  1875  came  to  Russia  from  the 
Slavs  of  the  Turkish  Empire  was  devoid  of  romance;  for,  if 
ever  cause  was  lofty  and  holy,  it  was  that  which  the  Tsar, 
Alexander  II,  championed  in  the  ensuing  years.  But  the 
Slav  movement  was  finally  to  suffer  from  the  bargaining  and 
the  statecraft  which  accompanied  and  closed  those  liberating 
efforts.  Assuredly,  the  cries  which  came  from  Bosnians, 
Serbs,  and  Bulgars  were  such  as  no  patriotic  Russian  could 
hear  unmoved.  Bulgaria  had  lagged  far  behind  her  neigh- 
bors in  developing  the  national  idea,  a  fact  which  we  may 
explain  partly  by  her  semi-Slavonic  origin.  The  Bulgars 
are  akin  to  the  Magyars  and  Turks.  True,  after  their  long 
stay  in  Russia,  near  the  Volga,  they  were  Slavized  and  finally 
became  Christian.  But  their  stolid  and  unemotional  tem- 
perament still  proclaims  their  affinity  to  the  Turanian  stock; 
so  that  persons  who  lay  stress  on  mere  questions  of  race  and 

aThe  Committee's  manifesto  contained  these  words:  "After  centuries 
of  misery  we  have  at  last  become  aware  of  our  unity,  our  responsibility 
for  one  another."  But  the  proceedings  at  the  Congress  demonstrated 
the  extreme  difficulty  of  common  action. 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS  105 

ignore  the  higher  and  more  lasting  influences  making  for 
nationality  may  perhaps  find  some  slight  excuse  for  the  re- 
cent treachery  of  the  Bulgars  to  the  Slavonic  cause.  But  let 
it  ever  be  remembered  that  the  Bulgars  owe  everything  to 
the  Slavs.  Besides,  of  themselves  they  would  never  have 
shaken  off  the  Turkish  yoke.  In  1834  Kinglake  travelled 
from  Belgrade  through  Sofia  to  Constantinople.  In  Serbia 
he  recognized  the  people  as  Serbs.  East  of  the  Dragoman 
Pass,  that  is  in  Bulgaria,  he  deemed  all  the  inhabitants 
Turks,  except  a  substratum  of  Christina  rayahs  unworthy 
of  his  notice.  It  was  reserved  for  the  French  professor  of 
Slavonic  literature,  Cyprien  Robert,  to  unearth  the  Bulgars, 
and  he  found  them  secretly  cherishing  their  religion,  customs, 
and  language,  all  of  them  not  very  unlike  those  of  the  Serbs. 

Apart  from  a  few  local  risings  of  Bulgar  peasants,  goaded 
to  madness  by  Turkish  tyranny,  nothing  of  importance  oc- 
curred in  their  history  until  1870,  when  they  gained  the  right 
to  have  their  own  religious  community,  that  is,  apart  from 
the  Patriarch  of  the  Greek  Church.  The  Porte  was  induced 
to  take  this  step,  partly  by  the  demands  of  Russia,  France, 
and  Great  Britain,  who  always  favored  Bulgarian  claims; 
partly  also  because  it  hoped  by  this  means  to  divide  the  Chris- 
tians and  weaken  them.  Far  from  that,  the  formation  of  a 
national  Church  strengthened  the  Bulgarian  movement  at 
the  expense  both  of  Greeks  and  Serbs.  To  the  new  Church 
were  allotted  Bulgaria  Proper,  also  the  vilayets  of  Adrianople, 
Salonica,  Kossovo,  and  Monastir.  In  these  districts,  which 
Serbs  and  Greeks  also  claimed,  the  Bulgars  soon  began  a 
vigorous  propaganda  by  means  of  churches  and  schools, 
which  soon  withdrew  vast  numbers  from  the  Greek  Church. 
Sir  Charles  Eliot  believes  that  this  act  halved  the  numbers 
of  those  who  previously  were  counted  Greeks.1  The  Bulgars 
also  stole  a  march  on  the  Serbs  in  the  districts  of  Kossovo 
1  Sir  C.  Eliot,  Turkey  in  Europe,  pp.  259,  291. 


106          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

and  Monastir.  A  Serb  gentleman  once  informed  me  that 
his  people  never  suffered  a  worse  blow  than  the  allocation  of 
Old  Serbia  to  the  Bulgarian  Church.  The  consequence  was 
the  growth  of  an  intense  rivalry  between  Bulgar,  Greek,  and 
Serb,  especially  for  supremacy  in  Macedonia.  The  present 
war  is  in  large  measure  the  outcome  of  the  racial  jealousies 
which  the  Porte  kindled,  or  rather  rekindled,  by  its  firman 
of  1870.  Bulgaria  is  making  a  mad  bid  for  the  conquest  of 
the  territory  which  the  Porte  gave  to  her  ecclesiastically 
in  1870.  It  was  not  until  late  in  the  nineteenth  century  that 
the  Serbs  gained  the  right  to  open  their  schools  in  the  vilayets 
of  Monastir  and  Salonica:  and  not  until  1900  did  they  acquire 
a  national  church. 

In  this  respect  Serbia  has  been  very  unfortunate,  while 
Bulgaria  enjoyed  exceptional  good  fortune.  Ever  since 
1805  the  Serbs  were  struggling  for  their  independence  from 
the  Turks.  Yet  in  1870  at  one  bound  the  Bulgars  passed 
them  by  in  the  race  for  supremacy,  which  depends  largely 
on  religious  organization.  How  much  this  meant  was  seen 
in  the  racial  statistics  of  Macedonia;  in  which  the  priest  and 
schoolmaster  were  able  to  make  what  they  liked  of  that  doubt- 
ful material.  The  report  of  a  Russian  victory,  a  lavish  dis- 
tribution of  Austrian  gold,  or  fear  of  the  incursion  of  a  robber- 
band  of  Greeks  sufficed  to  make  the  wretched  peasantry  of 
Macedonia  turn  over  from  one  side  to  the  other  with  unblush- 
ing effrontery. 

To  revert  to  the  events  of  1875;  the  reopening  of  the  East- 
ern Question  certainly  came  from  the  Serbs  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina.  Their  revolt  in  the  autumn  of  1875  was  caused 
by  the  exceptional  cruelty  of  the  Turkish  tax-gatherers  after 
a  bad  harvest.  That  rising  has  by  some  been  ascribed  to 
Austrian  agitators.  But  when  crops  were  seized  wholesale, 
and  the  sanctities  of  home  were  foully  outraged,  what  need 
is  there  to  drag  in  the  foreign  agitator?  The  explanation 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS  107 

is  not  supported  by  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  it  is,  in  general, 
a  singularly  superficial  way  of  accounting  for  a  widespread 
movement. 

Last  of  all  the  Slavonic  peoples,  the  Bulgars  began  to  stir, 
but  in  the  partial  way  that  might  be  expected  from  their 
canny  and  suspicious  nature.  An  ambitious  Bulgar  youth, 
named  Stambulofif,  who  had  been  educated  in  Russia  but 
expelled  thence  as  a  revolutionary,  came  back  to  Bulgaria 
in  1875  and  sought  in  mid-September  to  raise  the  peasants 
against  Turkish  tyranny.  Of  the  thousands  who  promised 
to  help  him  only  thirty  assembled  at  the  rendezvous  near 
Eskizagra.  These  courageous  men  fled  to  the  Balkans. 
Thence  Stambulofif  and  a  very  few  escaped  to  Russia,  where 
once  again  he  sought  to  rouse  his  sluggish  countrymen. 

He  had  grounds  for  hope.  The  men  of  Herzegovina  and 
Bosnia  held  out  on  the  mountains,  despite  the  hardships  of 
the  winter  of  1875-6.  The  efforts  of  the  three  Empires 
(Austria,  Russia,  and  Germany)  to  induce  the  Sultan  to 
grant  effective  reforms  were  thwarted  by  the  British  Cabinet. 
Lord  Beaconsfield,  unwarned  by  the  utter  failure  of  our 
Crimean  War  policy,  refused  to  support  the  efforts  of  the  three 
Empires  to  apply  pacific  coercion  in  order  to  extort  from 
Turkey  the  needed  reforms.  The  British  Ministry  went 
further.  It  sent  our  Mediterranean  squadron  to  Besika  Bay, 
near  the  entrance  of  the  Dardanelles,  a  step  which  encouraged 
the  Sublime  Porte  to  expect  the  armed  succor  of  Britain  in 
case  of  war  with  Russia.  These  events  increased  the  excite- 
ment both  of  Moslems  and  Christians  in  the  Peninsula. 
Serbia  could  scarcely  keep  her  sword  in  its  scabbard;  and  the 
Bulgars  hoped  for  armed  aid  from  Russia.  A  Bulgar  school- 
master found  out  a  curious  anagram.  The  Bulgarian  letters 
which  make  up  the  words  "Turkey  will  fall,"  when  put  in  the 
form  of  an  addition  sum  (letters  serve  as  figures  in  the  Cyrillic 
alphabet)  amount  to  the  total  1876. 


io8          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

The  news  whetted  the  eagerness  of  the  peasants.  The 
Bulgarian  novelist,  Vazoff,  in  his  romance,  Under  the  Yoke, 
has  described  the  secret  preparations  for  the  revolt.  The 
women  worked  hard  to  bake  quantities  of  biscuit  for  the  men 
who  were  to  take  to  the  hills  at  the  end  of  April,  1876.  The 
men  made  guns,  pikes,  knives;  while  the  more  ambitious  of 
them,  who  had  heard  tell  of  what  the  Carlists  did  long  before 
in  Spain,  cut  down  their  finest  cherry  trees,  hollowed  them 
out,  hooped  them  with  iron  clamps,  and  hoped  for  great 
things  from  these  curios  mounted  on  the  hills.  Imagine  the 
sequel  on  the  first  of  May,  when  the  Turkish  Bashi-bazouks 
marched  in.  No  deafening  roar,  no  devastating  volleys  of 
grape  shot  on  the  Moslems;  only  a  dull  puff,  a  sound  of  rent 
wood,  and  the  gunners  themselves  laid  low.  That  pathetic 
incident  was  typical  of  the  whole  rising.  With  the  narrow 
view  of  things,  which  is  characteristic  of  the  Bulgars,  some 
villages  waited  for  the  others  to  begin;  and  most  never  began 
at  all.  On  the  few  bolder  spirits  the  Turks  burst  like  a  whirl- 
wind; and  then  the  work  of  murder  and  outrage  began.  At 
Batak  the  Moslems,  after  accepting  the  surrender  of  the 
place,  drove  the  men  into  the  great  church  and  set  it  on  fire. 
Out  of  seven  thousand  inhabitants  five  thousand  were  done 
to  death. 

But  the  victims  did  not  die  wholly  in  vain.  When  these 
horrors  became  known  in  England  they  aroused  a  storm 
of  indignation  against  Turkish  misrule.  Mr.  Gladstone 
voiced  that  indignation  in  tones  which  rang  through  the 
world.  Even  to-day,  or  certainly  up  to  their  last  mad  plunge, 
the  Bulgars  reverenced  his  memory  and  kept  his  portrait  in 
their  cottages  beside  that  of  "the  Tsar  Liberator." 

For  Alexander  II  now  listened  to  the  fervid  demands  of 
his  people  for  armed  intervention.  Gallant  little  Serbia  had 
drawn  the  sword  against  the  Turks;  and  the  sight  of  the 
Serbs  struggling  against  great  odds  stirred  Slav  opinion  to  its 


THE  AWAKENING  OF  THE  SLAVS  109 

depths.  As  before,  Slav  sentiment  centred  at  Moscow,  while 
official  circles  at  Petrograd  and  the  Tsar  himself,  suspect- 
ing that  crusading  fervor  concealed  revolutionary  designs, 
sought  to  turn  the  people  from  their  purpose.  In  this  they 
failed.  Finally,  after  curbing  Slavophile  sentiment  for  a  year, 
the  Tsar  perceived  that  further  delay  would  unite  the  nat- 
urally conservative  Slavophiles  with  the  Nihilists;  and  when 
the  Sublime  Porte,  still  trusting  to  British  succor,  refused  all 
offers  of  compromise,  he  declared  war  on  Turkey.  The 
ensuing  struggle  was  fertile  in  surprises.  Even  with  the  help 
of  Roumania,  Russia  barely  overcame  the  Turks  at  Plevna, 
and  then  had  to  submit  her  first  terms  of  peace,  those  of  San 
Stefano,  to  the  arbitrament  of  Europe.  Owing  to  the  opposi- 
tion of  England  and  Austria,  a  far  less  drastic  settlement  of 
the  racial  questions  of  the  Balkans  was  arrived  at  in  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin  (July,  1878).  That  treaty  cut  down  the 
new  Bulgarian  State,  from  the  San  Stefano  limits,  which 
would  have  brought  it  near  to  Salonica,  and  penned  Bul- 
garia Proper  up  in  the  province  north  of  the  Balkans.  The 
Bulgars  there  were  divided  from  their  brethren  south  of  that 
chain  so  as  to  weaken  that  people,  whom  British  and  Austrian 
statesmen  hastily  assumed  to  be  the  puppets  of  Russia.  The 
gratitude  of  the  Bulgars  to  Russia,  however,  vanished  when 
the  new  Tsar,  Alexander  III,  proceeded  to  treat  them  as 
puppets.  His  harsh  overbearing  ways  alienated  them;  and 
on  their  declaring  for  the  union  of  the  two  Bulgarias  in  1885, 
it  was  England,  under  Lord  Salisbury,  which  favored  the 
union,  while  the  Tsar,  chiefly  from  hatred  of  the  Bulgarian 
prince,  Alexander,  opposed  that  most  natural  and  salutary 
step.  The  statesmanlike  policy  of  Lord  Salisbury  had  been 
prompted  largely  by  our  ambassador,  Sir  William  White,  a 
warm  friend  of  the  Christians  of  the  Balkans;  and  thus  the 
evil  effects  of  Beaconsfield's  pro-Turkish  and  anti-national 
policy  were  reversed. 


no          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

We  must  postpone  to  a  later  lecture  a  consideration  of 
Balkan  politics  in  the  sequel.  I  have  sought  to  bring  before 
you  a  succession  of  scenes  in  which  the  Slavonic  peoples 
struggled  for  self-expression  and  for  the  most  part  utterly 
failed.  During  many  years  Panslavism  was  a  name  that 
aroused  terror  hi  the  clubs  and  salons  of  London.  The 
reality  never  alarmed  those  who  observed  the  centrifugal 
tendencies  always  potent  among  the  Slavs.  Hitherto  Pan- 
slavism  has  been  a  political  Tower  of  Babel. 


LECTURE  VH 
THE  GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE 

"The  aim  of  the  State  is  not  dominion  or  the  restraining  of  men 
by  and  the  subjecting  of  them  to  a  foreign  yoke.  On  the  contrary, 
its  aim  is  to  deliver  each  man  from  fear  so  that  he  may  be  able  to 
live  with  the  utmost  possible  security.  .  .  .  The  aim  of  the  State 
is  liberty." — SPINOZA,  Theological  Politics,  ch.  20. 

Ax  the  beginning  of  this  lecture  I  wish  to  make  it  clear 
that  my  aim  is,  not  to  discourse  upon  any  one  theory  of 
the  State,  but  rather  to  show  how  the  notions  about  the 
State,  now  prevalent  in  Prussia  and  Germany,  developed 
there.  I  will  also  not  waste  time  by  seeking  to  frame  an 
elaborate  definition  of  the  term  "State."  The  word  itself 
means  that  which  is  fixed  or  established,  that  is,  in  regard 
to  law  and  government.  Setting  aside  minor  differences, 
there  are  three  chief  conceptions  regarding  the  State.  The 
first  regards  it  as  depending  on  the  will  of  the  monarch 
(e.  g.  VEtat  c'est  moi,  of  Louis  XIV) ;  or,  secondly,  of  a  priv- 
ileged set  of  persons;  or,  thirdly,  of  the  mass  of  the  people. 
The  organism  which  gives  effect  to  one  or  other  of  those 
wills  is  the  State.  Notions  respecting  it  are  always  changing; 
and  amidst  the  present  cataclysm  he  would  be  a  bold  man 
who  would  ascribe  definiteness  and  fixity  to  the  conception 
of  the  State.1  But  the  desire  for  something  approaching  to 
definiteness,  if  not  fixity,  is  inherent  in  the  human  mind, 
witness  the  declaration  of  poor,  bewildered  Louis  XVI  not 

1 1  accept  the  description  given  by  Mr.  C.  Delisle  Burns  [The  Morality 
of  Nations,  p.  28]  as  "the  sovereign  organization  for  the  attainment  of 
common  political  good." 


112          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

long  before  the  French  Revolution.  Conscious  that  le  regime 
du  bon  plaisir  (i.  e.  of  the  King's  will)  was  doomed,  he  de- 
clared that  France  desired  une  manibre,  fixe  d'etre  gouvernee. 
That  admission  heralded  the  dawn  of  a  democratic  order  on 
the  Continent.  Thenceforth  the  typical  State  was  not  to  be 
the  expression  of  one  man's  will,  but  of  "the  general  will," 
which  Rousseau  affirmed  to  be  the  source  of  all  law  and 
administration. 

But  even  when  we  limit  ourselves  to  the  modern  State 
based  on  representative  institutions,  we  find  a  great  variety 
of  conceptions  regarding  its  functions.  The  most  important 
of  these  differences  arise  respecting  the  claims  which  the 
State  may  make  on  the  liberty  and  services  of  the  individual 
citizen.  Here  at  once  we  plunge  into  the  region  of  contro- 
versies that  are  certain  to  become  more  and  more  acute. 
In  this  connection  it  is  well  to  remember  that  the  democratic 
States  of  the  Ancient  World,  e.  g.  that  of  Athens,  required 
implicit  and  almost  unlimited  obedience  from  their  citizens. 
These  were  bound  in  many  ways  which  we  should  deem 
abhorrent  to  true  liberty.  Transport  a  Londoner  to  the 
Sparta  of  Lycurgus,  and  he  would  protest  vigorously  that 
he  was  a  mere  bondman,  not  much  better  off  than  the  actual 
slaves.  Again,  the  fact  that  a  Roman  citizen  could  for 
heinous  crimes  be  degraded  to  the  position  of  a  slave  illus- 
trates the  radical  difference  between  the  authority  of  the 
State  over  the  individual  in  the  Ancient  and  Modern  World. 
The  power  of  the  Greek  or  Roman  State  was  far  greater  than 
we  should  allow;  yet  that  power  was  accepted  as  in  the  nat- 
ural order  of  things  by  citizens  who  considered  themselves 
entirely  free. 

When,  therefore,  we  approach  the  subject  of  the  authority 
of  the  modern  State  over  its  citizens,  we  must  remember 
that  all  well-educated  men  were  familiar  with  a  condition 
of  society  in  which  a  democratic  State  could  demand  nearly 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  113 

everything  from  its  subjects.  Lord  Acton  well  describes  the 
State  in  ancient  times  as  being  "both  Church  and  State"  in 
one.1  It  was  even  more.  It  was  Church  and  State  and  an 
exacting  employer  all  in  one. 

Lord  Acton's  simile  is  even  more  applicable  to  the  absolute 
monarchies  of  Western  Europe;  for  their  authority  was  based 
on  a  theocratic  creed  as  well  as  on  military  force.  Henry 
VIII,  Philip  IV,  and  Louis  XIV  claimed  to  exercise  an  au- 
thority conferred  by  divine  power  and  sacred  unction.  This 
was  the  theory  adopted  by  the  Hohenzollerns  in  the  year 
1701.  The  claim  in  their  case  was  singular;  for  everyone  who 
looked  on  at  the  gaudy  ceremony  of  coronation  of  the  first 
Prussian  King  at  Konigsberg  was  aware  that  the  royal  title 
was  gained  by  hard  bargaining  with  the  Hapsburg  Court  at 
Vienna.  Nevertheless,  Frederick  I  of  Prussia  decided  that  he 
would  be  a  king  by  the  grace  of  God,  and  he  did  his  utmost 
to  get  himself  taken  seriously  in  that  character.  He  crowned 
himself,  as  all  his  successors  have  done,  excepting  the  greatest 
of  them.  Frederick  the  Great  deemed  that  ceremony  a 
farce,  besides  wasting  money  better  spent  on  troops  or  road- 
making. 

By  this  resolve  he  struck  the  key-note  of  Prussian  policy. 
Nothing  for  show,  everything  for  efficiency.  Rigorous 
efficiency  in  all  departments  of  government,  such  was  the 
aim  of  Frederick  II.  Nothing  was  too  small  to  escape  his 
ken.  In  time  of  peace  he  visited  once  a  year  every  part  of 
his  kingdom.  He  decided  what  marshes  should  be  drained, 
or  what  rivers  embanked  for  the  prevention  of  floods.  It 
was  his  fostering  care  that  unproved  the  woollen  trade, 
founded  new  villages,  and  sought  to  construct  a  navy  and 
plant  colonies  overseas.  He  was  his  own  commander-in- 
chief,  foreign  minister,  chief  engineer,  and  chief  develop- 
ment commissioner.  Woe  betide  the  official  who  neglected 
1  Acton,  History  of  Freedom  and  other  Essays,  p.  16. 


H4          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

his  work!  Frederick's  eye  was  sure  to  detect  the  fault  and 
punish  it  severely.  During  one  of  his  journeys  he  happened 
to  find  out  that  a  courier  was  kept  waiting  owing  to  the 
somnolence  of  a  postmaster.  The  King  rushed  upstairs  into 
the  offender's  bedroom,  dragged  him  from  bed,  and  admin- 
istered a  severe  caning  under  the  most  favorable  conditions. 

Frederick  II  was  the  Prussian  State.  To  his  nephew  he 
described  his  feelings  early  in  the  reign  as  he  surveyed  the 
splendid  troops  and  full  coffers  bequeathed  by  his  fathers. 
He  spent  some  of  the  money  and  increased  the  troops.  Then 
he  looked  around  him  and  saw  four  provinces  that  he  might 
seize.  He  chose  Silesia.  "Therefore"  (he  wrote  to  his  suc- 
cessor), "have  money,  give  an  air  of  superiority  to  your 
troops.  Wait  for  opportunities,  and  you  will  be  certain,  not 
merely  to  preserve,  but  to  increase  your  dominions.  .  .  . 
All  depends  on  circumstances  and  on  the  courage  of  him  who 
takes."  Such  are  the  fundamental  maxims  of  Prussian  state- 
craft: "Be  strong,  be  ready,  then  make  your  coup." 

But  if  Frederick  schemed  and  tricked,  it  was  for  Prussia; 
and  it  was  for  Prussia  that  he  was  ready  to  bleed  and  die. 
His  letter,  of  October,  1760,  written  in  the  midst  of  a  seem- 
ingly hopeless  campaign,  strikes  a  high  note:  "I  regard 
death  from  the  Stoic  point  of  view.  Never  shall  I  see  the 
moment  that  forces  me  to  make  a  disadvantageous  peace. 
No  persuasion,  no  eloquence,  shall  ever  induce  me  to  sign 
my  dishonor.  .  .  .  Finish  this  campaign  I  certainly  will,  re- 
solved to  dare  all,  and  to  make  the  most  desperate  attempts, 
either  to  succeed  or  to  find  a  glorious  end." — That  is  the 
spirit  which  prevails  over  less  determined  foes,  whose  chatter 
about  peace  proclaims  their  half-heartedness,  or  at  least 
their  lack  of  the  supreme  resolve  of  the  hero.  It  is  this 
rigorous  spirit,  rigorous  towards  self  as  well  as  towards 
others,  which  has  made  Prussia  so  formidable.  Rightly 
to  understand  the  Prussian  idea  of  the  State,  you  must 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  115 

first  understand  historically  the  Hohenzollern  spirit;  for  it 
is  that  spirit  which  has  made  the  State.  The  State  is  merely 
the  machine;  that  spirit  is  the  inner  fire  which  imparts  to 
the  machine  its  terrible  force;  and  that  spirit  is  still  in  its 
essence  the  relentless  but  also  self-sacrificing  energy  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great. 

The  extent  to  which  the  personality  of  her  rulers  affected 
the  administration  of  Prussia  is  obvious  from  a  glance  at 
her  fortunes.  Frederick  the  Great  raised  her  to  the  rank 
of  a  Great  Power.  But,  as  Mirabeau  pointed  out  in  1786, 
that  position  was  very  precarious.  Under  the  rule  of  his 
vicious,  extravagant,  and  vacillating  nephew,  Frederick 
William  II,  Prussia  sank  quickly  to  the  second  rank.  The 
weakness  and  pedantry  of  his  son,  Federick  William  III, 
completed  her  misfortunes.  But  a  change  came  over  the 
scene  in  the  years  1807-13.  The  people,  formerly  passive 
in  the  hands  of  their  rulers,  became  keenly  interested  in  the 
revival  of  their  State.  Schiller  and  Fichte  had  awakened 
a  truly  national  German  feeling;  and  the  reforms  of  the 
Prussian  statesmen,  Stein,  Scharnhorst,  and  Hardenberg, 
in  those  years  made  Berlin  the  one  possible  centre  of  political 
union  for  all  Germans.  The  Prussian  people  were  identified 
with  the  Prussian  State,  as  was  the  case  nowhere  else  in 
Germany;  and  Germans  elsewhere  looked  to  Prussia  to  save 
them  from  Napoleon.  It  was  the  energy  of  thinkers  and 
men  of  action  at  Berlin  that  expelled  the  French  and  made 
Prussia  the  leader  of  Germany.  Depressed  by  the  weaknesses 
of  Frederick  William  IV,  she  was  raised  to  unexampled 
glory  by  William  I  and  his  paladins;  and  in  1871  she  unified 
Germany. 

Now,  Prussia  was  the  same  State,  yet  that  State  varied 
enormously  according  to  the  human  element.  Therefore 
it  is  fallacious  to  suppose  that  there  is  some  magic  in  the 
Prussian  State,  or  in  the  German  Empire  founded  on  it. 


Ii6          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

To  theorize  about  the  Prussian  State  as  though  it  were 
everything  hi  the  developemnt  of  Prussia  and  Germany 
is  absurd.  The  rulers  and  statesmen  are  more  important 
than  the  State.  Indeed,  from  the  time  of  the  Great  Elector 
down  to  Wilhelm  II  it  is  they  who  have  made  or  unmade 
the  State. 

Nevertheless,  the  development  of  ideas  about  the  Prus- 
sian State  deserves  careful  study.  Though  that  polity  made 
unheard  of  demands  on  the  citizens,  yet  it  looked  after  their 
interests  with  almost  grandfatherly  care.  Bismarck,  on  in- 
troducing the  first  measures  that  were  to  be  known  as  State 
Socialism,  declared  that  they  formed  no  new  departure; 
for  the  House  of  Hohenzollern  had  always  governed  with 
a  view  to  the  welfare  of  the  poor.  This  was  certainly  true 
of  its  best  members.  For  instance,  Frederick  the  Great, 
in  1766,  refused  to  countenance  a  proposal  of  one  of  his 
officials  to  tax  fat  cattle  when  imported.  "A  crown  a  head 
on  the  import  of  fat  cattle?  Tax  on  butcher's  meat?  (he 
exclaimed).  No.  That  would  fall  on  the  poorer  classes. 
To  that  I  must  say  no.  I  am,  by  office,  procurator  of  the 
poor  (avocat  du  pauvre)."  The  Hohenzollerns  have  generally 
sought  to  consult  the  welfare  of  their  poorer  subjects;  and 
this  was  the  reason  why  German  provinces,  like  Silesia, 
which  were  annexed  to  the  Prussian  monarchy,  soon  became 
Prussian.  That  kingdom  was  not  liked — it  never  has  been 
— but  its  vigorous  rule  promoted  prosperity  and  pushed  the 
people  on.  By  these  qualities  many  able  Germans  were  at- 
tracted to  Berlin.  Of  the  men  who  helped  to  raise  up  Prussia 
after  the  terrible  overthrow  of  1806-7,  the  most  illustrious 
were  non-Prussians.  Stein  was  a  Franconian,  Hardenberg 
and  Scharnhorst  were  Hanoverians,  Queen  Louisa  and  Blii- 
cher  were  Mecklenburgers,  Fichte  and  Gneisenau  were 
Saxons,  etc.1  Scarcely  a  single  able  leader  was  a  Prussian. 
1  Seeley,  Stein,  II,  403. 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  117 

Yet  the  best  brains  in  Germany  gravitated  to  Berlin.  What 
was  the  attractive  force?  Not  mere  ambition;  but  rather 
the  conviction  that  there  alone  worked  an  efficient  machine. 

These  considerations  explain  why  practically  all  German 
theories  as  to  the  State  originated  in  Prussia.  Omitting  the 
French  and  freedom-loving  theories  of  William  von  Hum- 
boldt,  the  first  is  that  of  Kant,  the  idealist  of  Konigsberg. 
Sir  John  Seeley  said  that  Kant's  severe  gospel  of  duty  was 
a  natural  outcome  of  the  age  and  the  polity  of  Frederick 
the  Great.  It  may  even  be  affirmed  that  Kant's  teaching 
about  the  State  is  an  idealization  of  all  that  was  best  in  the 
actions  of  the  great  King.  Kant  seeks  to  repress  the  selfish- 
ness of  individuals,  and  to  compel  them  to  work  for  the 
general  weal.  They  must  do  so  (he  claims)  in  the  interest 
of  order;  for  order  is  essentially  the  aim  of  the  State;  and 
order  can  be  assured  only  by  submission  of  individual  whims 
to  the  will  of  the  community.  True;  for  the  purpose  of  se- 
curing order,  the  State  must  be  endowed  with  force;  but 
it  does  not  exist  for  the  sake  of  developing  force.  (There 
Kant  is  far  ahead  of  the  latest  school  of  German  thinkers.) 
The  raison  d'etre  of  the  State  is  order. 

On  the  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution,  liberty,  prog- 
ress, and  peace  become  the  dominant  aims  of  Kant.  They 
are  set  forth  in  his  essay,  Perpetual  Peace  (1795),  which  re- 
mains a  landmark  of  the  generous  cosmopolitanism  that  was 
soon  to  be  submerged  by  the  Napoleonic  deluge.  We  shall 
return  to  Kant's  Essay  in  Lecture  X. 

The  next  of  Germany's  thinkers  was  a  Saxon  by  birth. 
Fichte  (1762-1814)  spent  most  of  his  early  life  hi  Saxony, 
Switzerland,  and  at  Jena;  but  a  charge  of  infidelity  drove 
him  from  his  professorship  at  that  University;  and  in  his 
thirty-seventh  year  he  settled  at  Berlin,  where  he  found 
more  toleration  and  freedom  of  speech  than  in  the  smaller 
centres.  In  1800  he  published  an  Essay,  The  Exclusive 


n8          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Commercial  State,  in  which  he  advocated  rigorous  protection 
and  an  almost  socialistic  ordering  of  all  activities.  The 
work  glorified  the  rigorous  tendencies  of  Prussian  politics; 
and  may  be  termed  a  rather  viewy  precursor  of  the  State 
Socialism  of  Lassalle  and  Bismarck. 

Far  fuller  and  more  philosophical  were  Fichte's  lectures  on 
"The  Characteristics  of  the  Present  Age"  (1804) — at  which 
we  glanced  in  Lecture  III.  In  them  he  eulogized  Prussia. 
In  the  tenth  lecture  he  rejected  a  theory  of  the  State,  which 
describes  it  as  merely  a  juridical  institution,  i.  e.  concerned 
with  the  making  and  administering  of  law.  Such  a  concep- 
tion might  do  for  Saxony  or  Wiirtemberg;  but  it  appeared 
to  him  inadequate  amidst  the  varied  activities  of  Prussia. 
He  put  forward  one  which  certainly  did  not  err  on  that  side. 
He  called  the  absolute  (i.  e.  complete  or  perfect)  State  "an 
artistic  institution,  intended  to  direct  all  individual  powers 
towards  the  life  of  the  race  and  to  transfuse  them  therein." 
In  previous  lectures  he  had  explained  his  sense  of  the  impor- 
tance of  the  universal  life,  declaring  that  the  aim  of  mankind 
was,  or  should  be,  "  to  order  all  their  relations  with  freedom 
according  to  reason."  Human  life,  then,  ought  to  be  con- 
cerned with  reasonable  activities,  which  must  enjoy  a  reason- 
able amount  of  freedom.  As  for  the  State,  it  would  be  the 
means  of  furthering  the  higher  aims  of  mankind.  It  would 
restrain  the  selfishness  of  individuals  by  directing  their 
energies  towards  the  welfare  of  the  whole  of  Society.  Fichte's 
aim,  at  this  time,  was  cosmopolitan,  not  Prussian. 

But  his  methods  were  autocratic.  As  the  collective  ac- 
tivities of  mankind  do  not  in  the  least  degree  attract  the 
numerous  individuals  to  whom  the  triumph  of  reason  is 
naught  and  the  pursuit  of  their  own  unreason  is  everything, 
he  maintains  that  they  must  be  compelled  to  enter  into  the 
collective  life.  Seeing  that  they  "feel  no  desire,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  a  reluctance,  to  offer  up  their  individual  life  for 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  119 

the  race,"  there  must  be  some  power  which  will  compel 
them,  if  need  be,  to  die  for  the  community.  That  power  is 
the  State. 

Fichte's  words  describing  the  State  as  an  artistic  institu- 
tion are  somewhat  odd,  seeing  that  it  directs  all  individual 
powers  towards  the  life  of  the  race.  But  he  explains  that 
by  "artistic"  he  means  that  which  raises  men  above  their 
natural  level  so  as  to  fulfil  the  destinies  of  the  race.1  The 
State  carries  out  this  purpose  and  compels  all  citizens,  with- 
out a  single  exception,  to  dedicate  themselves  to  this  duty. 
Even  the  rulers  are  subject  to  this  obligation.  It  is  their 
directing  power  and  the  directed  energies  of  the  governed, 
which  together  make  up  the  State.  He  proceeds  to  make 
another  claim:  "All  individual  power  which  is  known  and 
accessible  to  the  State  is  necessary  to  it  for  the  furtherance 
of  its  purpose:  its  purpose  is  Kultur  (civilization) ;  and  in 
order  to  maintain  the  position  to  which  a  State  has  already 
attained,  and  to  advance  still  further,  it  requires  at  all  times 
the  exertion  of  every  available  power;  for,  only  through  the 
united  power  of  ALL,  has  it  attained  this  position.  Should 
it  not  take  the  Whole  into  account,  it  must  needs  recede, 
instead  of  advancing,  and  lose  its  position  in  the  ranks  of 
civilization." 

These  statements  call  for  some  explanation.  Fichte  spoke 
at  a  time  when  the  Government  of  Prussia  was  in  the  weak 
and  nerveless  hands  of  Frederick  William  III;  when,  also, 
Germany  was  sinking  under  the  control  of  Napoleon  and 
accepted  his  direction  in  the  spoliation  of  the  Ecclesiastical 
States  and  knightly  domains.  In  view  of  that  disgraceful 
scramble  Fichte  desired  to  strengthen  Prussia;  he  sought 
also  to  remind  her  King  and  nobles  that  the  State  had  de- 
clined in  authority  and  prestige  since  the  days  of  Frederick 

1I  think  that  the  phrase  "a  civilizing  institution"  comes  nearer  to 
Fichte's  real  thought. 


120          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

the  Great.  Then  the  Prussian  State  was  the  embodiment 
of  power.  In  1804  it  was  not;  and  unless  it  recurred  to  the 
forceful  ideals  of  the  earlier  generation  Prussia  must  degen- 
erate. Fichte  therefore  sought  to  press  every  faculty  of  the 
Prussian  people  into  the  public  service;  and  he  clinched  his 
demand  by  this  declaration:  "In  a  perfect  State  no  just 
individual  purpose  can  exist,  which  is  not  included  in  the 
purposes  of  the  community,  and  for  the  attainment  of  which 
the  community  does  not  provide."  Or,  to  translate  it  into 
modern  parlance:  "Every  activity  of  life  belongs  to  the 
State;  and  the  perfect  community  will  have  a  place  for 
every  man  and  will  see  that  he  fills  that  place  to  the  utmost 
of  his  power." 

Obviously,  Fichte  was  heading  towards  a  drastic  State 
Socialism.  He  did  not  use  the  term  "Socialism,"  which, 
indeed,  does  not  first  appear  until  some  thirty-two  years 
later.  Still  less  did  he  see  his  Spartan  ideals  realized.  But 
his  system  would  have  imposed  on  Prussia  a  polity  as  ab- 
solute as  that  of  the  Pharaohs,  a  regime  in  which  individual 
liberty  would  vanish  and  all  the  activities  of  life  would  be 
regulated  as  they  are  in  an  ants'  nest.  "The  general  will" 
of  Rousseau,  having  passed  through  the  mill  of  German 
philosophical  method,  came  out  as  the  Prussian  State,  thus 
outlined  by  Fichte. 

For  the  attainment  of  its  complete  and  characteristic 
growth  one  more  element  was  necessary — that  of  Nationality. 
In  1804-5  Fichte  had  not  yet  hit  upon  that  formative  idea. 
Perhaps  he  derived  it  from  Schiller's  Wilhelm  Tell,  which 
seems  to  have  influenced  Fichte's  Addresses  to  the  German 
Nation.  Or  else,  as  I  ventured  to  suggest,  the  fall  of  the 
Prussian  State  after  Jena  (1806)  revealed  to  him  the  German 
nation.  In  the  earlier  lectures  on  the  State  he  never  men- 
tions the  nation.  He  conceives  the  Christian  European 
peoples  as  being  very  much  alike  and  concerned  with  the 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  121 

same  purposes.  It  is  the  States  that  are  in  perpetual  conflict, 
some  rising,  some  falling,  according  to  the  degrees  of  energy 
and  ability  which  they  display;  and  their  true  aim  is  to 
further  the  progress  of  the  race  as  a  whole.  To  take  a  con- 
crete instance,  Prussia  and  Austria  are  in  constant  com- 
petition, sometimes  in  actual  conflict.  Their  rivalry  calls 
forth  the  powers  of  their  rulers  and  subjects.  Prussia  wins 
because  she  is  the  better  organized;  and  her  triumph,  being 
a  survival  of  the  fittest,  furthers  the  progress  of  the  human 
race.  Fichte  was  not  then  thinking  of  the  German  race; 
for  indeed  it  was  in  so  divided  and  discordant  a  condition 
that  you  could  not  discern  it  as  a  political  unit. 

By  the  winter  of  1807-8  the  way  was  cleared,  and  Fichte's 
Addresses  to  the  German  Nation  called  to  action,  not  hide- 
bound States,  but  a  half-strangled  people.  As  always  hap- 
pens in  time  of  crisis,  he  sought  to  revive  their  courage  by 
recalling  the  mighty  deeds  that  Germans  had  accomplished 
both  in  war  and  in  the  peaceful  arts — their  inventions,  com- 
mercial development,  and  learning.  He  claimed  the  Refor- 
mation as  a  truly  German  assertion  of  liberty  of  thought; 
and  he  vaunted  the  superiority  of  the  pure  Germans  over 
the  Franks  and  other  Teutons  that  had  unlearnt  their  mother- 
tongue.  The  nation  was  now  the  dominant  thought.  It 
eclipsed  the  idea  of  the  State,  as  appeared  in  this  passage 
(Lecture  VIII):  "Nation  and  Fatherland  in  this  sense  as 
bearers  of  and  security  for  earthly  immortality  .  .  .  far 
transcend  the  State  in  the  usual  sense  of  the  term.  .  .  . 
The  State  only  amis  at  security  of  rights,  internal  peace. 
All  that  is  only  the  means,  the  condition,  the  preparation, 
for  that  which  patriotism  essentially  aims  at,  the  blossom- 
ing of  the  eternal  and  divine  in  the  world."  He  then  asserted 
that  patriotism  must  direct  the  State,  individual  liberty 
being  restricted  within  as  narrow  limits  as  possible.  In  his 
earlier  notions  the  State  was  supreme  in  order  by  competi- 


122          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

tion  with  other  States  to  advance  the  welfare  of  the  human 
race  as  a  whole.  In  1807-8  he  reduced  the  State  merely 
to  a  piece  of  mechanism,  driven  onwards  by  the  nation, 
with  patriotism  as  the  directing  agency.  The  union  of  his 
earlier  Pharaoh-like  theory  with  his  later  claim  of  the  su- 
premacy of  the  nation  prepared  the  way  for  the  later  theory 
of  the  German  State,  conterminous  with  the  German  na- 
tion, and  both  impelling,  and  impelled  by,  that  nation. 

His  teaching  bore  fruit  in  many  directions.  As  the  State 
or  the  nation  requires  all  the  activities  of  its  citizens,  it 
follows  that  all  distinctions  of  privilege  must  vanish;  for  the 
unprivileged  (e.  g.  the  serfs)  cannot  develop  their  full  powers. 
The  serfs  therefore  become  freeholders;  national  education 
begins,  so  does  municipal  government,  in  which  men  are 
compelled  to  take  up  their  duties.  All  these  changes  aim 
at  the  increase  of  power  and  efficiency.  For  this  same  pur- 
pose compulsion  is  laid  upon  them  to  defend  their  country. 
That  duty  had  been  required  of  all  Frenchmen  of  military 
age  by  the  French  Republic  in  1793,  and  more  systematically 
in  1798.  After  the  Peace  of  Tilsit  (1807),  Prussia  extended 
the  principle  of  compulsory  service  to  all  her  sons.  Scharn- 
horst  and  Gneisenau,  the  chief  designers  of  the  new  Prus- 
sian army,  demanded  in  the  preamble  to  their  reforms  that 
the  army  must  be  "the  union  of  all  the  moral  and  physical 
energies  of  the  nation."  The  phrase  recalls  the  words  of 
Fichte;  and  it  well  summarizes  the  aims  of  the  Prussian 
patriots  of  that  tune.  The  realization  of  their  ideal  in  the 
glorious  efforts  of  the  War  of  Liberation  reveals  the  poten- 
tialities of  the  Prussian  State.  Dowered  with  the  toughness 
of  the  Frederician  regime,  it  is  strengthened  and  enriched 
by  the  doctrines  of  civic  self-sacrifice  proclaimed  by  Kant 
and  Fichte. 

Long  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  the  memory  of  the  events 
of  1813-5  inspired  the  thinkers  of  Prussia  and  Germany. 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  123 

The  energy  and  order  prevalent  at  Berlin  attracted  thither 
many  thinkers  who  began  life  in  the  small  States.  That 
had  happened  to  Fichte,  and  in  1818  it  happened  to  Hegel, 
his  successor  in  the  chair  of  philosophy  in  that  University. 
Earlier  in  his  career  Hegel  (1770-1831)  had  been  an  en- 
thusiastic admirer  of  Napoleon  and  viewed  the  overthrow 
of  Prussia  with  supreme  indifference;  for  he  saw  in  the  French 
people  and  their  Emperor  the  outcrop  of  the  world-spirit. 
But  in  his  Berlin  period  he  became  Prussian.  In  his  lectures 
delivered  there  in  1820  he  delivered  his  theory  of  the  State 
in  regard  to  law.  His  conclusion  was  that  the  State  was  in 
the  moral  order  what  Nature  was  in  the  physical  order. 
As  the  State  sustained  and  regulated  everything,  it  formed 
the  chief  necessity  of  life  for  civilized  men,  and  became,  in 
effect,  the  realized  ethical  ideal  or  ethical  spirit. 

By  these  claims  Hegel  raised  the  State  to  a  supernatural 
level.  There  it  existed  as  something  perfect,  absolute,  and 
superhuman,  yet  dominating  the  fortunes  of  mankind. 
Apparently,  the  Hegelian  State  could  not  develop  or  change; 
for  development  implies  advance  from  a  less  perfect  condi- 
tion to  one  that  is  more  perfect.  Hegel  also  made  no  allow- 
ance for  its  permeation  by  the  ideals  of  other  States.1  His 
ideal  creation  remains  alone,  like  some  Zeppelin  tethered  a 
mile  or  so  above  Berlin,  and  dominating  earth,  air,  and 
heaven  itself.  Indeed,  this  simile  is  too  weak  to  express  the 
absolute  self-sufficiency  of  the  Hegelian  State.  Its  creator 
scoffed  at  all  inquiries  as  to  its  origin;  for  it  had  always  ex- 
isted while  the  nation  existed.  All  that  he  will  say  on  this 
head  is  that  the  State  is  the  outcome  of  the  deep-seated 
principle  of  order.2  This  it  is  which  determines  the  exercise 
of  what  Rousseau  termed  "the  general  will." 

Here  at  last  we  come  to  firm  ground;  but  we  remember 

1  See  D.  Burns,  op.  cit.,  pp.  45,  53. 

J  Hegel,  Philosophy  of  Light,  transl.  by  S.  W.  Dyde,  pp.  240-65. 


124          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

that  forty  years  earlier  Kant  had  affirmed  the  raison  d'etre 
of  the  State  to  be  the  craving  for  order.  In  this  respect,  then, 
the  Hegelian  notion  links  itself  on  to  the  doctrines  of  Rous- 
seau and  Kant;  but  the  outcome  is  a  terrifying  and  steriliz- 
ing creation,  whose  chief  practical  duty  is  to  protect  "the 
life,  property,  and  free-will  (!)  of  every  person,  simply  in 
so  far  as  he  does  not  injure  the  life,  property,  and  free-will 
of  any  other."  But,  he  proceeds,  the  State  is  far  more  than 
a  magnified  police  officer.  The  perfect  State  is  a  spiritual 
and  all-pervading  entity.  It  is  not  something  separate  from 
each  of  its  subjects.  It  is  not  distinct  from  you,  from  me. 
We  form  part  of  it;  and  in  this  consciousness  lies  our  political 
freedom.  Here  we  must  remember  that  Hegel  admits  that 
a  bad  State  is  finite  and  worldly.  But  wherein  the  perfect 
State  consists  and  wherein  a  State  is  bad  is  not  clearly  de- 
fined. 

It  may  seem  impertinent  in  a  mere  historian  to  criticize 
Hegel;  but  I  cannot  avoid  the  suspicion  that,  in  identifying 
the  subjects  with  a  perfect  State,  he  is  confusing  the  State 
with  the  nation.  My  insular  imagination  fails  to  conceive 
so  complete  an  identification  of  the  citizen  with  the  most 
perfect  State  as  to  become  merged  into  it.  That  merging 
is  possible  in  the  case  of  the  nation;  and  I  believe  that  it 
can  be  affirmed  of  every  true  patriot  at  a  great  crisis.  Cer- 
tainly every  Briton  who  now  dies  for  his  country  makes  that 
supreme  surrender  on  behalf  of  the  nation,  or  for  His  Maj- 
esty as  typifying  the  nation.  Professor  Edward  Meyer  hi 
a  recent  work  claims  that  it  is  the  great  defect  of  our  public 
life  that  we  do  not  think  about  the  State.  He  says:  "The 
Briton  never  speaks  of  his  State — a  State  does  not  exist  for 
him.  He  either  speaks  of  the  Empire  or  he  speaks  of  the 
Government,  meaning  the  Government  which  then  handles 
the  rudder  of  State.  A  State  high  above  the  clash  of  parties 
does  not  exist  for  the  Briton  as  it  exists  for  the  German": 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  125 

and  to  this  he  attributes  our  political  helplessness  in  this 
war.  Events,  of  course,  will  decide  that  point; l  and  I  ques- 
tion whether  the  average  German  is  filled  with  much  enthusi- 
asm for  the  German  State.  I  believe  that  he  fights  and  dies 
for  das  Vaterland,  which  is  a  far  more  human  and  inspiring 
conception  than  that  of  the  State.  The  idea  of  the  State, 
I  believe,  appeals  chiefly  to  the  intellectuals;  for,  ever  since 
Hegel's  day,  it  has  supplied  them  with  a  motiv  for  theory- 
weaving. 

However,  the  question  whether  a  soldier  fights  and  dies 
for  his  nation  or  his  State  is  academic  trifling;  and  (to  return 
to  Hegel)  I  believe  that  he  ascribed  to  the  State  much  that 
Fichte  had  ascribed  to  the  nation.  It  seems  to  me  that  on 
this  topic  Fichte's  view  was  sounder.  The  nation  it  was 
which  fired  France  with  hope  and  enthusiasm.  The  Ger- 
mans defiantly  retorted  with  their  national  idea  in  1813; 
and  though  the  idea  of  the  German  nation  did  not  in  that 
age  find  visible  expression  in  a  national  State,  yet  there  was 
the  chance  that  it  would  one  day  embody  itself.  To  idealize 
the  State  in  1830  was  surely  doubtful  psychology  and  false 
as  history.  The  criticism  of  some  of  Hegel's  contemporaries 
crystallized  in  the  joke  that  he  mistook  the  Kingdom  of 
Prussia  for  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven.2 

Hegel  even  affirms  that  the  State  is  the  nation's  spirit. 
That  again  is  a  question  of  words;  and  I  cannot  see  that 
such  a  description  of  the  State  advances  our  knowledge  of 
it.  We  worldly  minded  students  of  history  want  to  know, 
not  what  the  State  is,  but  how  it  works;  how  it  reconciles  the 
often  divergent  claims  of  general  order  and  the  liberty  of  the 
individual.  On  these  topics  Hegel  is  as  silent  as  Rousseau. 

1  See  the  suggestive  remarks  of  Rev.  J.  Oman,  The  War  and  its  Issues, 
ch.  Ill  [Camb.  Univ.  Press,  1915],  as  to  the  difference  of  British  and 
German  ideas  of  the  State. 

2  G.  P.  Gooch,  in  Contemporary  Review,  June,  1915. 


126         NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

In  fact,  Hegel,  like  Rousseau,  seems  to  believe  that  in  that 
ideal  entity,  the  absolute  State,  there  will  be  no  opposition. 
We  reply  that  that  is  unthinkable  among  a  free  community; 
and  our  suspicions  of  the  Berlin  professor  are  not  lessened 
by  his  assertion  that  to  offer  the  people  a  constitution  is  a 
mere  whim,  seeing  that  a  constitution  must  grow  from  the 
consciousness  of  the  people.  "True!"  we  English  reply; 
"that  is  the  best  method,  the  English  method;  but  is  that  a 
sufficient  reason  for  refusing  the  beginnings  of  a  free  govern- 
ment to  a  less  fortunate  people?  "  There  is,  of  course,  much 
truth  in  Hegel's  further  statement,  that  every  nation  has 
the  constitution  that  suits  it  and  belongs  to  it;  but  this 
assertion  again  is  liable  to  abuse,  if  it  implies  that  no  arbi- 
trary Government  is  ever  to  be  overthrown,  because  the 
people  do  not  deserve  a  better.1  In  practice,  Hegel's  theoriz- 
ing about  the  State  came  to  be  a  defence  of  paternal  and 
almost  despotic  Government.  "You  have  a  nearly  perfect 
State"  (said  he);  "be  content  with  it;  identify  yourself 
with  it;  you  need  not  wish  for  anything  better."  Some  of 
his  friends  reproached  him  with  deserting  his  earlier  progres- 
sive views;  and  the  charge  seems  proven. 

In  his  next  political  work,  The  Philosophy  of  History  (1830), 
Hegel  implicitly  defended  the  Prussian  system,  which  ex- 
cluded the  populace  from  the  political  life  of  the  State:  he 
also  decried  the  results  of  the  French  Revolution;  and,  as  for 
the  English  Reform  Bill,  he  declared  that  it  would  destroy 
what  slight  measure  of  governing  capacity  still  survived  in 
these  islands.  Moreover  (said  he),  the  typical  Englishman 
was  too  insular,  too  whimsical,  to  understand  real  liberty, 
and  always  looked  at  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  his  own 
home.  As  for  Prussia,  despite  her  exclusion  of  the  citizens 
from  political  affairs,  she  was  on  the  right  track;  for  she 
embodied  the  principle  of  reason.  She  was  Protestant,  and 
1  Dyde,  op.  cit.,  pp.  274-82. 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  127 

she  admitted  capable  men  to  all  posts.1  What  more  could 
they  want? 

Notwithstanding  this  discouraging  conclusion,  the  in- 
fluence exerted  by  Hegel  was  very  great.  Discredited  though 
he  was  by  the  later  Liberalism  (which  found  its  exponent  in 
Bluntschli 2),  his  State-absolutism  lived  on  and  helped  to 
reinforce  the  masterful  notions  of  the  Bismarck-Treitschke 
period.  Another  Hegelian  theory  tending  in  the  same  direc- 
tion was  that  of  the  World-Spirit  visiting  and  vivifying  the 
great  peoples  in  turn,  and,  in  the  fullness  of  time,  the  German 
people.  But  we  must  postpone  to  Lecture  X  an  examination 
of  that  theory. 

So  far  we  have  been  considering  the  German  idealists. 
It  has  been  stated  that  their  political  teaching  was  sound, 
and  that  the  poison  which  has  crept  in  was  due  solely  to 
materialism  of  thought  and  to  its  political  resultant,  Real- 
politik.3  But,  as  I  have  tried  to  show,  danger  lurked  in  the 
teachings  of  Fichte  and  Hegel.  In  their  Berlin  periods  they 
denied  individual  liberty  and  exalted  the  State  to  a  dangerous 
pre-eminence,  while  Hegel's  later  teachings  fostered  the 
growth  of  Prussian  Chauvinism.  The  following  years  wit- 
nessed the  publication  of  Clausewitz's  work  On  War,  memora- 
ble for  its  declaration  that  States  were  always  in  a  condition  of 
struggle,  of  which  war  was  only  an  intenser  form.  Then,  too, 
appeared  that  exciting  poem,  "  Deutschland,  Deutschland  uber 
dies." 

The  popular  outbreaks  of  1848-9  in  Germany  concern 
us  here  only  because  the  populace  everywhere  affirmed  the 

1  Hegel  [op.  tit.,  p.  437]  recognizes  a  South  German  nationality,  be- 
cause that  people  was  too  mixed  to  accept  Protestantism. 

*  See  J.  K.  Bluntschli,  The  Theory  of  the  State  [Eng.  edit,  (and),  Oxford, 
1892];  especially  Bk.  II  for  suggestive  remarks  on  the  State  and  Nation- 
ality. 

'  Prof.  J.  H.  Muirhead,  German  Philosophy  in  Relation  to  the  War, 
Lects.  I,  H. 


128          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

supremacy  of  the  whole  nation;  and  when  Frederick  William 
IV  for  a  time  surrendered  to  his  "dear  Berliners"  and  de- 
clared that  thenceforth  Prussia  would  merge  herself  in  Ger- 
many, the  triumph  of  the  nation  over  the  Prussian  State 
seemed  assured.  Owing  to  the  inexperience  and  reckless 
enthusiasms  of  the  first  German  Parliament,  which  met  at 
Frankfurt  in  1848,  all  went  awry.  The  old  political  mechan- 
ism was  set  up  again;  and,  when  Germany  achieved  her 
union  in  1870-1,  it  was  through  the  House  of  Hohenzollern 
and  the  Prussian  State.  Consequently,  the  failures  of  Ger- 
man Liberalism  hi  1848-9  have  profoundly  affected  the  trend 
of  political  thought.  Idealism,  democracy,  and  voluntary 
methods  being  discredited,  the  tendency  was  towards  the 
precepts  and  practice  of  Frederick  the  Great.  In  short,  the 
age  became  ripe  for  Bismarck's  gospel  of  "blood  and  iron," 
the  way  for  which  was  further  facilitated  by  prosperity,  and 
the  development  of  a  materialistic  philosophy.1  Bismarck 
often  gibed  at  the  professors  and  barristers  of  1848;  but  it  was 
their  viewiness  which  prepared  the  way  for  his  statecraft. 
The  excesses  of  democrats  have  always  been  the  best  help  of 
reactionaries. 

The  first  sign  of  the  new  spirit  was  an  essay  by  Rouchau 
on  Realpolitik.  Published  in  1853,  when  the  reaction  was 
in  full  swing,  it  trumpeted  forth  the  new  political  mate- 
rialism. "The  State  is  Power" — such  is  its  thesis.  It  at- 
tracted a  far  more  important  man  than  Rochau,  Heinrich 
von  Treitschke,  who  afterwards  developed  that  theory  to 
its  logical  conclusion.  Treitschke  (1834-96)  came  of  a  Slav 
family  and  was  endowed  with  Slavonic  intensity  and  ve- 
hemence, which  he  vented  against  that  race  with  all  the 
acerbity  of  a  renegade.  His  father  was  a  Saxon  officer  of 
proved  loyalty  and  steadfastness;  but  the  youth  soon  dis- 
played far  other  tendencies.  For  his  first  recorded  speech, 
1  See  Professor  Muirhead,  op.  cit.,  Lect.  III. 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  129 

delivered  at  a  prize-giving,  he  chose  as  his  subject  praise 
of  Prussia's  championship  of  German  unity;  and  that  incident 
is  typical  as  illustrating  his  natural  bent  towards  Prussianism. 
As  a  student,  he  read  with  ardor  the  Politics  of  Aristotle  and 
the  Prince  of  MachiaveUi,  dangerous  reading  for  a  youth  of 
his  ardent  temperament.  The  study  of  Fichte  and  Hegel 
fortified  his  conviction  of  the  need  for  the  supremacy  of  the 
State;  and  in  1861  (the  year  of  the  consummation  of  Italian 
unity)  he  set  forth  the  ideal  of  "the  nationally  exclusive 
State,"  i.  e.  a  State  composed  of  one  people.  "For  (said  he) 
where  the  living  and  indubitable  consciousness  of  unity  per- 
vades all  the  members  of  the  State,  there  and  there  only  is  the 
State  what  its  nature  requires  that  it  should  be,  a  nation 
possessing  organic  unity."  He  prophesied  that  the  great 
peoples  would  everywhere  form  national  States — a  singularly 
correct  forecast.  In  common  with  all  nationalists  he  de- 
tested the  House  of  Hapsburg  as  artificially  clamping  together 
diverse  elements  which  Nature  meant  to  exist  separately. 
What,  then,  would  he  have  said  about  the  Hohenzollern- 
Hapsburg-Bulgar-Turkish  compacts  for  the  domination  of 
neighboring  lands?  Probably  he  would  have  defended  that 
strange  league  on  the  ground  that  the  State  is  power  and  must 
hew  its  way  through  to  more  favorable  positions  on  the  North 
Sea  and  in  the  Levant;  but  assuredly  such  a  plea  would 
contradict  his  earlier  contention,  that  the  State  must  be 
conterminous  with  the  nation,  and  that  it  is  well  even  "to 
amputate  alien  elements  of  the  population."  * 

His  eager  nationalism  led  him  to  advocate  the  absorption 
of  the  smaller  German  States  by  Prussia;  and  indeed  he 
invited  her  to  attack  them.  The  end,  said  he,  would  justify 
the  means;  and  they  would  soon  benefit  by  her  vigorous 
rule.  Such  was  his  plea  in  1864.  He  knew  perfectly  well 

1  Treitschke  overlooked  the  Poles  of  Posen,  then,  as  now,  utterly  un- 
Prussianized. 


130          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

that  the  King  and  Bismarck  were  then  governing  illegally 
and  despotically.  All  the  same,  he  prayed  that  they  might 
succeed;  for  Prussia  alone  could  unify  Germany.  She  alone 
could  win  the  coveted  duchies,  Schleswig-Holstein,  and 
thereby  assure  to  Germany  a  commanding  position  in  the 
North  Sea  and  the  Baltic.  Similar  reasons  induced  him  to 
side  against  Austria  and  her  South  German  allies  in  the 
struggle  of  1866.  After  the  triumph  of  Prussia,  he,  a  Saxon 
by  birth,  demanded  that  she  should  annex  Saxony  outright, 
for  the  crime  of  taking  the  side  of  Austria;  and  he  professed 
to  be  surprised  and  pained  that  his  father  should  speak  of  him 
as  "a  political  Jesuit." 

Treitschke  persisted  in  his  claim  that  Prussia  should  lead 
the  German  people  forward  to  power  and  prosperity  far 
beyond  the  bounds  of  the  nation.  In  a  remarkable  passage  in 
his  essay  Bundesstaat  und  Einheitsstaat  he  pleaded  for  an 
effective  unity  of  Germans  so  that  they  might  be  able  to 
compete  with  other  peoples  for  the  commerce  of  the  oceans. 
The  South  Sea  was  calling  for  traders;  and  mighty  united 
nations  were  pressing  in,  while  the  Germans  could  only  fol- 
low humbly  at  a  distance  their  more  fortunate  predecessors. 
Why  should  Germans  be  steeped  in  inland  notions?  Let 
them  hear  the  call  of  the  sea  and  organize  themselves 
fitly  for  a  great  future.  That  future  they  could  realize  only 
by  means  of  political  unity.  Enough  of  their  old  federalism! 
What  they  needed  was  unity — an  Einheitsstaat  (a  united 
State). 

This  was  the  thought  that  impelled  his  angry  demand  for 
the  annexation  of  Saxony,  as  well  as  Hanover  and  Hesse 
Cassel.  In  August,  1870,  even  before  Napoleon  III  was 
overthrown  at  Sedan,  Treitschke  passionately  demanded  the 
annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  That  the  people  of  those 
provinces  objected  to  such  a  change  was  nought  to  him. 
"These  provinces  (he  cries)  are  ours  by  the  right  of  the  sword; 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  131 

and  we  will  rule  them  in  virtue  of  a  higher  right;  in  virtue  of 
the  right  of  the  German  nation  to  prevent  the  permanent 
estrangement  of  her  lost  children  from  the  Germanic  Empire. 
We  Germans,  who  know  both  Germany  and  France,  know 
better  what  is  for  the  good  of  the  Alsatians  than  do  those  un- 
happy people  themselves,  who,  in  the  perverse  conditions  of  a 
French  existence,  have  been  denied  any  true  knowledge  of 
modern  Germany.  We  desire,  even  against  their  will,  to 
restore  them  to  themselves."  Then  comes  the  naive  and 
illuminating  admission:  "We  are  by  no  means  rich  enough  to 
renounce  so  precious  a  possession."  He  also  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  extension  of  the  responsibilities  of  the  German 
people  would  lift  their  politics  above  doctrinaire  pettiness  "to 
a  great,  strenuous  and  positive  conduct  of  the  affairs  of  the 
State."  1 

This  last  statement  is  instructive,  in  view  of  the  opposi- 
tion already  offered  by  German  Liberals  and  Socialists  to 
the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  progressive  elements 
hi  Germany  deprecated  such  an  act,2  not  only  from  principle, 
but  also  from  expediency;  from  principle,  because  the  transfer 
of  people  like  cattle  to  an  alien  rule  was  abhorrent  to  democ- 
racy; from  expediency,  because  the  Government  of  these 
unwilling  subjects  must  be  more  or  less  coercive;  and  coercion 
renders  the  Government  harsher  towards  its  own  subjects, 
besides  furthering  the  growth  of  militarism.  Now,  it  was 
precisely  for  these  reasons  that  Treitschke  advocated  the 
annexation.  He  wanted  to  have  done  with  idealism  in  order 
to  assure  "a  positive  conduct  of  the  affairs  of  the  State,"  in 
other  words,  he  aimed  at  the  triumph  of  Realpolitik.  Bis- 
marck was  of  the  same  mind  as  Treitschke.  The  Iron  Chan- 
cellor, speaking  to  Busch  just  after  Sedan,  laughed  at  the 
notion  that  Germany  would  annex  Alsace  in  order  to  re- 

1H.  W.  C.  Davis,  The  Political  Thought  of  Treitschke,  p.  112. 
1  Busch,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  1, 147. 


132          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

teutonize  her  lost  children.  All  that  talk  was  merely  the 
vaporing  of  German  professors  (not  yet  in  favor) :  "  It  is  the 
fortresses  of  Metz  and  Strassburg  which  we  want,  and  which 
we  will  take." 

That  is  the  essence  of  Realpolitik.  Germany  needs  Metz 
and  Strassburg  for  military  reasons.  Therefore  she  will 
annex  them.  True,  a  little  later,  Bismarck  wavered  about 
annexing  the  wholly  French  population  of  Metz;  but  the 
German  Staff  never  wavered.  They  had  their  way,  and  that 
way  led  towards  a  more  drastic  polity.  Thus,  just  as  Freder- 
ick II 's  persistent  rigor  resulted  from  his  deliberate  choice  of 
an  aggressive  and  therefore  militarist  policy,  so,  too,  the  ag- 
grandized Germany  of  1871  imposed  on  Europe  the  evils  of 
an  armed  peace  and  on  herself  a  more  absolutist  regime. 

In  proportion  as  the  amis  of  Berlin  politicians  became 
more  and  more  objective,  so  did  the  teaching  of  Treitschke. 
He  laughed  at  a  political  science  based  on  abstract  principles, 
viz.,  the  science  of  Kant,  Fichte,  Hegel.  He  claimed  that  it 
must  be  the  outcome  of  the  experience  of  each  people.  As 
the  peoples  differed  widely  in  character  and  local  conditions, 
so,  too,  must  their  polity.  To  affirm  the  necessary  superiority 
of  any  one  State-system  was  ridiculous.  The  nation  must 
construct  its  own  form  of  polity  in  order  that  it  might  lead 
its  own  Me.  The  true  guide  was  history,  not  the  doctrine 
of  abstract  right;  for  history  showed  what  the  people  was  and 
what  it  wanted.  So  far,  good.  Few  Englishmen  will  dis- 
pute these  dicta.  But  Treitschke  proceeded  to  claim  that  in 
matters  political  there  was  no  positive  right  and  wrong. 
Every  nation  must  construct  its  own  moral  code — as  the 
Germans  have  done. 

His  reasoning  at  this  point  is  illogical;  for,  though  he 
postulated  the  complete  supremacy  of  the  State  in  secular 
affairs,  he  deliberately  excepted  matters  of  conscience  which 
(said  he)  pertained  to  the  relations  between  God  and  man, 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  133 

and  were  beyond  the  cognizance  of  the  State.  Yet  the  State 
must  form  its  own  code  of  morality.  The  only  escape  from 
the  difficulty  is  to  claim  that  State  morality  is  something 
entirely  separate  from  the  morality  of  the  individual.  That 
is  what  the  followers  of  Treitschke  have  both  affirmed  in 
their  lecture-rooms  and  practiced  in  Belgium. 

Finally  we  may  note  that  Treitschke  identified  the  State 
and  the  nation.  He  defined  the  State  as  a  people  united  by 
legal  ties  to  form  an  independent  power.  On  this  subject 
again  his  ideas  were  inconsistent.  Sometimes  he  denied  that 
the  State  was  an  organism  and  declared  it  to  be  a  person 
(presumably  the  nation  personified).  Elsewhere,  however, 
he  thus  defined  it:  "The  State  is  the  public  power  for  de- 
fensive and  offensive  purposes."  (That  is,  it  is  a  magnified 
drill-sergeant.)  Pursuing  this  trend  of  thought,  he  thus 
narrowed  down  the  functions  of  the  State:  "It  only  repre- 
sents the  nation  from  the  point  of  view  of  power"  (a  political 
Hercules).  But,  again,  he  said:  "The  State  is  the  basis  of  all 
national  life"  (an  eternized  Frederick  the  Great).1 

It  is  difficult  to  frame  any  intelligible  theory  out  of  these 
descriptions;  and  the  composite  photograph  made  up  from 
these  personifications  would  be  an  odd  creature,  recognizable 
only  by  the  spiked  helmet.  But  there  is  one  feature  common 
to  them  all.  They  body  forth  the  idea  of  power;  they  imply  a 
something  which  functions  with  tremendous  energy,  which 
belongs  more  to  the  barracks  and  the  workshop  than  to  the 
Church  and  the  University.  Treitschke's  State,  whatever 
he  may  at  times  say  to  the  contrary,  is  a  mechanical  contriv- 
ance designed  for  conquest;  and  to  this  contrivance  the 
German  people  is  closely  linked. 

These  conceptions  of  the  State  as  drill-sergeant  and  of  the 
populace  as  recruits  mark  a  serious  set  back  from  the  ideas 

1  Treitschke,  Politik,  I,  pp.  28-32,  62-3;  quoted  by  H.  W.  C.  Davis, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  127-131. 


134          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

of  Fichte;  for  he  insisted  on  the  ideal  character  of  the  nation. 
In  his  view  the  nation  far  transcended  the  State,  which  con- 
cerned itself  with  government  and  law.  The  nation  looked 
to  higher  things,  to  the  blossoming  of  the  eternal  and  divine 
in  the  world.  Despite  his  too  hopeful  idealism,  Fichte  was 
far  nearer  to  the  truth  than  Treitschke.  For,  surely,  the 
State  is  the  organism,  while  the  nation  is  the  brain  and  the 
soul.  True,  the  nation  needs  the  State  to  endow  it  with 
hands  and  feet.  But  the  nation  remains  the  directing  agency 
vitalizing  and  directing  the  body  politic.  Indeed,  the  nation 
survives,  even  when  all  the  machinery  of  Government  is 
shattered.  At  this  very  time  the  Belgian  State  and  the  Ser- 
bian State  scarcely  exist;  but  the  Belgian  nation  and  the  Serb 
nation  endure — aye,  and  will  endure;  for  their  sublime 
courage  has  endowed  them  with  immortality.  This  is  what 
German  politicians  and  German  professors  cannot  under- 
stand. Destroy  all  the  machinery  of  government  and  you 
have  destroyed  the  nation,  say  Treitschke  and  his  succes- 
sors. Possibly  it  is,  in  part,  these  mechanical  notions  which 
have  led  them  astray  into  their  recent  adventures;  for  other- 
wise their  conduct  is  altogether  inexplicable.  It  becomes 
dimly  intelligible  when  compared  with  that  of  Napoleon,  who, 
carrying  eighteenth-century  materialism  into  the  realm  of 
high  policy,  deemed  the  Spanish  nation  conquered  when  he 
had  beaten  their  armies  and  seized  the  machinery  of  govern- 
ment. It  is  the  nemesis  of  a  forceful  regime  that  it  neglects 
everything  which  cannot  be  measured  in  battalions,  money, 
and  foot-pounds. 

Treitschke  had  before  him  the  example,  not  only  of  Na- 
poleon's disastrous  blunder,  but  also  that  of  two  peoples  who 
defied  all  assessment  by  official  measures.  During  a  century 
(with  a  short  interval  after  Waterloo)  the  Poles  enjoyed  no 
political  existence.  Yet  have  the  Poles  ever  ceased  to  be  a 
nation?  The  other  instance  is  even  more  striking.  During 


GERMAN  THEORY  OF  THE  STATE  135 

1800  years  the  Jews  have  had  no  State.  Nevertheless,  Jew- 
ish nationality  is  one  of  the  powerful  influences  of  the  world, 
often  seemingly  destroyed,  but  ever  rising  again  in  Phcenix- 
like  vitality.  In  spite  of  these  patent  proofs  of  the  superiority 
of  the  nation  to  the  State,  Treitschke  and  his  many  followers 
insist  upon  degrading  the  nation,  which  is  essentially  a  spirit- 
ual entity,  to  the  level  of  the  organism  which  merely  endows 
it  with  power  for  action.  I  believe  that  there  is  no  hope  for 
German  political  thought  until  it  frees  itself  from  this  dis- 
astrous confusion.  "Back  to  Fichte"  ought  to  be  the  cry 
of  all  German  idealists;  for,  though  his  political  creed  con- 
tained much  that  was  despotic,  yet  he  proclaimed  the  all- 
important  truth  (veiled  to  Treitschke),  that  a  nation  exists 
in  the  realm  of  spirit  and  cannot  be  made  or  unmade  by  force. 
When  that  discovery  is  brought  home  to  the  German  people 
they  will  have  taken  the  first  step  towards  a  political  renas- 
cence. Then  they  will  liberate  themselves  from  the  traditions 
of  Frederick  the  Great.  Then  they  will  reorganize  themselves 
on  rational  lines,  free  from  the  overmastering  influence  of 
the  Prussian  State. 


OUR  studies  in  national  movements  have  been  by  no  means 
complete.  We  have  passed  by  the  struggles  of  the  Poles, 
Belgians,  Greeks,  and  Hungarians,  also  the  efforts  of  the 
French  for  a  revival  of  their  polity  in  the  critical  years  1871-5. 
The  study  of  the  French  Risorgimento  reveals  the  sterling 
worth  of  that  people  and  also  the  practical  usefulness  of 
patriotism  in  rebuilding  an  almost  shattered  society.  No 
better  guide  and  inspiration  can  be  found  for  the  tremendous 
work  of  reconstruction  which  awaits  the  European  peoples 
at  the  close  of  this  disastrous  war.1 

We  have  also  had  to  omit  from  our  survey  the  most  sur- 
prising of  all  national  movements  in  our  age,  that  of  Japan. 
A  genuinely  patriotic  impulse  it  was  which  suddenly  trans- 
formed Japan  from  a  mediaeval  into  a  modern  State,  which 
absorbed  much  of  the  best  in  European  civilization  without 
impairing  the  strength  of  the  old  Japanese  chivalry  (Bushido). 
Finally  it  was  a  keen  sense  of  national  honor  which  flung 
back  Russia  from  Korea,  expelled  Germany  from  Shang 
Tung,  and  is  now  loyally  helping  the  Allies  by  furnishing 
Russia  with  the  munitions  of  war.  All  this  has  been  done 
by  a  people  which  less  than  half  a  century  ago  fought  with 
bows  and  arrows  and  frightened  the  enemy  with  masks. 
It  is  a  romance;  and  the  soul  of  the  romance  is  the  intense 

1  The  revival  of  France  in  1871-5  will  form  one  of  the  "  special  periods" 
for  the  Historical  Tripos  of  1917,  etc.;  and  will  be  dealt  with  by  members 
of  the  Cambridge  History  School. 

136 


NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM  137 

patriotism  which  nerves  the  Japanese,  from  the  highest 
to  the  lowest,  with  devotion  to  the  Mikado  as  the  embodi- 
ment of  all  that  is  holy  and  lofty  in  the  national  life.  There 
is  terrible  poverty  in  Japan;  but  no  Japanese  would  dream 
of  whining:  "I  have  no  country  to  fight  for." 

These  great  movements  one  and  all  demonstrate  the  tre- 
mendous force  of  Nationality.  It  may  be  granted  that 
that  feeling  appeared  long  ago  in  England,  France,  and 
Spain;  yet  its  influence  was  fitful  by  comparison  with  that 
which  it  has  recently  exerted  upon  the  European  peoples; 
and  I  think  we  may  ascribe  its  development  largely  to  the 
spread  of  education  and  of  facilities  for  trade  and  travel. 
In  the  Ancient  and  Mediaeval  Worlds  the  town  or  even  the 
village  was  the  typical  social  unit.  By  degrees  that  unit 
enlarged.  In  times  of  general  danger  men  recognized  their 
kinship  with  men  previously  deemed  strangers  or  enemies; 
and  with  the  widening  of  social  intercourse  that  conception 
acquired  strength  until  it  flashed  forth  in  a  universal  con- 
sciousness at  a  time  of  mental  exaltation  such  as  that  which 
exhilarated  France  in  1789-90.  Elsewhere,  as  in  Spain,  Eng- 
land, and  North  Germany,  danger  of  conquest  by  the  for- 
eigner furnished  the  mental  stimulus;  and  then  what  had 
been  a  group-consciousness,  a  county  or  provincial  feeling, 
became  a  permanently  national  feeling.  As  I  have  tried  to 
show  in  these  lectures,  this  widening  outlook,  this  pride  in 
the  country  instead  of  merely  in  the  county,  opens  up  an 
immense  store  of  vital  energy.  There  passes  through  those 
diverse  groups  and  classes  a  thrill  which  makes  them  one 
body  politic — not  a  corpus  vile  on  which  Kings  and  lawgivers 
may  work  their  will,  but  a  conscious  powerful  entity  which 
bends  them  to  its  will.  Such  is  the  change  which  has  come 
over  the  peoples.  It  has  refashioned  the  map  of  Europe, 
forming  in  the  centre  massive  blocks  out  of  what  was  a 
feudal  mosaic,  dissolving  the  Ottoman  Empire  into  its  com- 


138          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

ponent  racial  groups,  in  short,  giving  political  expression  to 
the  settlements  of  the  peoples  effected  during  the  Dark  Ages. 

Reverting  to  our  political  bioscope  of  Lecture  I,  we  see 
that  the  political  boundaries  of  Europe  now  correspond 
nearly  to  the  more  permanent  of  the  conquests  made  by  the 
barbarian  invaders  who  shattered  the  Roman  Empire.  First 
there  was  imperial  unity,  which  gave  way  before  tribal 
chaos;  then  there  ensued  long  and  painful  jostlings;  then  an 
assorting  process  under  monarchs;  then  there  emerged  groups 
of  tribes  nearly  related,  which  developed  at  the  expense  of 
merely  traditional  or  enforced  groupings;  finally  there  were 
formed  the  solid  homogeneous  blocks  of  to-day.  Obviously, 
here  we  have  an  elemental  force  of  incalculable  potency, 
whether  for  good  or  harm.  The  reasonable  method  of  re- 
garding this  national  instinct  is,  not  to  sneer  at  it  as  something 
old-fashioned  and  certain  soon  to  disappear  before  an  en- 
lightened cosmopolitanism,  but  rather  to  try  and  understand 
it,  so  as  to  dissociate  its  baser  elements  from  those  which 
may  further  the  progress  of  mankind. 

Firstly,  then,  what  is  Nationality,  using  the  term  in  its 
abstract  sense?  l  Perhaps  we  shall  come  nearer  to  the  truth 
if  we  apply  the  method  of  exclusion  and  discover  what  it  is 
not.  Our  studies  have,  I  believe,  led  us  to  doubt  whether  it 
is  determined  by  race.  Let  us  consider  this  question  in  the 
light  of  the  science  of  ethnology.  We  now  know  that  the 
old  notions  about  "the  European  family"  and  its  supposed 
division  into  Celts,  Teutons,  etc.,  are  without  scientific 
foundation.  There  is  no  European  family,  no  Celtic  race, 
no  Teutonic  race.  Anthropologists,  by  their  careful  exami- 
nations of  certain  physical  characteristics,  such  as  the  shape 
of  the  skull  and  the  color  of  hair  and  eyes,  have  proved  that 
so-called  racial  divisions  based  on  language  or  tradition  are 

1  See  the  Preface  for  notes  on  the  terms  "people,"  "nation,"  "nation- 
ality." 


NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM  139 

not  fundamental.  Speaking  broadly,  there  are  three  races  in 
Europe:  (i)  the  tall,  fair,  long-haired  race  which  spreads 
from  the  British  Isles  and  the  North  of  France  through 
Flanders  and  the  North  European  plain  and  Scandinavia  as 
far  as  the  Gulf  of  Finland;  (2)  the  broad-headed  race,  gener- 
ally termed  the  Alpine,  which  inhabits  the  greater  part  of 
Central  France,  Central  Europe,  and  the  Balkan  Peninsula; 
(3)  the  Mediterranean  race,  inhabiting  the  European  lands 
north  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  with  the  exception  of  North 
Italy  and  the  Balkan  Peninsula.1 

Science,  then,  knows  of  no  essential  physical  difference 
between  a  North-West  German,  a  Fleming,  and  a  North 
Frenchman.  There  is  a  difference  between  this  northern 
family  and  the  Central  and  Southern  Germans  and  French- 
men. Considered  according  to  race,  Germany  is  tripartite, 
and  so  is  France.  There  is  no  marked  distinction  of  race  be- 
tween a  Norman  and  a  Hanoverian;  between  a  Lyonnais 
and  a  Bavarian;  between  a  Provencal  and  a  Calabrian.  In 
the  French  army  there  are  three  distinct  racial  types:  so  there 
are  in  the  German  army.  Yet  those  three  diverse  types  are 
welded  into  political  and  military  entities,  which  oppose 
each  other  with  the  most  desperate  determination.  But  this 
political  and  military  grouping  is  not  racial;  it  is  based  on 
difference  of  culture  (using  the  term  in  its  widest  sense). 
Though  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  Celtic  or  Teutonic  race, 
Celtic  or  Teutonic  culture  is  a  reality.  So,  too,  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  people  is  a  conglomerate,  made  up  of  several  racial 
elements;  but  Anglo-Saxon  culture  has  marked  and  distinct 
characteristics,  which,  from  our  present  point  of  view,  over- 
shadow the  physical  differences  above  noted.  It  is  also  im- 
portant to  get  rid  of  the  old  notion  that  there  is  a  fundamental 

1  The  above  summary,  of  course,  does  not  comprise  the  Jews,  Turks, 
Bulgars,  Magyars,  and  Finns.  It  is  only  a  very  general  statement. 
Deniker  subdivides  the  three  races  named  above  into  several  groups. 


140          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

physical  difference  between  the  average  Englishman  and  the 
average  North  Frenchman,  and  between  him  and  the  average 
North  German.1  What  differences  there  are  have  developed 
later.  They  are  due  to  language,  tradition,  religion,  custom, 
and,  finally,  political  grouping  and  political  sentiment.  Of 
course  these  differences  make  up  nearly  the  whole  of  life  to 
the  modern  man;  but  (to  put  it  baldly)  the  Englishman  is 
not  a  different  animal  from  the  North  German,  or  he,  again, 
from  the  North  Frenchman.  Science  has  rendered  a  great 
service  by  disproving  that  hoary  superstition. 

No!  Only  in  a  very  crude  form  (like  that  which  now  pre- 
vails hi  Germany  and  the  Balkans)  does  Nationality  depend 
on  race.  The  Belgian  litterateur,  Laveleye,  well  expressed 
the  thought:  "In  proportion  as  the  culture  of  a  people  ad- 
vances, identity  of  race  and  of  blood  exercises  less  power  on 
it,  and  historic  memories  exercise  more  power.  Above 
ethnical  nationalities  there  are  political  nationalities,  formed 
by  choice  (one  may  say),  rooted  in  love  of  liberty,  in  the  cult 
of  a  glorious  past,  in  accord  of  interests,  in  similarity  of  moral 
ideas,  and  of  all  that  forms  the  intellectual  life."2  Here, 
however,  I  must  regretfully  remark  that  this  peaceful  and 
ideal  development  is  apt  to  be  interrupted  by  inrushes  of 
sentiment  and  passion.  At  such  crises,  especially  during 
war,  the  adage  "Blood  is  thicker  than  water"  holds  good; 
and  the  affinities  produced  by  generations  of  culture  vanish 
under  the  drag  of  racial  instincts  that  seemed  to  be  dead. 
Then  the  cultured  European  gives  place  to  the  tribal  warrior. 

In  normal  circumstances,  however,  Nationality  does  not 
depend  on  race.  Does  it,  then,  depend  on  language?  Here 
certainly  we  come  nearer  to  a  powerful  political  influence. 
But  again  consider.  In  the  French  army  are  Bretons  and  a 
few  Basques  and  Spaniards  who  speak  no  French,  yet  are 

1 W.  Z.  Ripley,  The  Races  of  Europe,  ch.  6. 

*E.  Laveleye,  Le  Gouvernement  et  la  Democratic  (1891),  I,  p.  58. 


NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM  141 

enthusiastically  French  at  heart.  In  the  German  army  are 
Wends  who  in  a  political  sense  are  thoroughly  Germanized, 
not  to  speak  of  Poles,  Danes,  and  Lorrainers  who  are  not 
Germanized.  In  the  Austrian  army  are  peoples  speaking 
eleven  distinct  languages;  yet  there  is  in  that  army,  as  in  the 
Austrian  Empire,  far  more  solidarity  that  was  believed  to 
be  possible.  But  the  crowning  proof  that  language  does  not 
determine  Nationality  is  found  in  Switzerland.  The  Swiss 
comprise  portions  of  three  peoples,  which  speak  French, 
German,  and  Italian;1  yet  they  remain  at  peace,  though 
over  the  borders  their  kith  and  kin  are  at  war.  How  is  this 
possible?  Merely  because  language  does  not  determine 
nationality.  The  sentiment  of  Swiss  Nationality,  rooted  in 
pride  in  their  historic  past  and  in  contentment  with  an  almost 
ideal  polity,  has  triumphed  over  linguistic  differences.  Tri- 
lingual Switzerland  remains  at  peace — agitated,  it  is  true, 
for  language  is  a  powerful  tie.  Nevertheless,  the  spiritual 
union  of  that  people  holds  firm;  and  its  triumph  is  an  augury 
of  hope  for  the  future.  Scarcely  less  remarkable  is  the  case 
of  the  Jews,  at  which  we  glanced  in  Lecture  I.  They  have 
retained  their  solidarity,  though  dispersed  during  long  ages, 
and  divided  by  sharp  differences  of  language.  Only  where 
congregated  together  in  large  numbers  do  they  habitually 
use  Hebrew.  In  Spain  and  the  Balkan  States  they  use 
Spanish;  in  Russia  and  Poland  they  speak  either  Polish  or  a 
corrupt  German;  in  Morocco,  Arabic.  Yet  they  rarely  lose 
their  Nationality.2 
The  case  of  the  Swiss  and  that  of  the  Jews,  then,  seems  to 

1 1  omit  the  Romansch,  spoken  in  the  Engadine,  as  too  small  to  count. 

2  Ripley,  op.  cit.,  p.  369;  S.  B.  Rohold,  The  War  and  the  Jew  (Toronto, 
1915),  shows  that  350,000  Jews  are  fighting  for  Russia,  180,000  for 
Austria,  over  15,000  for  us,  and  over  10,000  for  France.  Yet,  though 
loyally  obeying  their  Governments  and  fighting  against  their  co-religion- 
ists, they  remain  Jews. 


142          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

show  that  language  is  not  necessary  to,  though  it  may  help 
on,  the  forming  of  a  nation.  Probably,  with  the  spread 
of  education,  language  will  play  a  smaller  part  than  before. 
Welsh  is  dying  in  several  parts  of  Wales,  especially  in  the 
industrial  districts;  and  the  smaller  languages  will  doubtless 
vanish,  and  with  them  racial  differences  and  jealousies. 
Migration  and  emigration  help  on  the  assimilating  process. 
In  the  United  States  and  Canada  few  languages  except 
English,  French,  and  German  have  a  chance  of  surviving, 
and  French  and  German  only  hi  certain  areas.  Speaking 
generally,  in  the  new  lands  the  smaller  languages  tend  to 
disappear.  Dutch  (in  a  very  simplified  form)  persists  in 
South  Africa;  but  there,  too,  commerce  helps  on  the  more 
useful  language,  English.  Indeed,  the  victory  of  General 
Botha  over  Herzog  at  the  polls  in  South  Africa  may  prove 
to  be  the  beginning  of  a  genuinely  Anglo-Dutch  reunion, 
which  will  be  neither  English  nor  Dutch,  but  Africander 
(perhaps  bi-lingual  for  some  generations),  loyal  to  the  Em- 
pire which  not  only  tolerates  but  fosters  within  its  fold 
all  peoples,  all  creeds,  all  languages.  The  present  war  has 
been  a  terrible  set  back  to  the  progress  of  mankind;  for  it 
has  revived  national  hatreds  and  has  arrayed  against  each 
other  peoples  speaking  different  languages;  but  there  are 
tendencies  at  work,  more  permanent  than  war,  which  lessen 
linguistic  differences  and  induce  peoples  of  diverse  tongues 
to  live  together  in  friendly  union.  Of  these  Federations, 
Switzerland,  the  United  States,  and  the  British  Empire 
(which  is  in  spirit  a  Federation  rather  than  an  Empire) 
form  the  most  promising  examples;  and  the  present  disastrous 
conflict  will  probably  tend  ultimately  to  strengthen  the  devel- 
opment of  such  unions  existing  independently  of  race  or 
language.  Such  at  least  is  the  tendency  among  the  leading 
peoples  of  the  West.  They  do  not  need  to  conquer  their 
neighbors;  they  attract  them  by  the  charm  of  their  culture. 


NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM  143 

And  this,  surely,  is  the  type  of  Nationality  which  will  ulti- 
mately prevail  over  the  crude  force  that  is  now  devastating 
the  world. 

No!  Nationality  does  not  depend  on  language.  Still  less 
does  it  depend  on  a  State.  As  we  saw  in  the  last  lecture, 
a  nation  that  depends  on  a  State  is  mistaking  an  organism 
for  the  life  and  soul  of  that  organism.  In  modern  tunes, 
national  feeling  has  fashioned  States,  and  is  always  at  work 
refashioning  them  in  accordance  with  new  needs.  Nations 
make  States;  not  States,  nations.  The  one  exception  is 
Prussia;  so  long  as  she  limited  herself  to  the  unification  of 
the  German  people,  she  achieved  remarkable  success;  but 
so  soon  as  the  Prussian  State  sought  to  Germanize  other 
peoples,  it  utterly  failed.  Herein,  surely,  lies  one  of  the  chief 
causes  of  the  deep  hostility  between  the  Germans  and  other 
peoples.  The  Germans  have  glorified  the  State  and  have 
sought  to  force  their  Kultur  on  neighboring  highly  civilized 
peoples,  who  resent  that  process.  Even  if,  by  some  miracle, 
they  succeeded  in  this  war,  their  effort  would  be  doomed  to 
failure,  as  surely  as  that  of  Napoleon  the  Great.  For  it 
violates  a  fundamental  conviction  of  the  modern  man. 

Lastly,  is  Nationality  an  emanation  of  the  World-Spirit? 
Hegel  (in  his  Philosophy  of  History,  1830)  put  forth  a  theory 
which  assumed  that  a  world-force  visited  the  peoples  in  a 
predetermined  order  and  endowed  them  with  exceptional 
vitality  for  some  special  task.  While  they  performed  that 
task,  they  were  "moral,  virtuous,  vigorous."  Thereafter, 
they  declined,  and  another  took  up  that  or  some  similar  task. 
The  theory  finds  little  support  from  History.  It  breaks  down 
in  the  case  of  China,  which  during  thousands  of  years  has 
pursued  the  even  tenor  of  its  way,  with  few  signs  of  decline, 
and,  indeed,  recently  with  many  signs  of  rejuvenescence.  The 
theory  also  seeks  to  account  for  the  decay  of  the  nations,  both 
ancient  and  modern,  on  a  single  hypothesis;  whereas  history 


144          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

shows  that  decline  and  decay  were  due  to  very  diverse  causes, 
many  of  them  of  an  agrarian  or  social  character  but  slightly 
understood  in  Hegel's  day.  Nations  also  may  seem  to  be  on 
the  downward  trend,  like  the  France  of  Louis  XV  and  XVI, 
and  then  by  a  conscious  and  determined  effort  of  reform  they 
will  shoot  up  again  to  unimagined  heights  of  power,  declining 
once  more  when  that  power  is  abused  by  a  dictator,  Napoleon. 
If  Napoleon  was  the  chief  emanation  of  the  World-Spirit, 
as  Hegel  long  assumed  him  to  be,  how  came  it  that  he  left 
France  far  weaker  than  he  found  her?  Did  the  World-Spirit 
suddenly  change  its  mind  in  1813  and  resolve  to  desert  him 
and  go  over  to  the  Allies? 

On  these  and  similar  topics  the  World-Spirit  theory  offers 
no  adequate  explanation.  Indeed,  it  cannot  explain  the 
complex  phenomena  of  the  rise  and  fall  of  nations.  That 
certain  peoples  have  now  and  again  displayed  marvellously 
increased  vigor  is  true;  but  that  phenomenon  is  generally 
due  to  one  or  more  of  the  following  causes:  There  may  be  a 
f  using  together  of  various  tribes  by  some  able  leader  or  under 
the  impulse  of  religious  fervor  (as  happened  to  the  Arabs 
after  the  time  of  Mohammed).  A  great  warrior  may  have 
incited  peoples  to  wars  of  ambition.  Or,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
nation,  when  threatened  with  conquest,  may  be  thrown  back 
on  itself  and  develop  to  the  utmost  the  powers  that  generally 
go  unused.  Or,  again,  a  people  can  be  stimulated  by  becom- 
ing the  exponent  of  some  great  idea,  as  were  the  Swedes  of 
Gustavus  Adolphus  by  Reformation  fervor,  or  the  French 
Revolutionists  by  the  ideas  of  liberty,  equality,  and  National- 
ity. Lastly,  geographical  discoveries  and  mechanical  inven- 
tions bring  some  peoples  to  the  front  and  depress  the  fortunes 
of  others,  as  is  evident  from  the  history  of  Venice,  Portugal, 
Holland,  Great  Britain.  Looking  at  the  causes  that  make  for 
the  rise  and  fall  of  nations,  we  discern  a  great  variety;  they 
range  from  warlike  ambition  or  the  spur  of  hunger,  to  impulses 


NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM  145 

of  an  ideal  nature,  such  as  religious  zeal,  or  newly  aroused 
national  pride,  or  wars  of  liberation.  Sometimes  a  new  energy 
raises  the  people  to  a  higher  level  of  thought,  art,  or  inven- 
tion. Again,  it  drives  them  to  the  conquest  of  new  markets. 
How  is  it  possible  to  refer  to  any  one  cause  impulses  of  so 
bewildering  a  variety?  Label  your  causa  causans  "World- 
Spirit"  if  you  like;  but  remember  that  it  is  a  very  Proteus, 
now  flashing  forth  as  a  warrior,  then  shrinking  into  a  huck- 
ster; now  an  artist  or  poet,  then  a  politician;  now  a  philoso- 
pher, then  an  explorer;  now  an  admiral,  then  a  mechanic  or 
engineer.  You  must  run  through  the  whole  range  of  life  in 
order  to  fill  up  all  the  characters  that  your  Spirit  may  assume. 

Lastly,  remember  that  the  theory  of  a  World-Spirit  in- 
flating one  people  and  deflating  others  in  a  predetermined 
order  is  morally  mischievous.  For  it  tends  to  puff  up  with 
pride  a  people  which  believes  it  detects  some  sign  of  the 
spiritual  afflatus;  while  it  also  disheartens  peoples  that  deem 
the  deflating  process  begun,  and  thereby  discourages  the 
timely  efforts  at  reform  which  can  nearly  always  avert 
collapse.  Believe  me,  that  a  fatalistic  theory,  such  as  that 
of  the  World-Spirit,  has  little  warrant  from  history.  It  does 
not  apply  to  peoples  that  refuse  to  bow  down  to  the  supposed 
decrees  of  fate.  Only  those  peoples  are  sure  to  perish  who 
tamely  prostrate  themselves  before  those  decrees.1 

We  have  now  cleared  the  ground  of  faulty  or  inadequate 
explanations  of  Nationality.  Perhaps  we  shall  best  under- 
stand what  it  is  if  we  briefly  review  the  events  that  first  made 
it  a  force  in  the  modern  world. 

Recent  history  is  held  to  begin  with  the  French  Revolu- 
tion of  1789:  and  Alison  classed  all  the  campaigns  up  to 
Waterloo  under  the  Revolution.  Is  it  not  truer  to  fact  to  sub- 
divide the  period  and  say  that  the  first  phase  of  Nationality 

1 1  think  that  Nationality  explains  several  of  the  cases  of  exceptional 
vitality  which  Hegel  ascribed  to  his  World-Spirit. 


146          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

as  distinct  from  Democracy  begins  with  the  Spanish  Rising 
of  1808?  It  ends  with  Waterloo.  The  second  phase  com- 
mences fitfully  in  1830  and  1848,  and  more  definitely  with  the 
Italian  War  of  Liberation  in  1859.  From  1859  to  the  present 
is  pre-eminently  the  climax  of  the  Age  of  Nationality.  By 
this  I  mean  that  the  idea  has  permeated  the  masses  of  the 
population  and  has  increased  their  power  for  action.  True, 
the  national  idea  had  previously  dawned  upon  poets  and 
thinkers.  It  vibrates  in  the  verse  of  Dante,  Chaucer,  and 
Shakespeare;  but,  as  we  saw  in  Lecture  I,  it  did  not  permeate 
the  masses,  except  at  intense  moments  of  their  life,  such  as 
coincided  with  the  exploits  of  Jeanne  d'Arc,  the  repulse  of  the 
Spanish  Armada,  or  the  revolt  of  the  Dutch  "Beggars" 
against  Spain.  Subsequently,  it  died  down  even  in  France, 
England,  and  Holland;  for  the  Religious  Wars  divided  peoples 
against  themselves,  and,  on  the  cessation  of  those  strifes, 
dynastic  wars  or  the  growth  of  absolutist  States  half  stifled 
the  sentiment.  Louis  XIV  personified  the  French  nation,  but 
so  successfully  that  the  nation  was  but  half  aware  of  its  own 
existence. 

Much  preparatory  work  had  to  be  done  before  this  dis- 
covery was  possible.  The  shipbuilders,  road-makers,  and 
traders  played  their  part  in  bringing  men  together.  Thinkers 
pointed  out  what  was  natural,  what  artificial,  in  their  society. 
But  when  all  this  preliminary  work  was  ended,  and  men  of 
different  provinces  of  France  began  to  greet  each  other  instead 
of  scowling,  any  widespread  impulse  was  certain  to  produce  a 
new  and  vital  union. 

Such  an  event  was  the  Revolution.  It  changed  the  half- 
'animate  clods  into  citizens,  but  it  also  sent  through  them 
a  sympathetic  thrill  which  made  the  citizens  a  nation.  France 
is  often  termed  the  political  laboratory  of  Europe;  for  her 
actions  are  more  striking  than  are  the  gradual  unfoldings  that 
characterize  our  annals.  Certainly,  it  is  in  French  history 


NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM  147 

that  the  development  of  Nationality  is  most  clearly  outlined. 
The  merging  of  different  peoples  and  diverse  provinces  in  a 
single  monarchy  was  the  work  of  French  monarchs  and 
statesmen,  so  that,  except  in  a  few  moments  of  inspiration, 
the  nation  existed  only  by  and  in  the  person  of  the  King.  As 
the  monarchy  declined  under  Louis  XV  and  XVI,  the  nation 
emerged;  and,  early  in  the  Revolution  (as  we  saw  in  Lec- 
ture II),  the  disputes  of  the  National  Assembly  with  the  King 
brought  the  sense  of  Nationality  to  sudden  maturity.  It 
found  expression  during  the  famous  sitting  of  August  4,  1789, 
when  Lorraine,  youngest  of  the  French  provinces,  expressed 
her  desire  to  join  intimately  in  the  life  of  "this  glorious 
family." 

I  know  of  no  words  that  better  describe  Nationality.  It  is 
an  instinct,  and  cannot  be  exactly  defined;  it  is  the  recognition 
as  kinsmen  of  those  who  were  deemed  strangers;  it  is  the 
apotheosis  of  family  feeling,  and  begets  a  resolve  never  again 
to  separate;  it  leads  to  the  founding  of  a  polity  on  a  natural 
basis,  independent  of  a  monarch  or  a  State,  though  not  in  any 
sense  hostile  to  them;  it  is  more  than  a  political  contract;  it  is 
a  union  of  hearts,  once  made,  never  unmade.  These  are  the 
characteristics  of  Nationality  in  its  highest  form — a  spiritual 
conception,  unconquerable,  indestructible.  So  soon  as  clans, 
tribes,  or  provinces  catch  the  glow  of  this  wider  enthusiasm, 
they  form  a  nation.  And  thus  it  was  that  France  burst  into 
her  new  life.  Her  long  chrysalis  stage,  when  patriotism  clung 
about  the  old  monarchy,  was  ended;  and  the  nation  stood 
erect  and  defiant.  England,  Italy,  Illyria,  Spain,  Russia, 
Germany,  successively  felt  the  impact  of  this  new  vital  force, 
and  responded  with  messages,  first  of  sympathy,  then  of  dis- 
trust, finally  of  hostility.  Thus,  within  twenty-five  years, 
Europe  was  awake,  and  became  a  camp  of  warring  nations. 

During  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Age,  then, 
France  exhibits  Nationality  at  its  best  and  at  its  worst.  In  its 


148          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

higher  developments  in  1789-91  that  principle  endowed  her 
with  a  distinct  and  vivid  consciousness,  so  that  what  had 
been  a  set  of  limbs,  worked  in  the  main  by  a  master,  became  a 
body-politic — nay,  more,  a  soul-politic  that  defied  division. 
In  this  new  and  intense  life  she  exerted  a  singular  fascination 
on  all  peoples.  Thinkers  felt  her  magnetic  potency.  Goethe, 
unresponsive  to  German  politics,  bowed  before  the  manifesta- 
tion of  her  uncanny  strength  at  Valmy.  Schiller  and  Fichte 
hailed  her  as  the  source  of  light  and  warmth  to  a  dead  world. 
Wordsworth  and  Coleridge  first  felt  the  full  thrill  of  poetic 
ecstasy  as  they  gazed  on  her  civic  raptures,  and  foretold 
defeat  to  all  who  withstood  her  new-found  might.  That 
was  Nationality  in  its  purest  form.  It  corresponds  to  the 
tune  in  lif  e  when  the  youth  finds  himself. 

But,  as  often  happens  in  human  affairs,  this  strength  ran 
riot.  Self-realization  begot  self-confidence,  and  that  in  its 
turn  contempt  for  those  who  were  still  inert.  Hence  the 
crusade  of  1792  for  the  liberation  of  unfree  peoples  degen- 
erated into  wars  of  aggression.  As  Wordsworth  phrased  it: — 

"But  now,  become  oppressors  in  their  turn, 
Frenchmen  had  changed  a  war  of  self-defence 
For  one  of  conquest,  losing  sight  of  all 
Which  they  had  struggled  for.  .  .  . 

...  I  read  her  doom, 
With  anger  vexed,  with  disappointment  sore."  l 

This  sudden  degeneration  of  French  Nationality  reminds 
us  that  there  is  a  baser  side  to  the  instinct.  In  this  respect 
it  does  not  aim  at  the  union  of  all  who  desire  to  share  hi  the 
common  life,  but  seeks  to  compel  aliens  to  come  in.  It  uses 
force,  not  attraction.  Its  outcome  is  tyranny,  not  liberty;  a 
military  Empire,  not  a  free  Federation. 

Not  only  events  in  France  in  1792-1815,  but  also  the 
1  Wordsworth,  Prelude,  Bk.  XI. 


NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM  149 

Continental  movements  of  1848-9  reveal  the  ease  with  which 
Nationalism  is  perverted  and  becomes  an  enemy  to  freedom. 
When  the  peoples  of  Italy,  France,  Germany,  and  Austria- 
Hungary  rose  to  demand  constitutional  rule  and  a  more 
natural  political  grouping,  Democracy  and  Nationality 
seemed  for  a  time  to  have  achieved  a  complete  triumph. 
But  the  two  principles  soon  clashed,  especially  among  the 
Germans  and  Magyars.  In  Hungary,  the  Magyars  won  their 
freedom  from  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  but  soon  showed  their 
unfitness  for  the  boon.  No  sooner  did  they  gain  constitutional 
rights  than  they  used  them  to  force  the  Magyar  language  on 
their  Slav  fellow-subjects — an  act  of  intolerance  fatal  to 
Hungary  in  1849,  as  similar  acts  have  been  hi  the  recent 
past.1  At  other  points,  too,  the  Nationalists  of  1849  strained 
their  case  to  breaking  point,  with  the  result  that  in  Central 
Europe  and  to  a  less  extent  in  Italy  Democracy  and  National- 
ity parted  company,  to  their  mutual  detriment. 

The  upshot  of  it  all  was  that  the  programme  of  Mazzini 
failed  in  the  sphere  of  practice;  and  the  peoples,  unable  to 
achieve  self-expression  by  their  unaided  exertions,  fell  back 
on  the  methods  of  diplomacy  and  force  exemplified  in  the 
careers  of  Cavour  and  Bismarck,  and  championed  by  the 
Houses  of  Savoy  and  Hohenzollern.  In  that  statement 
much  lies  enfolded;  for  it  implies  that  they  entered  upon 
paths  parallel  to  those  which  led  Revolutionary  France 
towards  Militarism. 

True:  the  successes  won  by  Cavour  and  Bismarck  were 
phenomenal.  The  Italian  and  German  movements  rushed 
to  victory  in  the  eleven  years  1859-70;  but  I  believe  that  all 
intelligent  Germans  now  regret  the  suddenness  and  the 
brilliance  of  that  triumph  of  military  force.  Better  that 

1  Bluntschli  (Theory  of  the  State,  Bk.  II,  ch.  3)  says  that  a  State  cannot 
deny  a  Nationality  the  use  of  its  language  and  literature,  though  it  may 
use  the  predominant  language  for  convenience. 


150          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Germany  and  Italy  had  struggled  on  some  decades  longer, 
and  won  their  national  unity  by  less  forceful  means  and  at 
the  cost  of  fewer  national  antipathies. 

Let  us  retrace  our  steps  in  order  to  observe  the  parallel 
courses  of  Militarism  in  Republican  France  and  Bismarckian 
Prussia.  As  we  saw  in  Lecture  II,  France  adopted  the  prin- 
ciple of  civic  service  for  her  newly  enfranchised  sons  in  1789; 
and  Lafayette,  shortly  after  the  capture  of  the  Bastille,  when 
founding  the  new  National  Guard,  pronounced  that  force 
"an  institution  at  once  civic  and  military,  which  must  prevail 
over  the  old  tactics  of  Europe,  and  which  will  reduce  arbitrary 
Governments  to  the  alternative  of  being  beaten  if  they  do  not 
imitate  it,  or  overthrown  [by  their  subjects]  if  they  dare  to 
imitate  it."  1  This  remarkable  prophecy  did  not  come  true 
until  the  national  danger  became  acute;  but  then,  in  the 
spring  of  1793,  the  organization  of  the  National  Guards  was 
greatly  extended,  so  much  so  as  to  cause  the  first  outbreaks  in 
recalcitrant  La  Vendee.  After  the  individualist  Girondins 
were  overthrown  on  June  2,  thoroughgoing  Jacobins  leaped 
to  power,  and  they  proceeded  to  enforce  the  principle  of 
national  service.  With  Robespierre  supreme  in  the  Com- 
mittee of  Public  Safety  and  Carnot  as  its  military  organizer, 
conscription  became  the  groundwork  of  the  national  defence. 
In  a  great  speech  at  the  Jacobins'  Club  on  August  1 1  Robes- 
pierre thus  set  forth  the  gravity  of  the  military  crisis:  "... 
The  remedy  is  in  you  yourselves.  ...  If  the  whole  people 
does  not  derive  fresh  courage  from  our  reverses;  if  one  single 
citizen  fails  to  rush  forward  to  devote  himself  to  the  salvation 
of  the  country  by  beating  back  its  oppressors,  it  is  all  up  with 
Liberty:  she  will  not  survive  our  courage."  Thereafter  a 
Report  was  presented  to  the  National  Convention  urging 
drastic  measures,  because  "half  measures  are  always  fatal 
in  extreme  peril.  The  whole  nation  is  easier  to  move  than  a 
1  Lafayette,  M€ms.,  II,  267. 


NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM  151 

part  of  the  nation.  .  .  .  Let  there  be  no  exceptions  save 
those  which  are  necessary  for  the  sowing  and  harvesting  of 
the  crops."  Barere  then  declared  that  the  whole  nation 
ought  to  rise  in  defence  of  freedom  and  constitution  and  to 
drive  out  the  foreign  despots  and  then*  satellites.  On  Au- 
gust 23  the  National  Convention  placed  all  males  of  military 
age  permanently  at  the  service  of  the  armies.  The  decree  ran 
thus:  "The  young  men  shall  go  to  fight;  married  men  shall 
forge  weapons  and  transport  supplies;  the  women  shall  make 
tents  and  uniforms  or  serve  in  the  hospitals;  the  children 
shall  make  lint;  the  old  men  shall  be  carried  to  the  public 
squares  to  excite  the  courage  of  soldiers,  hatred  of  kings, 
and  enthusiasm  for  the  unity  of  the  Republic."  l  That  is 
how  France  interpreted  the  new  device  on  its  flags:  "The 
French  nation  risen  against  tyrants." 

It  has  been  asserted  that  the  decree  of  1798  is  the  first 
law  of  conscription.  True,  it  carried  out  more  methodically 
the  system  imposed  hi  August,  1793.  But  the  later  decree 
was  merely  the  extension  of  the  earlier  decree,  which  gave 
France  those  massive  arrays  so  fatal  to  the  thin  lines  of 
Coburg  and  the  Duke  of  York.  The  momentum  of  the  new 
national  forces  carried  them  into  Holland,  the  Rhineland, 
and  the  Genoese  Riviera  in  the  campaigns  of  1794-5,  thus 
inaugurating  the  period  of  conquest,  which  was  prolonged  by 
the  genius  and  ambition  of  Napoleon. 

These  facts  should  be  noted  carefully;  for  they  dispose 
of  the  assertions  often  made,  that  conscription  was  a  device 
of  the  monarchs  for  the  enslavement  of  their  peoples.  Far 
from  that,  conscription  was  a  device  of  the  most  democratic 
government  in  the  world  for  the  expulsion  of  the  armies  of  the 
monarchs.  None  of  them  dared  to  copy  the  democratic 
principle  of  national  service,  until  Frederick  William  III  of 
Prussia  doubtfully  adopted  it  as  a  desperate  expedient  for 
1  Hist,  parlementaire,  XXVTII,  455-469. 


152          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

saving  that  humiliated  State  from  utter  ruin;  and  the  Prussian 
army,  when  nationalized,  played  a  very  important  part  in  the 
overthrow  of  Napoleon.  I  believe  that  there  is  a  vague 
notion  that  conscription  originated  with  him.  He  merely 
systematized  its  application.  The  responsibility  for  the 
introduction  of  the  system  lies  with  the  French  Republicans 
of  1793  and  1798.  It  was  therefore  a  result  of  the  national 
and  democratic  sentiment  which  swept  through  France  at  the 
tune  of  her  great  Revolution.  The  statement  that  Militarism 
is  the  outcome  of  a  deep-laid  plot  of  rulers  to  enslave  their 
peoples  is  so  far  wrong,  that,  after  the  Restoration  of  the 
French  Bourbons  in  1814-5,  the  national  army  was  con- 
siderably reduced;  and  the  same  thing  happened  among 
other  peoples.  Autocrats  do  not  like  universal  service;  for 
they  cannot  trust  it.  Thus  ended  Militarism  hi  its  first 
phase. 

The  second,  or  Prussian,  phase  began  in  1860,  when,  for 
purposes  of  defence,  after  the  humiliations  of  the  previous 
years,  the  Regent  (soon  King),  William  I  of  Prussia,  intro- 
duced the  first  of  his  famous  Army  Bills.  They  were  fiercely 
opposed  by  the  Prussian  Parliament  in  the  belief  that  he 
would  make  the  army  the  tool  of  absolutism.  But  his  aim  was 
patriotic,  not  despotic.  After  the  overthrow  of  Denmark  and 
Austria  by  means  of  that  army,  Prussian  Liberals  withdrew 
their  opposition  and  condoned  all  the  illegal  proceedings  of 
years  1860-6.  Why?  Because,  however  high-handed,  the 
the  Bismarckian  policy  had  enabled  them  to  win  Schleswig- 
Holstein  from  the  Danes  and  to  weld  the  North  German 
States  on  the  firm  basis  of  the  Prussian  monarchy.  Their 
constitutional  scruples  vanished  when  it  appeared  that  the 
policy  of  "blood  and  iron"  had  prevailed  over  two  neigh- 
boring States,  and  had  nearly  solved  the  problem  of  German 
unity.  The  Prussian  deputies  now  saw  that  the  King's  aim 
had  been  national.  The  triumph  of  1870  clinched  the  success 


NATIONALITY  AND  MILITARISM  153 

of  Prussia;  and  the  German  Empire  of  1871,  though  federal  in 
form,  was,  in  effect,  an  enlargement  of  Prussia.  In  March, 
1849,  King  Frederick  William  IV  had  solemnly  promised  that 
Prussia  should  merge  herself  in  Germany.  In  1871  Germany 
merged  herself  in  Prussia. 

The  brilliance  of  these  military  triumphs  led  neighboring 
peoples  to  copy  the  Prussian  army;  and  once  again  Europe 
became  an  armed  camp.  The  results  are  well  known.  Just 
as  Napoleon  diverted  to  purposes  of  conquest  a  citizen- 
army  which  at  first  was  solely  defensive,  so  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II 
has  misused  the  enormous  resources  of  men,  arms,  and  money 
which  his  grandfather  is  believed  to  have  amassed  primarily 
for  the  sake  of  defence.  Worst  of  all,  the  national  army 
which  enabled  Prussia  in  1866-70  to  effect  the  unity  of  Ger- 
many, has  been  prostituted  to  colossal  schemes  of  aggrand- 
izement at  the  expense  of  weaker  neighbors.  The  conduct 
of  Wilhelm  II  in  this  century  therefore  resembles  that  of 
Napoleon  a  century  ago.  But  in  one  respect  the  Hohen- 
zollern  has  less  excuse  than  the  Corsican.  In  the  years  1805- 
15  national  sentiment  was  far  less  developed  than  it  is  to-day. 
A  century  of  effort  has  strengthened  the  individuality  of 
all  the  peoples,  so  that  their  merging  in  any  one  State  or 
Union,  which  was  possible  under  Napoleon,  is  unthinkable 
under  Wilhelm.  Prussia  now  offers  her  victims  no  high 
ideal  of  citizenship,  only  the  prospect  of  unlimited  drilling 
with  a  view  to  the  subjection  of  other  peoples;  no  inspiring 
traditions  s,uch  as  glorified  the  French  Empire — little  else 
than  records  of  astute  opportunism,  sudden  attack,  and  now, 
as  hi  1871,  brutality  in  the  hour  of  real  or  fancied  triumph. 
Such  is  the  history  of  fifty-five  years  of  Prussian  Militarism. 
Under  Napoleon  (at  any  rate  up  to  Friedland,  1807)  the 
French  polity  had  not  so  far  belied  its  democratic  origin 
as  to  be  a  tool  of  despotism  and  ambition.  The  men  who 
carried  Napoleon's  eagles  to  Vienna,  Rome,  and  Warsaw 


154          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

believed  that  they  were  furthering  the  cause  of  liberty. 
Do  the  German  troops  in  Belgium,  Poland,  and  Serbia  be- 
lieve that?  Will  a  foreign  poet  and  a  foreign  composer 
ever  sound  forth  the  heroism  and  chivalry  of  zwei  Grenadieren, 
as  Heine  and  Schumann  immortalized  those  of  Napoleon? 


LECTURE  IX 

NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885 

"Weak  and  incapable  nations  must  look  on  while  foreign  na- 
tionalities gain  in  number  and  importance  within  the  borders  of 
their  State." — PRINCE  VON  BULOW,  Imperial  Germany,  p.  240. 

THE  previous  studies  have  illustrated  the  excellences  and 
defects  of  the  national  movements  up  to  the  year  1885.  The 
instinct  of  Nationality  has  endowed  the  European  peoples 
and  Japan  (perhaps  soon  we  shall  add  China)  with  a  vitality 
and  force  which  resembles,  say,  the  incoming  of  steam-power 
into  industry.  What  previously  had  been  minutely  sub- 
divided and  inert  became  united,  vigorous,  aggressive.  Con- 
trast the  ridiculous  Germany  at  which  Heine  mocked,  the 
torpid  Italy  which  Mazzini  awakened,  with  the  great  and 
powerful  nations  of  to-day.  The  changes  wrought  by  the 
national  wars  of  the  years  1859-70  are  among  the  most  im- 
portant of  all  tune;  for  they  altered  not  only  the  polity  but 
the  national  character  in  France,  Germany,  and  Italy.1 
Further,  the  Balkan  peoples  were  nerved  to  struggle  for 
their  rights,  and  in  1876-8  and  1885  they  largely  succeeded 
in  shaking  off  the  Turkish  yoke.  In  the  autumn  of  1885 
the  union  of  the  two  Bulgarias  almost  completed  the  aspira- 

1  In  a  Paris  paper  early  in  February,  1871,  was  an  article  by  "Fer- 
ragus"  which  began:  "Bismarck  has  probably  done  better  service  to 
France  than  to  Germany.  He  has  worked  for  a  false  unity  in  his  country, 
but  very  effectually  for  a  regeneration  of  ours.  He  has  freed  us  from  the 
Empire.  He  has  restored  to  us  our  energy,  our  hatred  for  the  foreigner, 
our  love  for  our  country,  our  contempt  for  life,  our  readiness  for  self- 
sacrifice,  in  short  all  the  virtues  which  Napoleon  III  had  killed  in  us." 


156          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

tions  of  that  people;  and  (as  we  saw  in  Lecture  VI)  it  enabled 
them  to  escape  from  Russian  tutelage  and  to  proceed  with 
internal  developments  of  great  promise.  On  the  other  hand 
British  policy,  which  under  Lord  Beaconsfield  had  thwarted 
the  national  efforts  of  the  Balkan  peoples,  now,  under  Lord 
Salisbury,  resumed  its  traditional  r61e  of  protector  of  the 
small  nationalities.  Thus,  up  to  the  month  of  September, 
1885,  Nationalism  won  portentous  triumphs.  True,  in  1866 
Prussia  overstepped  her  fair  limits  by  annexing  the  Danes 
of  North  Schleswig,  and  in  1871  by  wrenching  Alsace-Lor- 
raine from  France.  Still,  the  balance  was  decidedly  favorable 
for  the  national  principle. 

We  now  approach  events  of  a  different  order.  I  propose 
to  review  them  here  as  impartially  as  possible,  and  in  the 
mam  to  leave  you  to  draw  your  own  conclusions. 

On  November  14,  1885,  King  Milan  of  Serbia  suddenly 
declared  war  against  Bulgaria  on  a  frivolous  pretext,  his 
real  reason  being  jealousy  of  the  increase  of  her  power  con- 
sequent on  the  recent  union.  The  Serbs  entered  Bulgaria, 
and  were  advancing  towards  Sofia,  when  the  Bulgars,  speedily 
rallying,  soundly  beat  them  at  Slivnitza,  and  chased  them 
back  into  their  own  territory.  Near  Pirot  the  victors  were 
bidden  to  halt.  The  Austrian  general,  Khevenhiiller,  de- 
clared in  imperious  terms  that  any  further  advance  would 
oblige  the  Dual-Monarchy  to  send  in  its  white-coats.  The 
Bulgars  thereafter  retired,  and  patched  up  matters  with 
Serbia;  but  the  incident  rankled  in  the  breasts  of  both 
peoples  and  excited  racial  jealousies  dating  back  five  cen- 
turies to  the  time  of  Serbia's  glory  under  the  sway  of  King 
Dushan. 

The  collision  has  a  double  significance.  Only  seven  years 
after  deliverance  from  their  bondage  to  the  Turk  two  Chris- 
tian peoples  flew  at  one  another's  throats  and  thereby  pro- 
voked hatreds  whose  ghastly  sequel  has  recently  appalled 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  157 

the  world.  Secondly,  the  intervention  of  Austria  on  behalf 
of  her  protege,  King  Milan,  gave  color  to  the  story  that  she 
had  incited  him  to  that  fratricidal  attack  in  order  to  weaken 
the  Balkan  peoples  and  thus  prepare  the  way  for  her  advance 
southwards  to  Salonica.  As  she  had  bargained  with  the  Tsar 
hi  1876  with  a  view  to  the  acquisition  of  that  long-coveted 
port,1  she  probably  had  a  hand  in  Milan's  enterprise.  There- 
after both  he  and  his  son,  Alexander  (the  latter  reigned  at 
Belgrade  from  1889  to  1903)  were  notoriously  under  Haps- 
burg  patronage,  which  often  screened  them  from  the  resent- 
ment of  the  Serb  people.  The  murder  of  Alexander  and  the 
accession  of  Peter  (of  the  Karageorge  family)  inaugurated 
a  national  policy,  which  increasingly  incurred  the  displeasure 
of  the  Hapsburgs.  But,  despite  the  long  tutelage  of  Serbia 
by  them,  and  that  of  Bulgaria  by  the  Tsar  Alexander  III; 
even  despite  the  cruelties  of  the  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  II 
against  both  the  Serbs  and  Bulgars  in  Macedonia,  these  races 
could  not  lay  aside  their  mutual  hatreds.  Consequently, 
the  ideal  of  a  Balkan  Federation  remained  a  dream;  and 
disgust  at  the  narrow  and  vindictive  Nationalism  of  the 
Balkan  peoples  probably  figured  among  the  motives  which 
led  the  new  Tsar,  Nicholas  II  (1894-  ),  to  turn  away  from 
their  exasperating  feuds  towards  the  golden  visions  opening 
out  in  the  Far  East.  Whatever  his  reasons,  he  certainly  took 
less  interest  than  his  father  in  Balkan  affairs. 

In  1897  the  Greeks  struggled  unsuccessfully  to  extend 
their  too  narrow  bounds  in  Thessaly.  They  met  with  no 
support  whatever  from  Serbs  and  Bulgars,  and  succumbed 
to  an  unexpectedly  sharp  counter-stroke  from  Turks  and 
Albanians.  In  the  same  year  ruthless  massacres  of  Mace- 
donians and  Armenians  by  order  of  Abdul  Hamid  mani- 
fested his  resolve  to  effect  a  Moslem  revival  by  the  tradi- 
tional Turkish  method;  and  the  sight  of  this  energy  produced 
1  Debidour,  Hist,  diplomatique  de  I' Europe,  II,  515. 


158          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

no  small  impression  at  Berlin.  In  face  of  these  glaring  vio- 
lations of  the  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  1878,  guaranteeing 
good  government  to  the  Christian  subjects  of  the  Sultan, 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  displayed  an  apathy  highly 
discreditable  to  their  rulers.  Their  inaction  in  a  matter 
closely  concerning  their  honor,  the  orientation  of  Russian 
policy,  and  the  warlike  prowess  of  Abdul  Hamid  served  to 
strengthen  a  Panislam  movement,  which  soon  received  a  pub- 
lic benediction  from  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II.  During  his  Eastern 
tour  in  1898  (that  is,  two  years  after  the  adoption  of 
Weltpolitik)  he  announced  his  resolve  to  befriend  the  Sultan 
and  the  300,000,000  Moslems — a  declaration  destined  to 
strengthen  Mohammedan  fanaticism  and  to  cause  further 
massacres  of  the  Christians  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Further 
troubles  having  ensued,  especially  in  that  seething  cauldron 
of  races,  Macedonia,  the  Emperors  of  Russia  and  Austria 
drew  up  at  Miirzsteg  in  1903  a  programme  of  reforms  for  an 
unproved  administration  of  that  province.1  The  "Miirzsteg 
Programme"  completed  and  strengthened  one  that  the  two 
Sovereigns  had  framed  in  1897,  the  other  Powers  on  both 
occasions  agreeing  to  delegate  special  functions  to  those 
previously  rival  Empires.  Both  efforts  to  put  down  anarchy 
in  Macedonia  failed,  either  from  lack  of  energy  in  the  efforts, 
or  because  the  racial  feuds  were  insoluble.  Accordingly, 
the  Great  Powers  once  more  took  up  the  duties  imposed  on 
them  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  and  in  April,  1907,  sought  to 
cure  the  maladministration  of  Macedonia.  This  attempt 
came  too  late;  for  the  situation  had  recently  changed  in 

1  Very  many  Macedonians  have  no  definite  racial  affinity,  which 
enables  rival  claimants  to  number  the  Greeks  either  600,000  or  200,000; 
the  Bulgars,  2,000,000,  1,500,000,  or  60,000;  the  Serbs  2,050,000  or  nil; 
the  Wallachs  100,000  or  75,000;  the  Turks  600,000  or  230,000.  See  J. 
Cvijic,  Remarques  sur  V Ethnographic  de  la  Macedoine;  Ichircoff,  Etude 
ethnographique  sur  les  Slaves  de  Macedoine  (Paris,  1908). 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  159 

favor  of  the  Central  Empires.  Russia  was  badly  beaten  by 
Japan  in  1904-5,  whereupon  the  Berlin  Government  dic- 
tated terms  to  France  in  the  Moroccan  affair  of  1905-6; 
and,  with  the  accession  of  Aehrenthal  to  office,  in  1906, 
Austria  entered  upon  a  vigorous  foreign  policy.  The  results 
were  seen  in  an  increase  of  Teutonic  energy  in  all  quarters, 
while  the  Slav  cause,  which  Russia  had  neglected  since  1897, 
underwent  a  notable  decline,  the  prestige  of  Austria  and 
Turkey  proportionately  rising. 

These  facts  explain  the  daring  stroke  of  Austria  in  annexing 
Bosnia  outright;  while  at  the  same  time  her  protege,  Prince 
Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,  proclaimed  himself  Tsar  of  the  Bul- 
garians (October,  1908).  Coming  soon  after  the  Young  Turk 
Revolution  at  Constantinople,  these  events  foreshadowed 
a  future  in  which  Austria,  Bulgaria,  and  a  renovated  Turkey 
would  share  the  Peninsula  about  equally  between  them. 
Germany  threw  her  weight  into  the  scale  in  favor  of  Austria; 
and  a  threat  from  Kaiser  Wilhelm  to  Russia  in  the  spring  of 
1909  caused  the  latter  to  accept  the  Hapsburgs' /#^  accompli 
in  Bosnia.  Thenceforth  the  future  of  the  Balkans  lay  with 
the  Central  Empires  and  with  their  proteges,  Bulgaria  and 
Roumania. 

To  the  confusion  caused  by  threats  from  without  were 
added  the  miseries  due  to  ever-increasing  racial  feuds  and 
mad  misgovernment.  The  Young  Turks,  far  from  carrying 
out  their  much-vaunted  programme  of  reforms,  soon  exas- 
perated their  subjects  by  an  "  Ottomanizing"  policy  of  the 
most  pedantic  and  irritating  kind.  Consequently,  the  Greek, 
Serb,  and  Bulgar  elements  in  Macedonia  despaired  of  ob- 
taining redress  except  by  force,  and  what  the  Turkish  vam- 
pires spared  the  armed  bands  of  these  rival  races  swept  off. 
The  beginning  of  the  end  came  for  Ottoman  rule  when  the 
usually  faithful  Albanians  rose  in  revolt  against  stupid  inter- 
ferences with  their  customs  and  language.  Consequently, 


160          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

the  Eastern  Question  in  1909-12  entered  upon  its  last  and 
most  terrible  phase. 

While  Nationalism  in  the  Balkans  made  more  and  more 
for  strife,  the  same  instinct  waxed  powerful  and  aggressive 
in  Central  Europe.  The  interaction  of  these  cyclonic  systems 
has  finally  produced  the  present  appalling  tempest.  In  order 
to  understand  that  interaction  and  the  tremendous  forces 
which  it  set  in  motion,  we  must  retrace  our  steps  and  note 
the  rise  of  Chauvinism  in  Germany  and  the  outlet  which  it 
sought  to  acquire  towards  the  East. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  has  modelled 
his  policy  largely  on  that  of  Frederick  the  Great.  Now,  dur- 
ing that  reign,  as  also  subsequently,  Prussia  often  made  use 
of  the  Turks  to  annoy  and  weaken  either  Russia  or  Austria, 
whenever  those  realms  were  at  feud  with  her.  Another  fact  is 
equally  significant.  The  rival  Houses  of  Hapsburg  and 
Hohenzollern  have  rarely  continued  long  in  close  union  except 
for  purposes  of  aggression  against  their  neighbors.  Cases  in 
point  are  their  agreements  to  effect  the  Partitions  of  Poland 
(1772, 1793, 1795,  though  in  1793  Austria  complained  of  being 
left  in  the  lurch)  and  those  of  1792  and  1815  for  the  annexa- 
tion of  large  portions  of  France.  In  1827-30  they  united  in 
order  to  thwart  the  emancipation  of  Greece,  then  championed 
by  Russia,  France,  and  England,  the  general  aim  of  the 
Germanic  Powers  being  to  uphold  Turkish  authority  and 
stay  the  growth  of  the  Christian  peoples  of  the  Balkans.1 
But  that  negative  and  cramping  policy  has  of  late  given  way 
to  one  that  has  sought  to  range  Turkey,  if  possible  along  with 
Roumania  and  Bulgaria,  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Empires. 
Serb  nationalists,  inspired  by  jealousy  of  Bulgaria  and  the 

1  See,  too,  Debidour,  Hist,  diplomatique  de  V Europe,  II,  181-3,  for 
Austria's  opposition  to  the  formation  of  the  Principality  of  Roumania 
in  1858,  which  was  helped  on  by  Russia  and  Napoleon  III,  "the  friend 
of  nationalities." 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  161 

hope  of  detaching  their  kith  and  kin,  the  Croats  and  Slovenes, 
from  Austria,  firmly  opposed  all  attempts  at  bullying  or 
bargaining  from  Vienna.  But  the  stolid  Tartar  strain  in  the 
Bulgars'  nature  afforded  some  hope  of  rallying  them,  under 
their  Coburg  prince,  to  the  side  of  their  Moslem  oppressors 
and  against  their  Russian  liberators.  This  done,  Serbia  alone 
barred  the  way  to  the  formation  of  a  Teutonic-Magyar- 
Turanian  League,  extending  from  the  North  Sea  to  the 
Persian  Gulf.  For  such  a  purpose  Hohenzollern  and  Haps- 
burg  might  well  clasp  hands  and  consort  with  the  butchers  of 
the  Balkan  Christians.  That  this  Eastern  expansion  would 
crush  Balkan  Nationalism  was  nothing  to  the  leaders  of 
thought  and  action  in  the  Central  Empires;  for  their  concep- 
tion of  things  had  wholly  changed  since  the  time  when  Bis- 
marck and  Deak  achieved  the  triumph  of  that  principle  for 
the  German  and  the  Magyar. 

Let  us,  then,  review  the  events  which  transformed  Bis- 
marck's Austro-German  alliance  of  1879  (an  essentially 
defensive  compact)  into  an  aggressive  league  aiming  at  the 
domination  of  the  land  hemisphere.  The  determining  event 
was  the  accession  of  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  to  the  German  throne 
in  1888.  Inheriting  a  powerful  and  prosperous  domain, 
protected  by  an  invincible  army  and  unassailable  alliances,  he 
nevertheless  declared  hi  his  first  proclamation  that  he  would 
ever  be  responsible  for  the  glory  and  honor  of  his  army.  To 
this  was  added  keen  solicitude  for  naval  and  colonial  expan- 
sion, as  appeared  in  his  very  profitable  bargain  with  Lord 
Salisbury  in  1890  for  the  cession  of  some  untenable  claims 
over  Zanzibar  against  the  acquisition  of  that  valuable  naval 
base,  Heligoland.  But  the  fact  that  he  bargained  anything 
away  in  East  Africa  angered  the  more  eager  of  the  German 
patriots,  who  sought  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  such  a  humilia- 
tion by  founding  a  kind  of  watchdog  Society  in  1891,  which, 
three  years  later,  became  the  Pangerman  League.  Claiming 


162          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

that  the  German  Empire  must  become  a  World-Empire,  it 
set  forth  the  following  ideal:  "Above  the  interests  of  the 
State  should  be  those  of  the  Nation.  Even  more  sacred  than 
love  of  the  Fatherland  should  be  love  of  the  Motherland." 
It  soon  appeared  that  the  nation  was  the  totality  of  all 
German-speaking  peoples,  and  the  Motherland  was  the  area 
(geographically  vague  but  mentally  stimulating)  which 
would  bring  all  these  peoples  into  the  Teutonic  fellowship. 
The  Germans  of  Austria,  Switzerland,  and  the  Baltic  prov- 
inces of  Russia  (though  the  last  were  but  a  small  minority 
among  the  Letts  and  Esthonians)  were  all  to  be  swept  into 
the  Motherland's  arms,  which  would  finally  close  around 
Dutch,  Flemings,  and  Scandinavians.  The  day  of  little 
States  and  little  peoples  was  over;  for  they  lived  a  narrow 
existence,  oppressed  by  fear  of  vigorous  neighbors.  Let 
them,  therefore,  merge  their  miserable  lives  in  that  of  the 
Teutonic  Superman.  Such  was  the  Pangerman  propa- 
ganda, directed  by  a  friend  of  the  Kaiser,  Dr.  Hasse.  It 
soon  gained  an  immense  vogue;  and  around  the  League 
clustered  several  organizations,  chief  among  them  the  Navy 
League. 

The  generation  which  grew  up  during  the  years  of  Konig- 
gratz  and  Sedan  (William  IPs  generation)  was  in  the  mood 
to  regard  even  those  triumphs  as  precursors  to  others  of 
world-wide  import.  Merely  by  skilful  carpet-bagging  and 
diplomatic  hustling,  Bismarck  and  agents  like  Peters,  Nachti- 
gall,  and  Liidertiz  had  secured  a  considerable  colonial  Empire; 
and  if  that  were  gained  by  craft,  what  might  not  be  the 
outcome  of  a  well-prepared  effort  of  the  whole  German 
nation?  After  the  surrender  of  Paris  in  January,  1871, 
Bismarck  called  his  people  "the  male  principle,  the  fructify- 
ing principle"  of  Europe;  while  the  Celts  and  Slavs  repre- 
sented the  female  sex.  As  for  the  English,  they  were  con- 
temptible hucksters,  envious  of  the  brave  Germans  but 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  163 

afraid  to  fight  them.1  Such  was  the  doctrine  taught  to  young 
Germany  in  and  after  1871.  To  it  Treitschke  merely  added 
an  academic  veneer.  Viewing  history  from  the  standpoint 
of  a  patriotic  pamphleteer,  he  excited  the  youth  of  Germany 
by  sentences  such  as  these:  "To  tell  the  truth,  the  Slav 
seems  to  us  a  born  slave"; 2  or  again:  "What  nation  will 
impose  its  will  on  the  other  enfeebled  and  decadent  peoples? 
Will  it  not  be  Germany's  mission  to  ensure  the  peace  of  the 
world?  Russia,  that  immense  Colossus  with  feet  of  clay, 
will  be  absorbed  in  its  domestic  and  economic  difficulties. 
England,  stronger  in  appearance  than  in  reality,  will  doubt- 
less see  her  colonies  break  loose  and  exhaust  themselves 
in  fruitless  struggles.  France,  given  over  to  internal  dis- 
sensions and  the  strife  of  parties,  will  sink  into  hopeless 
decadence.  As  to  Italy,  she  will  have  her  work  cut  out  to 
ensure  a  crust  to  her  children.  The  future  belongs  to  Ger- 
many, to  which  Austria  will  attach  herself  if  she  wishes 
to  survive."  With  a  few  honorable  exceptions  the  teachers 
at  the  German  Universities  adopted  this  tone,  and  thus 
nursed  the  feeling  of  national  pride  which  the  parade  ground 
brought  to  lush  maturity. 

Along  with  this,  however,  there  grew  up  a  passion  to 
excel,  to  push  through  every  task  to  thorough  completion. 
An  English  correspondent  long  in  Germany  has  described 
it  by  their  word  Drang — driving  force,  or  the  resolve  to 
make  your  will  prevail.3  It  is  a  formidable  force  in  all  de- 
partments of  life,  and  contrasts  sharply  with  the  easy  good 
nature  and  weak  tolerance  of  bad  work  far  too  prevalent 
among  us.  In  this  respect  we  need  to  copy  the  Germans 
and  regain  that  passion  for  thoroughness  which  used  to  be 

1  Bismarck:  some  secret  Pages  of  his  History,  I,  500,  526;  Bismarck  in 
the  Franco-German  War,  I,  277,  II,  8,  19,  333,  345  (note). 

2  Treitschke,  Germany,  France,  Russia,  and  Islam  (Eng.  edit.),  p.  17. 
*  C.  Tower,  Changing  Germany,  p.  255. 


1 64          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

ours,  but  which  has  vanished  of  late  under  the  influence  of 
pleasure,  sport,  or  the  worship  of  the  eight-hours'  day.  It 
is  significant  that  the  German  phrase  Attes  in  Ordnung, 
which  corresponds  to  our  "All  right,"  conveys  a  guarantee 
that  all  is  right.  Whereas  our  phrase  "All  right"  has  come 
to  mean:  "Now,  don't  bother:  I've  done  all  I  mean  to 
do."  This  is  the  spirit  which  we  must  drive  from  our  Uni- 
versities and  schools,  our  workshops  and  public  offices.  We 
need  a  new  sense  of  the  dignity  of  work  such  as  Thomas 
Carlyle  hammered  into  his  generation — a  healthy  public 
opinion  which  will  be  stronger  than  official  etiquette,  stronger 
than  red  tape,  stronger  even  than  Trade  Union  regulations. 
In  this  respect  Germany  has  much  to  teach  us  regarding 
her  matchless  power  of  organization;  and  at  bottom  that 
means  power  of  hard  work  and  clear  thinking.  In  the  fierce 
competition  of  the  modern  world  (a  competition  which  will  be 
fiercer  than  ever  after  the  war)  no  nation  is  sure  of  holding 
its  own  unless  it  puts  forth  its  utmost  powers,  directs  them 
wisely,  and  minimizes  the  friction  between  Capital  and 
Labor. 

To  return  to  Germany:  the  intense  devotion  of  her  people, 
fostered  in  the  schools  and  Universities,  has  permeated  all 
parts  of  the  national  life;  and  it  must  be  remembered  that 
that  feeling,  with  its  counterpart,  contempt  for  other  peoples, 
is  based  on  a  not  unnatural  belief  in  the  primacy  of  Germans 
in  all  important  spheres.  Thus  a  new  tone  has  permeated 
the  German  people  during  the  reign  of  Wilhelm  II.  It  has 
also  profoundly  affected  their  settlers  in  other  lands,  who, 
under  the  influence  of  patriotic  clubs,  have  tended  to  form 
garrisons  for  the  Empire,  ready,  when  called  upon,  to  take 
action  against  the  communities  out  of  which  they  have 
made  their  money.  No  harm  would  have  resulted  from 
this  fanatical  Teutonism  if  the  Kaiser  and  his  paladins  had 
been  wise  and  prudent.  But  startling  results  followed  when 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  165 

he,  they  and  the  leading  professors  and  journalists  sought 
to  outcrow  each  other  in  praise  of  Germania.  Sheer  political 
vertigo  was  the  outcome,  especially  since  1896,  when  Wilhelm 
proclaimed  Wdpolitik  as  the  goal  of  her  efforts.  The  Panger- 
man  League  first  enunciated  the  programme  in  1894.  Not 
to  be  outdone,  the  Kaiser  adopted  it  at  the  twenty-fifth 
anniversary  of  the  proclamation  of  the  Empire  (January  21, 
1896). 
In  other  matters  the  League  has  pushed  him  on.  In 

1895  it  urged  the  acquisition  of  a  good  naval  base  in  China; 
the  mailed  fist  in  1897  descended  upon  Kiao-Chao,  after 
the  opportune  murder  of  two  German  missionaries.     In 

1896  the  League  earmarked  Asia  Minor  as  a  fit  sphere  for 
economic  penetration  by  the  Germans.    Again  after  an  in- 
terval of  two  years,  the  Kaiser  proceeded  to  Constantinople 
and  Damascus,  making  at  the  tomb  of  Saladin  his  promise 
ever  to  champion  the  Moslem- World.    In  1896-7  the  Panger- 
man  and  Navy  Leagues  began  a  systematic  agitation  in 
favor  of  a  great  navy.    The  Kaiser  responded  by  appoint- 
ing Admiral  von  Tirpitz  to  the  Admiralty,  and  an  expansion- 
ist, Count  (now  Prince)  von  Billow,  to  the  Foreign  Office; 
while  the  Navy  Bill  of  1898  ushered  in  the  long  series  of 
measures  for  the  systematic  and  sustained  increase  of  the 
German  marine.     Certain  acts  of  the  Kaiser,  such  as  his 
proclamation  as  to  Weltpolitik,  bear  the  impress  of  his  per- 
sonality, which  loves  to  seize  a  great  occasion  for  the  utter- 
ance of  a  sonorous  and  telling  phrase.    But  in  the  main  it 
seems  that  he  has  been  pushed  on  by  eager  and  ambitious 
patriots,  who,  after  gaining  the  ear  of  a  morbidly  sensitive 
public,  have  reproached  him  for  timidity  whenever  he  has 
sought  to  steady  the  pace. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  that  he  has  given  them  their  head 
on  occasions  when  he  deemed  Germany  to  be  well  prepared 
for  war.  Such  occasions  were  the  years  succeeding  the 


1 66          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

opening  of  the  Kiel  Canal  in  1895;  the  completion  of  the 
first  instalment  of  the  new  navy  in  1905  (which  coincided 
with  Russia's  defeats  in  the  Far  East) ;  the  opportunity  which 
offered  for  supporting  Austria's  forward  move  of  October, 
1908,  in  the  Near  East;  and  the  completion  of  the  enlarged 
Kiel  Canal  in  June,  1914  (which  coincided  with  singular 
difficulties  for  the  Entente  Powers  and  a  unique  state  of 
military  preparation  in  Germany).  On  other  occasions  he 
has  often  held  in  the  Pangermans  despite  their  champing 
the  bit  and  pawing  the  air.  But  again,  as  if  to  relieve  his 
pent-up  feelings,  he  has  uttered  words  that  struck  like  a  spur: 
"Our  future  lies  on  the  water" — "The  trident  must  pass 
into  our  hands"— "We  are  the  salt  of  the  earth"— "The 
German  nation  alone  has  been  called  upon  to  defend,  cul- 
tivate, and  develop  great  ideas" — "Our  German  nation  shall 
be  the  rock  of  granite  on  which  the  Almighty  will  finish  his 
work  of  civilizing  the  world.  Then  shall  be  fulfilled  the  words 
of  the  poet: '  German  character  shall  save  the  world. ' "  The 
ruler  who  uttered  these  words,  and  tried  to  live  up  to  them, 
must  bear  a  heavy  share  of  responsibility  for  the  growth  of 
an  overweening  Chauvinism.  The  collective  impulse,  which 
up  to  1870  had  been  a  healthy  endeavor  to  achieve  national 
union,  has  under  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  been  degraded  into  an 
aggressive  Nationalism  utterly  callous  of  the  claims  of  other 
peoples. 

Rash  in  word  but  prudent  in  deed,  Wilhelm  kept  a  tight 
curb  on  his  high-spirited  charger  until  a  clear  field  was  before 
him;  and  in  this  respect  he  may  count  as  the  new  Machiavel. 
During  the  Boer  War  of  1899-1902  he  turned  the  furiously 
Anglophobe  passions  of  his  subjects  into  a  practical  channel 
by  carrying  through  an  immense  naval  programme;  and  in 
the  spring  of  1905,  when  Russia's  military  power  tottered 
under  the  blows  of  Japan,  he  embarked  on  the  Moroccan 
policy  which  the  Leagues  had  pressed  on  him  long  before. 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  167 

Meanwhile  his  Chancellor,  Btilow,  had  secured  the  passing 
of  the  Tariff  Laws  of  1902  for  the  protection  of  agriculture 
so  that  the  Germany  of  the  future  might  not  depend  too 
largely  on  foreign  foodstuffs.  A  further  aim  of  the  Kaiser 
and  Chancellor  was  to  stimulate  tillage  of  the  soil  so  as  to 
maintain  a  healthy  balance  between  industry  and  agricul- 
ture, as  was  summed  up  in  the  phrase,  "Agriculture  must 
provide  soldiers  and  industry  pay  for  them."  l 

Thus  was  built  up  a  polity  no  less  prosperous  in  peace 
than  well  prepared  for  war;  and  the  outcome  of  this  material 
preparedness  and  national  confidence  was  seen  in  the  rebuffs 
dealt  to  France  in  the  Moroccan  affair  of  1905-6.  Appre- 
hension of  Germany  had  prompted  the  Anglo-French  En- 
tente of  1904,  and  in  1907  came  that  between  England  and 
Russia,  which  was  clinched  by  the  recent  declarations  of 
Germany  at  the  Hague  Conference,  that  she  would  neither 
lessen  her  armaments  nor  submit  disputes  to  arbitration. 
The  Ententes,  though  merely  conditional  agreements  far 
removed  from  definite  alliances,  ought  to  have  warned  the 
German  people  of  the  need  of  lowering  its  tone.  In  normal 
conditions  a  nation  would  regard  the  alienation  of  an  old 
friend,  like  Russia,  and  her  drawing  towards  other  States 
for  protection,  as  a  sign  that  its  conduct  had  been  unduly 
provocative,  and  that  bluster  must  give  way  to  conciliation. 
But  this  is  not  the  way  of  champions  of  Drang.  Their  aim 
being  to  carry  matters  with  a  high  hand,  they  interpret  all 
signs  of  distrust  as  a  challenge  to  their  honor.  Newly  awak- 
ened Nationalism  (and  that  of  Germany  dates  from  1870) 
has  always  displayed  the  morbid  sensitiveness  of  youth,  and 
has  given  out  that  the  Entente  is  contriving  a  villainous  plot 
to  "encircle"  Germany  and  Austria  with  a  view  to  bring- 
ing about  their  isolation  and  destruction. 

Let  us  examine  this  charge  in  the  light  of  facts.  They  are 
1  Billow,  Imperial  Germany,  pp.  209-11. 


168          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

as  follows:  The  Central  Empires  had  a  close  alliance  with 
Italy  and  a  personal  compact  with  the  King  of  Roumania, 
a  member  of  the  Swabian  branch  of  the  House  of  Hohen- 
zollern.  A  German  prince  reigned  over  Bulgaria,  the  Kaiser's 
sister  had  married  the  Crown  Prince  of  Greece,  and  the  Sultan 
of  Turkey  was  notoriously  a  satrap  of  Berlin.  Consequently, 
the  "encircling"  of  a  block  of  territory,  which  extended  from 
the  North  Sea  to  the  Tyrrhene  and  .^Egean,  could  scarcely 
be  taken  seriously  by  those  who  knew  the  facts  of  the  case. 
But  by  dint  of  much  noise  and  skilful  suppression  of  facts,  the 
Germans,  and  not  a  few  Englishmen,  were  led  to  regard  the 
Central  Empires,  etc.,  as  pinched  in  by  wily  and  aggressive 
foes  under  the  direction  of  the  arch-plotter,  King  Edward 
VII.  The  theory  of  "encircling"  proved  to  be  especially 
serviceable  in  dulling  the  opposition  of  German  Socialists 
to  the  successive  Army  and  Navy  Bills.  Unacquainted  with 
military  history,  they  failed  to  realize  the  enormous  advan- 
tage of  the  central  position  in  warfare;  and  the  authorities, 
who  every  year  increased  that  advantage  by  constructing 
strategic  railways  to  the  western  and  eastern  frontiers,  ceased 
not  to  alarm  then:  subjects  as  to  the  terrible  might  of  the 
Eastern  Colossus,  the  quenchless  thirst  of  Frenchmen  for  a 
war  of  revenge,  and  the  malignant  jealousy  of  England. 

That  the  German  Government  was  not  actuated  by  fear 
of  Russia  or  France  is  obvious  from  its  policy.  At  the  Hague 
Conference  of  1907,  as  we  have  seen,  it  rejected  all  proposals 
for  arbitration  and  limitation  of  armaments;  at  the  close  of 
1908  the  Reichstag  passed  Bills  for  the  Germanizing  of 
Alsace-Lorrainers,  the  Poles  of  Posen,  and  the  Danes  of 
North  Schleswig.  At  the  same  time  Germany  supported 
her  ally,  Austria,  in  her  annexation  of  Bosnia;  and  in  March, 
1909,  a  threatening  note  from  Berlin  to  Petrograd  led  the 
Tsar  to  withdraw  his  opposition  to  that  step.  Further,  the 
vigorous  efforts  of  Teutonic  diplomacy  to  recover  the  ground 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  169 

at  first  lost  at  Constantinople  in  the  Young  Turk  Revolution 
of  1908  were  completely  successful.  This  forceful  policy 
upheld  the  arms  of  Austria-Hungary,  browbeat  Russia,  and 
encouraged  the  Young  Turks  to  proceed  with  the  "Ottoman- 
izing"  of  their  Christian  subjects.1 

In  no  quarter  did  the  Teutonic  idea  work  more  effectively 
than  in  Austria-Hungary.  In  its  early  stages  the  Panger- 
man  movement  seemed  to  threaten  the  disruption  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy,  whose  Germanic  subjects,  hard  pressed  by 
Slavs  and  Magyars,  seemed  likely  to  break  away  from  the 
crumbling  heritage  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  form  a  southern 
annexe  of  the  Hohenzollern  Empire.  But,  however  much 
the  Pangermans  played  with  the  notion,  the  statesmen  of 
Berlin  finally  discouraged  it  as  tending  to  form  a  diffuse 
realm  in  which  Prussian  influence  would  be  lost.2  They 
deemed  it  better  to  favor  the  German  elements  in  Austria 
and  support  that  Empire  in  the  difficult  enterprise  of  domi- 
nating the  Balkans.  In  1906  the  Archduke  Ferdinand  and 
the  new  Foreign  Minister,  Aehrenthal,  inaugurated  a  spirited 
foreign  policy  which  succeeded  in  quieting,  or  crushing, 
racial  strifes  within  the  Empire.  The  revival  of  the  prestige 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy  was  assisted  by  the  passionate  Nation- 
alism of  the  Magyars,  which  at  times  amounted  almost  to 
frenzy.  Excited  by  the  celebrations  of  the  thousandth 
anniversary  of  their  organized  national  Me  in  1896,  Hun- 
garian patriots  had  resolved  to  ride  roughshod  over  their 
Slavonic  and  Roumanian  subjects;  and  their  exuberant 
patriotism  reduced  parliamentary  elections  and  procedure 

1  Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East,  by  "  Diploma tist,"chs.  Ill,  IV. 

1 G.  Weil,  Le  Pangermanisme  en  Autriche,  chs.  7, 8.  But  the  revelations 
of  Mr.  Wickham  Steed  (Nineteenth  Century,  Feb.,  1916)  as  to  the  alleged 
bargain  between  Kaiser  Wilhelm  and  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand 
in  June,  1914,  seem  to  show  that  the  former  may  then  have  revived  the 
older  Pangerman  scheme. 


170          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

to  the  level  of  a  farce;  while  their  sense  of  justice  received 
startling  illustration  in  incidents  such  as  that  of  the  Agram 
trial.1  Nevertheless  this  crude  Nationalism  succeeded  for 
the  time;  and,  joining  hands  with  the  boisterous  anti-Semites 
of  Vienna  and  the  expansionists  of  Berlin,  it  prepared  to 
stride  southwards  to  conquest  over  the  hated  Serbs. 

Austro-Hungarian  Chauvinism  secured  its  first  triumph 
in  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in  October, 
1908.  The  significance  of  this  event  was  doubled  by  its  coin- 
cidence with  the  assumption  of  the  title  "Tsar  of  the  Bul- 
garians" by  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria  immediately  after 
a  visit  to  the  Hapsburg  Court.  Half  Austrian  by  upbringing, 
and  largely  Magyar  by  sympathy  and  territorial  connections, 
that  wily  schemer  by  his  title  now  laid  claim  to  lordship 
over  the  large  Bulgar  population  of  Macedonia;  and  Austria's 
longings  for  Salonica  being  notorious,  it  was  clear  that  the 
Dual  Monarchy  and  her  satrap  were  contemplating  an  even- 
tual partition  of  that  troublous  province.  In  view  of  the 
decline  of  Russia's  prestige  in  the  Near  East  since  her  dis- 
astrous adventures  in  the  Far  East,  the  Central  Empires 
and  their  pro-consuls  at  Sofia  and  Bukarest  had  in  their 
hands  the  future  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 

These  brilliant  successes,  I  repeat,  rehabilitated  the  pres- 
tige of  Austria,  stilled  her  racial  disputes,  and  reduced  the 
Serbs  and  their  Croat  cousins  to  despair.  The  details  of  the 
compromise  framed  by  the  Pangermans  and  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy are,  of  course,  not  known;  but  the  success  of  Austria's 
forward  and  Teutonic  policy,  as  contrasted  with  the  barren 
parliamentary  and  racial  strifes  of  the  earlier  period,  opened 
up  a  new  and  promising  future,  in  which  it  seemed  that 
Austria-Hungary  would  be  predominantly  German-Magyar 
and  would  control  the  Balkans,  thus  forming  an  essential 

1  See  Dr.  Seton- Watson's  works,  Corruption  and  Reform  in  Hungary, 
Racial  Problems  in  Hungary,  etc. 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  171 

link  in  the  future  Zollverein  stretching  from  the  North  Sea 
to  the  Bosphorus,  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  the  Red  Sea.  As 
this  scheme  developed,  it  naturally  aroused  alarm  in  Russia 
and  among  the  Mediterranean  Powers.  The  Italians  began 
to  sheer  off  from  the  Triple  Alliance  as  its  Oriental  ambitions 
developed;  and  fear  of  Austro-German  aggressions  grouped 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  more  closely  together. 
The  Franco-German  agreement  of  1909  respecting  Morocco 
did  not,  and  could  not,  solve  that  question;  while  the  Russo- 
German  compact  arrived  at  late  in  1910  failed  to  compose 
then:  rivalries  in  the  Near  East. 

This  brief  survey  will  suffice  to  explain  not  only  the  political 
tension  prevalent  throughout  Europe  but  also  the  growth 
of  a  neurotic  Nationalism  in  Germany.  Not  satisfied  with 
her  supremacy  in  Europe,  she  prepared  to  achieve  world- 
dominance;  and  the  military  weakness  of  Russia,  together 
with  the  absorption  of  France  and  England  in  parliamentary 
disputes,  furthered  her  schemes.  The  Western  Powers 
sought  to  solve  social  questions  by  concessions  and  bargains; 
Germany  prepared  to  solve  them  by  distracting  the  attention 
of  the  masses  to  national  issues.  Prince  Biilow  has  frankly 
avowed  that  intention.  He  states  that  the  successive  Army 
and  Navy  Bills  were  designed  to  help  on  Germany's  world- 
policy,  and,  in  order  to  secure  a  majority  in  the  Reichstag, 
the  middle  classes  and  as  many  as  possible  of  the  working 
classes  had  to  be  won  over.  He  admits  that,  notwithstanding 
all  the  efforts  put  forth  against  the  Social  Democrats,  their 
votes  at  the  polls  steadily  mounted,  though  the  number  of 
seats  gained  curiously  varied. 

Votes  polled.  Seats  gained. 
1898. .  .2,107, ooo  56 

1903...  3,01 1 ,000  81 

1907  •••3,539,000  43 

1912...  4,250,000  no 


172          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Their  losses  of  seats  in  1907  were  due  to  speeches,  explana- 
tions, and  "the  direction  of  the  electoral  compaign."  *  As 
to  the  Socialist  gains  of  1912,  Billow  says  nothing,  because 
they  were  due  to  the  spirited  protests  of  that  party  against 
Weltpolitik.  On  the  general  question  of  combating  the  Social- 
ists, he  says:  "We  must  accustom  them  to  the  idea  of  the 
State.  .  .  .  The  idea  of  the  nation  must  again  and  again 
be  emphasized  by  dealing  with  national  problems,  so  that 
this  idea  may  continue  to  move,  unite,  and  separate  the  par- 
ties. Nothing  has  a  more  discouraging,  paralyzing,  and  de- 
pressing effect  on  a  clever,  enterprising,  and  highly  developed 
nation  such  as  the  Germans  than  a  monotonous,  dull  policy, 
which,  for  fear  of  an  ensuing  fight,  avoids  rousing  passions  by 
strong  action."  Billow  also  advised  the  Government  to  fight 
Social  Democracy  by  "a  great  and  comprehensive  national 
policy."  By  this  he  declares  that  he  meant  the  Germanizing 
of  all  the  races  within  the  Empire,  especially  the  Poles, 
whose  political  incompetence  had  subjected  them  to  the 
superior  organization  of  Prussia.  But  he  deprecated  the  con- 
quest of  neighboring  territories.2 

Such  a  limitation  of  Germany's  expansive  power  displeased 
German  Chauvinists,  who  exercised  greater  pressure  on  Bil- 
low's successor,  Bethmann-Hollweg  (1909-  ).  The  Foreign 
Assistant  Secretary,  Kiderlen-Waechter,  favored  the  Agadir 
coup  of  July,  1911,  which  is  known  to  have  been  contrived 
by  the  Navy  and  other  patriotic  Leagues.  First,  they  pointed 
out  in  the  Press  the  urgent  need  of  German  expansion  in 
Morocco;  and  then  the  two  Ministers  declared  that  they 
must  try  to  keep  pace  with  public  opinion.  Thus  the  mutu- 
ally exciting  influences  of  the  Leagues  and  the  Adminis- 
tration worked  up  a  furious  national  feeling  which  formed  the 

1  Billow,  Imperial  Germany,  pp.  158-168.    The  total  number  of  dep- 
uties is  397. 
*  Ibid.,  pp.  157-204,  239-245. 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  173 

chief  danger  of  the  situation.  The  dispute  at  Agadir  in  itself 
was  trivial,  as  was  afterwards  admitted  by  German  patriots. 
But  their  masterful  tone  nearly  brought  about  a  general 
war.  Probably  this  was  their  aim;  for  great  was  their  wrath 
when  the  Kaiser  and  his  Ministry  finally  patched  up  the 
Morocco  dispute  by  the  compact  of  November  4,  1911,  with 
France,  gaining  about  100,000  square  miles  of  French  Con- 
goland  at  the  price  of  their  acquiescence  in  French  supremacy 
in  Morocco.  The  rage  of  German  Chauvinists  against  the 
Kaiser  for  this  profitable  though  inglorious  bargain  burst 
out  in  downright  insults,  Die  Post  calling  him  ce  poltron 
miserable.1 

In  a  short  time  the  Germans  saw  that  they  had  exag- 
gerated the  importance  of  the  Moroccan  affair.  In  1912 
that  astute  publicist,  Maximilian  Harden,  said:  "As  for 
the  Morocco  escapade,  God  knows  the  colonial  fever  was 
there  expended  for  nothing.  It  was  simply  an  affair  of 
prestige, — national  prestige,  personal  prestige.  Germany 
had  no  real  interests  in  Morocco."  The  Pangerman  cham- 
pion, Count  Reventlow,  also  blamed  that  adventure  as  ill- 
judged  because  it  offended  both  England  and  France.  Never- 
theless the  Pangermans  stirred  up  indignation  against  that 
"failure"  in  order  to  effect  and  increase  the  already  formid- 
able armaments.  The  expenditure  on  the  army  was  increased 
by  £6,450,000,  despite  the  incidence  of  a  severe  financial 
crisis  in  1911.  A  prominent  German  newspaper  stated  that  a 

1  Dr.  Rohrbach  (Der  deutscke  Gedanke  in  der  Welt,  p.  216)  declared  that 
Germany  took  the  wrong  turn  about  Morocco,  which  was  not  a  vital 
affair;  besides  the  Hedjaz  Railway,  the  Kiel-North  Sea  Canal  and  the 
forts  at  Heligoland  were  not  then  in  readiness.  In  the  future,  too,  the 
stake  must  be  a  greater  one  than  a  strip  of  Moroccan  coast.  He  con- 
cludes: "We  are  now  (1912)  in  a  position  to  launch  out  boldly."  Rohr- 
bach is  a  champion  of  the  Bagdad  and  other  Levantine  schemes,  which 
will  probably  prove  to  be  the  chief  cause  of  the  present  war.  Certainly 
they  interested  Austria  and  Turkey,  which  Morocco  never  did. 


174          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

great  war  would  be  "perhaps  delayed,  but  not  averted,  if 
German  armaments  are  not  of  a  nature  to  intimidate  every 
adversary  into  beating  a  retreat."  That  is  the  essential 
thought  at  the  bottom  of  German  Nationalism  of  the  Sturm 
und  Drang  type.1 

The  formation  of  the  Balkan  League  and  its  successful 
attack  upon  Turkey  in  the  autumn  of  1912  caused  great 
concern  in  Germany  and  Austria,  where  the  triumph  of  the 
crescent  had  been  taken  for  granted.  At  once  the  Central 
Empires  declared  the  new  League  to  be  a  mere  tool  of  Russia; 
whereas  it  was  certainly  the  outcome  of  the  grinding  pressure 
of  the  Young  Turks  on  all  their  Christian  subjects.  M.  Sazon- 
off,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  at  first  discouraged  the 
Leaguers  and  advised  them  to  come  to  terms  with  Turkey.2 
As  is  well  known,  after  the  conclusion  of  a  Balkan  peace  in 
London  in  the  spring  of  1913,  the  Christian  States  fell  out, 
and,  probably  under  the  impulse  of  Austria,  the  Bulgar  troops 
in  June,  1913,  perfidiously  attacked  the  Greeks  and  Serbs, 
only  to  suffer  condign  punishment.  Finally,  the  Treaty  of 
Bukarest  (largely  decided  by  the  two  Central  Empires) 
imposed  the  present  unsatisfactory  frontiers  and  left  all  the 
races  of  the  Peninsula  at  feud  (August,  1913).  Their  friction 
kindled  the  spark  which  set  Europe  in  a  blaze  in  August, 


1  Bourdon,  The  German  Enigma,  pp.  158,  180,  198.  Prof.  Van  Vollen- 
hoven  (War  Obviated  by  an  International  Police,  1910,  p.  7)  calls  them 
"force-monomaniacs."  They  were  long  laughed  at  in  Germany,  but 
carried  the  day  in  July,  1914. 

Tor  proofs  see  I.  E.  GueshofF,  The  Balkan  League  (Eng.  transl.), 

PP-  9-45- 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  71-94.  As  to  Austria's  responsibility  for  the  war  of  1913 
(not  yet  fully  proven)  see  "Balkanicus,"  The  Aspirations  of  Bulgaria 
(1915),  pp.  132-42.  Very  significant  were  the  remarks  of  the  Austrian 
Reichspost  (the  organ  of  the  Archduke  Ferdinand):  "The  results  of  the 
Balkan  War  (of  1913)  have  no  disagreeable  features  for  the  Austro- 


NATIONALISM  SINCE  1885  175 

Here  again,  then,  the  principle  of  Nationality,  for  which 
Gladstone  pleaded  and  Stambuloff  struggled,  has  undergone 
dire  degradation.  Promising  to  sort  out  the  Balkan  peoples 
according  to  ethnic  affinities,  it  has  of  late  aroused  their 
baser  passions  and  lent  itself  to  intriguers  who  have  ruined 
their  people  and  deluged  the  Peninsula  with  blood.  The 
part  recently  played  by  Bulgaria  completes  the  career  of 
infamy  on  which  she  entered  in  June,  1913.  Owing  all  that 
she  is  to  the  principle  of  Slav  Nationality  and  to  the  powerful 
aid  of  Russia,  she  has  acted  as  Judas  both  to  the  principle 
and  to  her  champion.  In  order  to  stab  Serbia  in  the  back 
she  has  helped  her  age-long  oppressors,  the  Turks,  and  those 
more  recent  and  more  formidable  enemies  of  Balkan  in- 
dependence, the  Germanic  Empires. 

To  all  who  were  not  blinded  by  revenge  or  blinkered  by 
mere  peasant-cunning,  it  ought  to  have  been  clear  that  the 
Austro-German  intrigues  with  the  Sublime  Porte  for  pre- 
dominance in  the  Near  East  involved  the  suppression  of 
all  the  free  races  which  lay  in  their  path;  that,  consequently, 
the  subjection  of  Serbia  in  the  present  war  would  but  prelude 
the  subjection  of  Bulgaria.  The  Teutonic-Turanian  policy, 
summed  up  in  the  Bagdad  Railway  scheme,  is  based  on 
military  and  trading  considerations,  in  which  Belgrade  and 
Sofia  figure  merely  as  stages  on  the  route  from  Berlin  to 
Bagdad  and  the  Persian  Gulf.  What  would  be  the  lot  of 
Turkey  in  case  of  the  triumph  of  the  new  imperial  commer- 
cialism is  far  from  clear.  That  the  lot  of  Bulgaria,  Serbia, 
and  probably  of  Roumania  and  Greece,  would  be  one  of 
political  impotence,  no  student  of  German  developments  can 
harbor  a  doubt.  Such  a  finale  to  the  present  war  would 
imply  the  extinction  of  Serbia  and  the  reversal  of  all  that 
Roumans,  Greeks,  Bulgars  have  achieved  with  the  help  of 

Hungarian  Monarchy  or  for  the  German  nation.    The  last  Balkan  War 
was  more  disastrous  for  Panslavism  than  the  first  one  was  for  Turkey." 


176          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Byron,  Canning,  and  Gladstone;  of  Napoleon  III  and  Gam- 
betta;  of  Diebitsch  and  Skobeloff.  The  results  of  a  century 
of  national  striving  would  be  swept  away  in  order  that  the 
Teutons  might  force  their  way  to  the  East.  It  is  in  face  of 
such  an  issue  that  Greece,  the  first-born  of  Europe's  children, 
vacillates,  while  Bulgaria,  the  youngest  of  the  family,  has 
foully  betrayed  the  Slavonic  national  cause  to  which  she 
owes  her  very  existence. 

Such  are  the  crucial  developments  of  Nationalism  since 
the  year  1885.  The  revival  of  racial  feuds  in  the  Balkans 
at  that  time  ensured  the  triumph  of  the  barbarous  policy 
of  Abdul  Hamid,  which  continued  to  desolate  Macedonia 
and  Armenia  until  1908.  The  accession  of  Wilhelm  II  in 
1888  inaugurated  an  era  of  aggressive  Nationalism  in  Ger- 
many and,  somewhat  later,  in  Austria,  the  result  being 
Pangermanism  and  its  varied  efforts  which  culminated  in 
July,  1914.  After  the  accession  of  the  Tsar  Nicholas  II  in 
1894  the  diversion  of  Russia's  energies  towards  the  Far 
East  emasculated  the  Panslav  movement,  so  powerful  under 
his  predecessors;  and  Slavonic  sentiment  retained  its  vitality 
chiefly  among  the  Serbs  and  other  South  Slavs,  who  could 
not  effect  much.  The  growth  of  Pangermanism  and  its 
alliance  with  the  Turks  and  the  Panislam  movement  has 
proved  to  be  the  chief  determining  factor  in  recent  history. 
That  these  national  movements  have  developed  immense 
energies  hi  their  respective  peoples  admits  of  no  doubt; 
but  the  events  of  1914-5  form  the  supreme  test  as  to  the 
worth  of  the  new  Nationalism. 


LECTURE  X 
INTERNATIONALISM 

"Si  une  guerre  menace  d'eclater,  c'est  un  devoir  de  la  classe 
ouvriere  dans  les  pays  concern6s,  c'est  un  devoir  pour  leurs  repre- 
sentants  dans  les  Parlements,  avec  1'aide  du  bureau  international, 
force  d'action  et  de  co-ordination,  de  faire  tous  leurs  efforts  pour 
empecher  la  guerre.  .  .  ." — Resolution  of  the  Congress  of  1'Inter- 
nationale  at  Stuttgart,  August,  1907. 

PERIODS  of  war  and  peace  succeed  each  other  with  a  per- 
sistence which  must  arouse  the  curiosity  of  every  well-wisher 
of  mankind.  Unless  we  accept  Bernhardi's  view  (now  so 
popular  in  Germany)  that  war  is  a  necessary  school  of  the 
manly  virtues,  its  periodicity  is  a  distressing  symptom. 
Certainly,  those  who  believe  that  human  progress  is  advanced 
more  by  peace  will  continue  to  inquire  whether  means  of 
avoiding  conflicts  may  not  be  discovered  and  successfully 
applied.  I  will  try  here  to  review  this  question  in  the  light 
of  the  teachings  of  history. 

Inquiries  of  this  kind  have  been  especially  numerous  at 
the  end  of  long  and  devastating  campaigns;  and  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  efforts  in  favor  of  peace  and  legality 
have  been  in  proportion  to  the  horrors  of  warfare. 

This  truth  is  obvious  in  the  case  of  the  founder  of  Inter- 
national Law,  Hugo  van  Groot  (Grotius).  Living  amidst 
the  atrocities  that  disgraced  the  Wars  of  Religion,  that 
Dutch  scholar  pondered  over  the  utter  lawlessness  that  had 
of  late  afflicted  mankind.  In  words  that  might  now  be  written 
by  a  Belgian,  Pole,  or  Serb,  Grotius  in  1625  thus  set  forth 
his  reason  for  inculcating  the  principles  of  public  right: 

177 


178          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

"I  saw  prevailing  throughout  the  Christian  world  a  licence 
in  making  war  of  which  even  barbarous  nations  would  have 
been  ashamed,  recourse  being  had  to  arms  for  slight  reason 
or  no  reason;  and,  when  arms  were  once  taken  up,  all  rever- 
ence for  divine  and  human  law  was  then  thrown  away,  just 
as  if  men  were  henceforth  authorized  to  commit  all  crimes 
without  restraint."  l  The  subsequent  atrocities  of  the  Thirty 
Years'  War  emphasized  the  need  for  some  guiding  and  re- 
straining authority;  and  hence  by  degrees  there  grew  up  a 
code  of  public  law,  the  chief  contributors  to  which  (like  the 
German  Pufendorf  in  1661)  were  those  who  had  experienced 
the  terrors  of  lawlessness.  In  1693,  during  our  campaigns 
against  Louis  XIV,  the  Quaker,  William  Penn,  set  forth 
proposals  for  the  preservation  of  peace;  and  in  1713,  at 
the  end  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  the  French 
priest,  Charles  de  St.  Pierre,  drew  up  a  scheme  which  I  shall 
notice  presently.  As  the  din  of  arms  filled  the  greater  part 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  thinkers  occupied  themselves 
with  the  problems  of  war  and  peace.  Voltaire,  Montesquieu, 
and  Rousseau  in  France;2  Adam  Smith  and  the  younger 
Pitt  in  England;  Kant  and  Lessing  hi  Germany,  all  voiced 
the  pacific  aspirations  of  the  age.  The  French  Economistes 
and  Adam  Smith  advocated  principles  which  would  have 
transformed  the  Continental  States  into  friendly  economic 
units  among  a  comity  of  nations. 
Especially  noteworthy  were  the  efforts  of  German  thinkers 

1  Quoted  by  Dr.  T.  J.  Lawrence,  The  Principles  of  International  Law, 
p.  42.    I  omit  Henri  IV's  peace  project  as  unimportant. 

2  Again  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  books  which  dealt  heavy  blows  at 
the  warlike  ambitions  and  false  aims  of  the  ancien  regime  appeared  at 
or  near  the  end  of  wars,  e.  g.  Les  Lettres  persanes  (1721),  L'Esprit  des 
Lois  (1748),  U  Encyclopedic  (1751-65),  Le  Contrat  social  (1762),  Le 
Systems,  de  la  Nature  (1770).    As  I  have  shown  in  my  Life  of  Pitt  (I, 
p.  340),  William  Pulteney  hi  1786  proposed  to  Pitt  a  plan  of  arbitration, 
and  Pitt's  treaty  with  France  of  that  year  was  an  effort  for  lasting  peace. 


INTERNATIONALISM  179 

on  behalf  of  peace  and  brotherhood.  The  philosophical 
movement  in  France  found  a  clear  echo  across  the  Rhine, 
where  leading  men  desired  to  end  racial  rivalries.  Deeming 
patriotism  a  promoter  of  strife,  they  belittled  that  instinct. 
The  genial  Lessing  wrote:  "I  have  no  conception  of  the 
love  of  country;  and  it  seems  to  me  at  best  a  heroic  failing, 
which  I  am  well  content  to  be  without."  Indeed  he  aspired 
to  a  far  higher  ideal.  In  his  most  perfect  play,  Nathan  der 
Weise  (1779),  the  hero  is  a  Jewish  merchant  of  the  time  of 
Saladin,  who,  even  in  that  tune  of  bigotry,  disarms  racial 
and  religious  hatreds  by  the  attractive  power  of  goodness. 
Rivalries  vanish  before  the  magic  of  his  virtue;  and  the  play 
ends  with  a  spectacle  of  concord  and  happiness.  Lessing 
took  the  leading  incident  of  the  play  from  Boccaccio;  but 
he  transformed  the  story  by  investing  it  with  the  ethical 
promise  of  his  own  time,  the  Age  of  Enlightenment. 

Kant  enforced  similar  precepts  in  his  tractate  Perpetual 
Peace,  published  in  1795  shortly  after  Prussia  came  to  terms 
with  France  in  the  Peace  of  Basel.  He  proposed  as  the  chief 
step  towards  peace  a  Federation  of  free  States.  They 
must  be  Republics,  i.  e.  they  must  be  States  endowed  with 
really  representative  institutions — which  would  rule  out  all 
forms  of  Bonapartism  with  their  modern  equivalent,  Kai- 
serism.1  These  free  States  would  form  definite  compacts 
one  with  the  other,  thus  laying  the  foundation  for  a  system 
of  International  Law,  binding  on  all,  and  thereby  substi- 
tuting the  reign  of  right  for  merely  national  aims.  Just 
as  individuals  had  by  degrees  consented  to  give  up  something 
of  their  entire  liberty  so  as  to  secure  order,  similarly  (he 
urged)  it  ought  to  be  possible  to  substitute  some  measure 
of  international  control  for  that  extreme  ideal  of  national 
liberty  which  often  led  to  war.  Kant  was  not  very  hopeful 

1  Kant,  Perpetual  Peace  (Eng.  Transl.  by  M.  Campbell,  Smith), 
p.  123. 


180          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

on  this  score.  He  saw  that  for  nations  to  give  up  their  natural 
liberty  (including  the  liberty  to  expand  and  to  make  war) 
implied  an  immense  advance  in  ethical  ideas,  as  is  now  pain- 
fully obvious.  Further,  in  his  Rechtslehre,  he  stated  that 
mankind  can  arrive  at  permanent  peace  "only  in  a  universal 
Union  of  States,  by  a  process  analogous  to  that  through  which 
a  people  becomes  a  State.  Since,  however,  the  too  great 
extension  of  such  a  State  of  Nations  over  vast  territories 
must,  in  the  long  run,  render  impossible  the  government  of 
that  Union — and  therefore  the  protection  of  each  of  its 
members — a  multitude  of  such  corporations  will  again  lead 
to  a  state  of  war.  So  that  perpetual  peace,  the  final  goal  of 
international  law,  as  a  whole,  is  really  an  impracticable 
idea."  Nevertheless,  he  hoped  that  these  political  principles 
might  approximate  towards  that  end. 

For  my  part  I  do  not  admit  that  the  extension  of  the  area 
of  these  federating  States  is  an  objection  to  Kant's  theory. 
His  fear  on  this  topic  was,  I  believe,  grounded  on  the  ob- 
jection felt  by  him,  by  Rousseau,  and  by  all  his  contem- 
poraries, to  the  formation  of  great  realms.  They  all  held 
that  civil  liberty  was  incompatible  with  great  States  and 
could  be  attained  and  retained  only  in  small  communities. 
The  fear  was  very  natural  in  times  of  slow  and  difficult 
communications.  It  is  groundless  now  in  the  days  of  railways 
and  telegraphs;  and  in  that  respect  we  are  far  more  favor- 
ably situated  than  our  forefathers  for  building  up  a  great 
Union  of  States.  Indeed,  it  is  essential  that  such  a  Union 
or  Federation  should  comprise  practically  all  the  great  States. 
It  is  not  too  great  an  extension,  but  too  partial  an  extension, 
that  is  the  danger.  As  we  have  recently  seen,  there  is  no 
security  for  peace  so  long  as  one  great  nation  remains  out- 
side the  circle  of  those  that  desire  peace. 

Further,  if  any  great  State  comes  into  such  a  Union  with 
the  notion  of  being  the  leader,  that  Union  will  be  a  sham  and 


INTERNATIONALISM  181 

a  delusion.  Not  until  the  federating  States,  one  and  all, 
put  far  from  them  the  idea  of  predominance,  will  there  be 
a  reasonable  hope  of  securing  fair  play,  justice,  and  therefore 
peace.  Kant  saw  this  clearly,  and  therefore  stipulated  that 
there  must  be  a  "universal  will  determining  the  rights  and 
property  of  each  individual  nation";  and  this  universal 
will  (an  extension  of  Rousseau's  "general  will"  of  a  single 
community)  must  take  the  form  of  a  contract.1 

Let  us  look  at  this  question  by  the  light  of  experience. 
In  1713,  at  the  end  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession, 
1'Abbe  de  St.  Pierre  pub  lished  a  tractate  on  peace.  His  chief 
contentions  were  that  Christendom  should  combine  to  form 
a  federation  of  States  under  the  lead  of  France,  and  proceed, 
as  the  first  of  its  pacific  duties,  to  turn  the  Turks  out  of 
Europe.  These  proposals  sufficed  to  damn  the  scheme  as  a 
device  for  re-establishing  French  prestige  recently  shattered 
by  Marlborough. 

Not  very  dissimilar  was  a  scheme  of  Napoleon  I.  During 
his  sojourn  at  St.  Helena  (which  ought  to  have  cured  him 
of  his  notions  of  world-supremacy)  the  illustrious  exile  de- 
scribed his  plan  of  forming  the  European  Association.  He 
would  have  imposed  the  same  system,  the  same  principles 
everywhere,  the  same  Code  of  Laws,  a  Supreme  Tribunal, 
the  same  weights  and  measures,  a  similar  coinage,  so  that 
Europe  would  have  formed  but  one  people.  But  it  is  sig- 
nificant that  all  these  plans  were  closely  connected  in 
his  mind  with  the  conquest  of  Russia.  That  implied  in  his 
mind  the  "beginning  of  security";  and  then  only  could 
the  European  System  be  founded.  Thereafter  he  would 
have  his  Congress  to  settle  Europe;  also  his  Holy  Al- 
liance.2 

1  Kant,  App.  II,  §  2. 

*  Las  Cases,  Memorial  de  Ste.  Eitene  (B,  398-400),  (August,  1816). 
So,  too,  he  told  Count  Rambuteau  (Memoires,  p.  55,  Eng.  edit.)  that  his 


182          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

In  much  the  same  spirit  the  German  Chancellor,  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg,  said  to  the  Reichstag  on  August  19,  1915: 
"If  Europe  is  to  come  to  peace,  it  can  only  be  possible  by 
the  inviolable  and  strong  position  of  Germany.  The  English 
policy  of  the  Balance  of  Power  must  disappear."  These 
words  imply  that  Germany  will  not  accept  a  position  of  mere 
equality  of  power;  she  must  be  supreme.  The  claim  is  not 
urged  with  the  extravagance  that  characterized  Napoleon's 
final  regrets.  Nevertheless,  the  German  claim  to  supremacy 
is  absolutely  incompatible  with  the  principle  of  proportion- 
ate equality  on  which  alone  a  federation  of  free  States  can 
be  firmly  established.  Minds  of  a  certain  bent  cannot  con- 
ceive of  any  other  way  of  imposing  order  and  quiet  than  that 
of  enforcement  by  some  superior  Power.  Well!  It  cannot 
be  too  clearly  understood  that  that  way  lies  war.  For, 
sooner  or  later,  your  constabulary  guardian  will  develop 
into  a  drill  sergeant;  and  thence  must  ensue  the  rule  of  force 
and  therefore  strife.  I  grant  that  the  drill  sergeant  theory 
is  the  simpler;  and  very  many  people  can  understand  no 
other  way.  They  cannot  see  that  harmony  attained  by  the 
agreement  of  all  is  infinitely  preferable  to,  and  more  probably 
lasting  than,  a  harmony  produced  by  dread  of  a  superior. 

Let  us,  however,  frankly  confess  that  a  union  of  peoples 
on  proportionate  terms  is  difficult  to  attain  and  still  more 
difficult  to  maintain.  The  French  Revolution  egregiously 
failed  in  the  international  sphere.  Though  it  began  with 
the  profession  of  fraternity,  yet  its  practice  degenerated 
under  the  strain  of  war.  Military  considerations,  backed 
up  by  national  pride,  carried  the  day  at  Paris;  and  French 
democracy,  even  before  the  rise  of  Bonaparte,  was  com- 
mitted to  courses  directly  opposed  to  the  cosmopolitan 
aims  of  1789.  It  was  a  German  thinker  who  in  1795  pointed 

Empire  would  be  safe  only  when  he  was  master  of  all  the  capitals  of 
Europe. 


INTERNATIONALISM  183 

towards  peace,  while  France  headed  towards  wider  conquests 
— and  Bonapartism. 

The  efforts  of  the  Tsar  Alexander  I  in  and  after  1815  to 
promote  a  Confederation  of  Europe  need  not  detain  us  long. 
There  prevailed  then  a  general  desire  for  peace,  one  expres- 
sion of  which  was  the  founding  of  the  Peace  Society  hi  London 
in  I8I6.1  Whether  Alexander  had  more  hi  view  an  Associa- 
tion of  Peoples  on  equal  terms  or  a  Confederation  of  States 
more  or  less  under  his  direction  cannot  be  discussed  here. 
Certain  it  is  that,  if  ever  he  cherished  the  lofty  views  ascribed 
to  him  in  1815,  they  soon  vanished;  and  the  promised  feder- 
ation of  the  European  peoples  became  a  mere  device  for 
depriving  them  of  political  and  civic  liberty.  The  period  of 
the  Congresses  (1818-22)  therefore  merits  the  sarcastic  cen- 
sure which  Sorel  applies  to  International  Law,  that  it  was 
known  "only  through  the  declamations  of  publicists  and  its 
violation  by  the  Governments."  It  is  not  surprising  that  all 
students  of  that  disappointing  era  should  view  with  reserve 
and  suspicion  all  proposals  for  World-Tribunals  and  Inter- 
national Congresses.  But  the  optimist  may  reply:  "Both 
the  men  and  the  methods  were  defective.  The  men  were 
autocrats  and  were  easily  turned  aside  '  into  reactionary 
paths."  This  is  undeniable;  and  I  refuse  to  believe  that, 
because  Metternich  lured  Alexander  aside,  therefore  Con- 
gresses of  delegates  chosen  for  the  purpose  of  founding  a 
Union  of  European  States  need  necessarily  be  held  hi  vain. 
We  have  nearly  a  hundred  years  of  experience  behind  us 
since  Aix-la-Chapelle  and  Verona.  I  trust  that,  after  the 
present  war,  we  shall  have  before  us  principles  more  definite 
and  sound  than  that  of  "morality  based  on  bayonets,"  which 
aptly  summarizes  the  bastard  Internationalism  of  1818-22. 

1 1  have  no  space  in  which  to  notice  the  works  of  Gentz,  1'Abbe  de 
Pradt,  etc.  See  Pradt's  L'Europe  apres  le  Congres,  and  Alison  Phillips' 
Confederation  of  Empire. 


184          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

It  is,  however,  instructive  to  notice  the  extreme  ease  with 
which  the  philanthropic  views  of  the  Tsar  were  perverted; 
and  the  experience  of  those  years  bids  us  beware  of  benevo- 
lent doctrinaires  no  less  than  wily  diplomats.  The  dreamer 
is  as  dangerous  as  his  first  cousin,  the  trickster,  into  whose 
hands  he  frequently  plays. 

More  genuine  than  the  federalism  of  the  Tsar  Alexander 
were  the  aims  of  Mazzini  and  the  Young  Europe  Movement 
of  1834-5  by  which  he  sought  to  group  together  the  democrats 
of  Italy,  France,  and  Switzerland,  as  well  as  other  peoples. 
The  sporadic  movements  of  1830  having  failed  owing  to  utter 
lack  of  concert,  Mazzini  now  sought  to  co-ordinate  them. 
By  means  of  a  central  advisory  body  in  Switzerland  he  en- 
deavored to  form  what  he  called  a  "college  of  intellects," 
which  would  both  incite  and  guide  democrats  of  various  lands. 
But  that  movement  failed,  largely  because  its  lofty  aims 
appealed  only  to  groups  of  intellectuals.  The  generation 
that  grew  up  under  Napoleon  and  his  conquerors  was  too 
exhausted  to  rise  hi  revolt  until  the  hardships  of  1847-8 
reinforced  the  teachings  of  idealists.  As  Lord  Acton  observed, 
Mazzini's  conspiracy  was  founded  not  on  a  grievance  but  "on 
a  doctrine"; l  and  the  experiences  of  1848  were  to  show  that 
the  doctrines  must  be  practical  and  the  grievances  intense 
to  produce  unanimity  among  peoples  only  half  awakened. 
"Young  Europe"  virtually  collapsed  with  Mazzini's  removal 
to  London  hi  1837;  and  it  is  questionable  whether  the  exiles 
who  founded  "Young  Europe,"  or  the  fiercer  group  of  Panslav- 
ists  that  gyrated  around  Bakunin  in  Paris  in  1847,  had  any 
practical  influence  on  the  democratic  movements  of  1848-9. 

The  events  of  those  luckless  years  showed  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  Democracy  and  Nationality  working  well  to- 
gether, and  justify  the  belief  that  they  are  hi  their  nature 
opposed.  Wherever  the  fervid  nationalists  got  the  upper 
1  Lord  Acton,  Essays  on  Liberty,  p.  286. 


INTERNATIONALISM  185 

hand,  liberty  was  jealously  restricted  to  the  leading  race; 
and  as  a  result  there  prevailed  those  cries:  "Hungary  for  the 
Hungarians,"  etc.,  which  brought  Nationalism  into  deserved 
disrepute.  In  Italy  alone  were  the  democrats  inspired  by 
broader  views,  thanks  to  the  inspiring  influence  of  Mazzini; 
but  at  Rome  and  Venice  the  foreigner  stamped  out  both 
Nationalism  and  Democracy,  so  that  by  the  end  of  1849 
the  future  of  the  Continent  was  most  dreary.  In  his  essay 
Europe:  its  Condition  (1852)  Mazzini  pointed  out  that 
Europe  no  longer  believed  in  the  Papacy,  or  hi  dynasties 
or  aristocracies.  In  fact  Europe  possessed  no  unity  of  aim, 
of  faith,  or  of  mission.  But,  he  proceeded,  a  new  initiative 
would  probably  arise  out  of  the  question  of  nationalities, 
which  would  destroy  the  Treaties  of  Vienna  and  assort  the 
peoples  in  accord  with  their  desires.  "The  question  of 
nationalities  (he  wrote),  rightly  understood,  is  the  alliance 
of  the  peoples,  the  balance  of  powers  based  on  new  founda- 
tions, the  organization  of  the  work  that  Europe  has  to  ac- 
complish." At  that  time  such  a  solution  was  possible.  The 
peoples  were  not  yet  at  enmity;  and  they  all  had  an  interest 
in  striving  for  more  complete  self-expression,  firstly,  by  be- 
coming complete  political  entities  instead  of  remaining  di- 
vided fragments;  secondly,  by  solving  the  social  and  indus- 
trial problems  in  a  way  that  was  impossible  in  then"  then 
fragmentary  existence.  Alas!  the  nations  did  not  rearrange 
their  political  boundaries  without  strifes  that  left  behind 
rankling  hatreds;  and  in  consequence  the  social  and  industrial 
problems  have  gone  unsolved.  Nationalism  asserted  itself 
in  its  cruder  form,  clothed  itself  in  Militarism,  and  made  the 
Continent  a  series  of  self-contained  and  hostile  nations. 

Consequently,  the  international  movement,  which  con- 
currently struggled  for  recognition,  had  little  chance  of 
success.  Its  beginnings  may  be  traced  in  the  famous  Associa- 
tion called  V Internationale,  which  was  started  by  French 


i86          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

and  British  workmen  in  London  in  1864.  Originating  in 
meetings  of  French  working-men  visitors  to  our  Exhibition 
of  1862  with  our  own  artisans,  it  soon  had  branches  in  all 
countries;  and  at  its  Congresses  revolutionary  Socialism  of  the 
most  advanced  type  gained  ground.  The  anarchic  section 
got  the  upper  hand  in  1869,  when  Bakunin  and  his  Russian 
and  Polish  Nihilists  joined  the  Association.  Its  influence 
on  the  Paris  Commune  of  1871  has  been  disputed,  but  I 
think  on  insufficient  grounds.  M.  Hanotaux  estimates  the 
number  of  its  members  in  Paris  at  between  70,000  and 
80,000,  and  thinks  that  Bismarck  may  have  encouraged 
the  anarchic  propaganda  of  the  French  Communists.  The 
idea  may  seem  far-fetched;  but  Bismarck  was  a  past  master 
in  the  art  of  weakening  his  enemies;  and,  on  January  27, 
1871,  during  an  interview  with  Jules  Favre,  he  alluded  to  the 
dangerous  state  of  public  opinion  in  Paris  on  the  eve  of  its 
surrender  to  the  Germans,  and  gave  the  following  Machia- 
vellian advice:  "Provoke  an  entente  while  you  still  have  an 
army  to  suppress  it  with."  l  Favre  looked  at  him  with  horror, 
for  making  so  bloodthirsty  a  suggestion.  But  evidently 
Bismarck  knew  the  state  of  things  in  Paris  better  than  Favre, 
who,  later  on,  probably  regretted  that  he  did  not  follow  that 
cunning  counsel. 

The  Internationale  played  Germany's  game  admirably 
in  completing  the  nun  of  France  in  the  spring  of  1871,  when 
Lyons  and  other  cities  of  the  Centre  and  South  sought  to 
copy  Paris  and  overturn  the  national  Government.  In  its 
place  they  sought  to  erect  a  system  based  on  the  Commune 
as  governing  unit,  with  federations  to  endow  these  micro- 
cosms with  some  solidarity.  That  the  Communists  should 
have  made  their  bold  bid  for  power  while  France  was  still 
writhing  under  the  heel  of  the  Germans  sufficiently  character- 
ized their  movement.  It  proved  that  among  a  fanatical 
1  Busch,  Bismarck  during  the  Franco-German  War,  II,  265. 


INTERNATIONALISM  187 

minority  of  "Internationals"  all  claims  of  country  were 
ignored;  nay,  that  the  greater  the  agony  of  la  patrie,  the  better 
was  the  opportunity  deemed  for  sweeping  away  old-world 
notions  and  imposing  a  communistic  and  anti-national  form 
of  society.  Of  course  the  national  view  prevailed,  but  after 
a  terrible  struggle,  which  brought  France  to  the  verge  of  dis- 
solution. The  violence  of  the  petroleuses  in  Paris  and  other 
signs  of  political  lunacy  discredited  the  cause;  and  in  1872 
the  Internationale  split  into  two  factions.  The  more  moder- 
ate, led  by  Marx,  outvoted  the  desperadoes  of  Bakunin;  but 
the  latter  found  a  considerable  following  among  the  artisans 
of  France,  and,  still  more,  of  Spain  and  Italy.  Worsted  at 
their  own  game  of  violence,  the  Nihilists  gradually  declined 
in  numbers;  but  the  Russian  branch  of  the  sect  effected  the 
murder  of  the  reforming  Tsar,  Alexander  II,  and  thus  threw 
Russia  into  the  arms  of  reaction. 

The  chief  significance  of  these  facts  lies  in  the  reckless  unwis- 
dom of  the  champions  of  Internationalism  and  their  utter 
disregard  of  the  claims  of  country,  even  after  a  most  dis- 
astrous war;  but  it  is  of  prime  importance  to  observe  that 
anarchic  and  anti-national  theories  had  a  far  greater  hgld 
on  the  Slav  and  Latin  peoples  than  on  the  Germans.  The 
Karl  Marx  party  dominant  in  German  Socialism,  though 
advanced  in  its  opinions,  was  not  anarchic.  Indeed,  Marx 
often  behaved  like  a  German  patriot.  On  July  20,  1870, 
just  before  the  Franco-German  War,  he  wrote  to  another 
Socialist,  Engels,  that  he  hoped  the  French  would  be  well 
thrashed;  then  the  centre  of  the  Internationale  would  be  in 
Germany.  He  was  no  less  hostile  to  the  French  Republic. 
On  the  contrary,  Bakunin  did  his  best  to  help  the  young 
French  democracy  against  the  Germans.1  Thus,  the  Teutonic 
Socialist  tended  towards  Nationalism,  the  French  and  Rus- 

1  James  Guillaume,  Karl  Marx  pangermaniste,  et  I' Association  Inter- 
nationale (Paris,  Colin,  1915),  pp.  85, 101. 


1 88          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

sians  towards  Internationalism;  the  fractions  that  now  and 
again  terrorized  the  Latin  and  Russian  peoples  were  the  de- 
clared enemies,  not  only  of  those  Governments,  but  of  all 
government. 

This  divergence  between  the  Teutonic  peoples  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  Latin  and  Slav  peoples  on  the  other  suggests 
that  there  must  be  a  fundamental  difference  of  tempera- 
ment and  outlook.  In  the  Latin  and  Slav  peoples  the  sense 
of  the  ideal  is  certainly  stronger ;  and  the  notion  of  a  common 
law  and  civilization  has  taken  deeper  root.  Consequently, 
on  every  important  question  the  authority  of  the  community 
tends  to  prevail — a  heritage  bequeathed  hi  rich  measure  by 
Ancient  Rome  to  the  Romance  peoples.  The  Slav  peoples 
are  characterized  by  similar  notions,  and  by  an  even  stronger 
vein  of  sentiment.  Consequently  a  movement  that  aims  at 
far-reaching  changes,  such  as  the  sovereignty  of  the  commu- 
nity or  of  the  human  race  at  large  over  the  individual,  has  a 
greater  chance  of  success  among  them  than  elsewhere.  In 
fact,  far-reaching  social  revolutions  have  generally  origi- 
nated with  them.  On  the  other  hand  the  Germanic,  Anglo- 
Saxon,  and  Scandinavian  peoples  are  remarkable  for  attach- 
ment to  the  home  and  to  individual  liberty.  Luther  and 
Cromwell  are  their  characteristic  products;  Rousseau  and 
Mazzini  those  of  the  Latin  peoples.  Accordingly,  it  seems 
probable  that  Internationalism  will  develop  first  among  the 
latter,  and  will  be  retarded  by  the  individualism  of  the  former. 

However,  in  1871  the  movement  was  wrecked  mainly  by 
the  extravagant  ardor  of  its  disciples.  Mrs.  Browning  has 
sung  of  the  proneness  of  the  French  of  her  day  to  hurry  to 
extremes: — 

"these  too  fiery  and  impatient  souls, 
They  threaten  conflagration  to  the  world, 
And  rush  with  most  unscrupulous  logic  on 
Impossible  practice." 


INTERNATIONALISM  189 

Never  was  this  defect  more  flagrant  than  in  the  spring  of 
1871.  It  was  due  to  the  Communists  that  the  French  Re- 
public became  for  a  time  a  prey  to  reaction.  In  Germany, 
on  the  contrary,  the  anarchist  movement  never  was  serious; 
and  the  majority  of  the  Socialists  in  the  long  run  tended 
to  express  not  much  more  than  the  discontent  naturally 
aroused  by  the  autocratic  proceedings  of  the  present  Kaiser. 
Even  the  Marxian  Socialists  have  diminished  in  Germany, 
where,  indeed,  the  Socialists  are  often  little  more  than  up- 
holders of  individual  liberty.  During  the  first  seven  or 
eight  years  of  his  reign  William  If  sought  to  appease 
them  by  measures  known  as  State  Socialism:  but  in 
and  after  1895  he  found  that  his  imperial  palliatives  were 
not  appreciated,  and  in  1896  he  threw  himself  into  Weltpo- 
litik. 

As  we  have  seen,  this  commercial  Imperialism  gamed 
ground  rapidly;  and,  what  is  most  remarkable,  it  won  over 
very  many  German  Socialists.  The  reasons  for  their  defec- 
tion are  still  far  from  clear;  but  one  cause,  perhaps  the  funda- 
mental cause,  has  been  pointed  out  by  a  Belgian,  M.  fimile 
Royer.  He,  the  Socialist  deputy  for  Tournay,  states  that 
Marxism  had  devoted  itself  almost  exclusively  to  the  national 
side  of  social  questions,  thereby  losing  sight  of  the  wider 
and  humanitarian  issues  which  nerved  the  Socialists  of  I848.1 
This  explanation  goes  far  to  solve  the  riddle;  for  since  the 
year  1888  the  German  Government  has  done  much  for  the 
workmen,  and  recently  has  tried  to  convince  them  of  the  need 
of  colonies  and  better  outlets  to  the  sea.  To  men  who  looked 
chiefly  to  the  loaves  and  fishes  the  Kaiser's  policy  presented 
irresistible  attractions.  For  instance,  the  Pangerman  pro- 
gramme, which  he  patronized,  has  aimed  at  the  inclusion  of 
Belgium  and  Holland  in  a  Greater  Germany — to  which  a 

1  Infependance  beige,  Feb.  17,  1915;  quoted  by  J.  Destree,  Les  Soci- 
alistes  el  la  Guerre  europtenne,  p.  20. 


190          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Central  Zollverein  would  be  the  convenient  prelude;  and  this 
programme  has  immensely  furthered  the  growth  of  imperial 
and  Chauvinistic  ideas  among  the  Bavarians.  Shedding 
their  former  separatist  notions,  they  have  embraced  the  new 
programme  with  ardor,  because,  as  their  King  recently 
stated,  it  promises  to  give  to  South  German  trade  its  natural 
outlets  to  the  sea,  Rotterdam  and  Antwerp.  Similarly  in 
the  great  commercial  centres,  very  many  Socialists  have 
favored  the  imperial  policy  of  expansion. 

Then*  conduct  has  dealt  a  heavy  blow  to  the  international 
cause.  Most  of  the  fathers  of  Socialism  believed  in  Free 
Trade  between  nations  as  a  means  of  furthering  friendly 
intercourse  and  lessening  the  chances  of  war.  But  Bis- 
marck's policy  of  protecting  home  industries  (supplemented 
by  that  of  Billow  respecting  agriculture)  had  very  important 
results,  far  beyond  the  limits  of  commerce  and  agriculture. 
For  there  were  two  alternatives  before  Germany;  either 
to  continue  in  the  path  of  Free  Trade,  which  implies  peaceful 
intercourse,  or  to  adopt  a  protective  and  narrowly  national 
policy.  Bismarck  chose  the  latter,  and  Wilhelm  accentuated 
the  choice,  his  aim  being  to  make  the  nation  as  far  as  possible 
a  self-sufficing  unit.  The  result  was  that  Germany  in  forty 
years  of  peace  piled  up  great  stores  of  industrial  energy 
which  threatened  to  burst  their  bounds.  On  the  basis  of 
protection  vast  industrial  interests  were  built  up,  which 
could  find  no  adequate  markets  unless  other  States  let  in 
German  goods  on  easy  terms;  and  this  they  would  not  do  to 
a  sufficient  extent.  Consequently  the  national  or  protective 
system  led  to  an  impasse.  The  new  trade  interests  clamored 
for  new  markets,  and  the  artisans  concerned  in  them  tended 
to  become  imperial  expansionists.  Thus  the  protective  sys- 
tem adopted  hi  1880  served  to  strengthen  the  demands  for 
further  annexations. 

In  fact  the  whole  system  gyrated  in  a  vicious  circle,  some- 


INTERNATIONALISM  191 

what  as  follows:  First  the  colonial  party  demanded  colonies 
and  protection.  Then  the  colonies  were  stated  to  need  a 
great  fleet;  while  protection  led  to  a  mushroom  growth  of 
industries  which  helped  to  pay  for  the  fleet.  Industries, 
inflated  to  near  bursting  point,  demanded  new  outlets,  and 
all  classes  of  the  community,  including  many  of  the  Socialists, 
believed  it  necessary  to  support  that  demand,  which  the 
army  and  fleet  were  prepared  to  satisfy.  If  Germany  had 
persevered  with  the  system  of  free  exchange  which  makes 
the  whole  world  an  open  market,  the  present  cataclysm 
would  probably  have  been  averted;  for  though  the  Prussian 
Junkers  would  hi  any  case  clamor  for  war,  their  cries  would 
have  found  no  response  in  commercial  circles,  still  less 
among  the  artisans  of  Germany.  These  last,  I  repeat,  have 
been  largely  led  astray  from  international  ideals  by  a  narrow 
commercialism ,  which  made  either  for  an  internal  explosion 
or  a  European  war.  In  these  islands  we  think  of  commerce 
as  a  bond  of  peace.  It  has  acted  far  otherwise  in  Germany, 
where  it  takes  on  the  guise  of  the  old  mercantile  system, 
that  fruitful  parent  of  wars  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries.  Indeed,  over-speculation  and  over-production 
in  Germany  probably  prompted  the  mad  plunge  of  July, 
IQI4.1  Antwerp,  Salonica,  Constantinople,  and  Bagdad 
were  to  be  the  safety-valves  for  a  surcharged  industrial 
system.  The  conquest  of  Belgium  and  North-East  France, 
Poland,  Courland,  and  the  Balkans  seemed  no  difficult  task 
in  view  of  the  confusion  and  weakness  in  the  Entente  States 
and  Serbia.  Commerce  therefore  joined  hands  with  Milita- 
rism, and  German  Socialists  did  not  bestow  on  that  suspicious 
union  the  expected  shower  of  curses. 

Imperialism,  of  course,  has  sometimes  assumed  a  threaten- 
ing guise  in  these  islands;  but  on  the  whole  it  has  aimed  at 

1  See  M.  Millioud,  The  Ruling  Caste  and  Frenzied  Trade  in  Germany 
'Eng.  transl.,  1916). 


192          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

safeguarding  the  Empire  by  the  upkeep  of  an  adequate  fleet, 
the  increase  of  which  barely  kept  pace  with  that  of  the  mer- 
cantile marine  and  of  our  colonial  responsibilities.  The 
r61e  of  the  British  fleet  was  necessarily  defensive;  that  of 
the  German  fleet,  on  its  very  limited  coasts,  could,  after 
the  recent  huge  additions,  well  be  offensive.  In  truth,  the 
danger  of  the  situation  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  greatest 
military  Power  in  the  world  aspired  to  rival  on  the  oceans 
the  Power  for  which  maritime  supremacy  is  the  first  law  of 
existence.  This  difference  in  the  situation  of  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  was  never  admitted  by  the  German  people; 
and  of  late  years  their  Socialists  have  ceased  effectively 
to  protest  against  the  increase  of  their  armaments,  and  that, 
too,  despite  the  persistent  refusal  of  the  Berlin  Government 
to  accept  proposals  at  the  Hague  Conferences  for  limitation 
of  armaments.1 

In  view  of  the  inaction  of  German  Socialists  at  the  greatest 
crisis  in  the  modern  world,  it  is  of  interest  to  glance  at  the 
resolutions  which  their  delegates  helped  to  pass  at  the  chief 
Congresses  of  the  Internationale.  At  Paris  in  1901  the  Con- 
gress engaged  the  Socialists  of  all  countries  to  oppose  votes 
for  naval  construction  and  colonial  wars.  At  Stuttgart  in 
1907  that  able  French  writer,  Gustave  Herve,  spoke  ve- 
hemently against  patriotism  as  an  anti-social  prejudice.  The 
German  leader,  Bebel,  opposed  this  on  the  ground  that 
la  patrie  belongs  more  to  the  poor  than  to  the  dominant 
classes;  and  he  warned  Herve  not  to  encourage  the  German 
General  Staff  against  "the  eventual  enemy."  For  himself, 
he  would  not  support  war,  but  he  supported  defensive  prepa- 
rations. Herve,  in  reply,  said  that  his  propaganda  in  France 

1  Bernhardi's  claim,  that  Germany  needs  new  colonies  for  her  surplus 
population,  is  refuted  by  the  official  statement  in  the  Preussische  Jahr- 
biicher  of  March,  1912,  that  her  emigration  had  of  late  sunk  to  about 
20,000  a  year. 


INTERNATIONALISM  193 

had  disarmed  the  Government,  which  in  case  of  mobilization, 
would  be  faced  with  insurrection  and  chaos.  Bebel  declared 
that  there  were  two  million  Socialists  in  the  German  army, 
but  gave  no  promise  as  to  then-  conduct  in  case  of  a  war, 
which,  moreover,  would  further  their  cause  better  than  ten 
years  of  propaganda.  The  Congress  unanimously  voted  a 
motion,  the  chief  clause  of  which  appears  at  the  head  of 
this  lecture. 

The  Congress  held  at  Copenhagen  in  1910  rejected  Keir 
Hardie's  motion  for  a  general  strike  of  workers  in  case  of 
war  by  131  votes  to  51.  In  the  majority  were  Germany 
20  votes,  Austria  18,  Italy  15,  America  14,  etc.;  in  the  mi- 
nority, Great  Britain  20,  France  12,  Russia  7,  Poland  5, 
etc.  The  delegates  who  met  at  the  Bale  Congress  of  No- 
vember, 1912,  were  cheered  by  the  sweeping  triumphs  of 
the  party  hi  the  recent  General  Elections  to  the  Reichstag 
(see  ante,  p.  191).  Referring  to  the  Balkan  War  then  raging, 
the  French  leader,  Jaures,  called  on  the  workers  in  Germany, 
France,  and  England  to  prevent  any  help  going  to  Austria 
or  Russia  if  those  Powers  came  to  blows.  The  German 
delegate,  Hasse,  for  his  party,  promised  to  use  all  possible 
means  to  prevent  a  war.1 

A  sinister  incident  followed.  In  the  hope  of  clearing  up 
the  Alsace-Lorraine  Question  180  French  Socialists  went  on 
to  Berne,  expecting  to  meet  the  same  number  of  German 
delegates.  They  found  a  mere  handful;  for  as  one  of  them 
said  to  M.  Vergnet:  "Every  German,  from  the  highest 
to  the  lowest,  considers  that  the  Alsace-Lorraine  Question 
can  be  reopened  only  on  the  battlefield.  Let  the  French 
have  no  illusion  on  that  head."2  The  German  Socialists 
also  made  no  sustained  protests  against  the  barbarous  treat- 

1 E.  Royer,  La  Social-Democratic  allemande  et  austro-hongroise  el  les 
Socialities  beiges,  pp.  8-24.    (17-18  Green  St.,  Leicester  Square,  London). 
2  Vergnet,  The  German  Engima,  p.  138. 


194          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

merit  of  certain  harmless  civilians  of  Zabern  by  German 
officers  near  the  close  of  1913.  At  that  time  the  centenary 
celebrations  of  the  German  War  of  Liberation  of  1813  turned 
all  heads  in  the  Fatherland;  and  Germany,  though  she  had 
no  Napoleon  to  fear,  whipped  herself  to  a  frenzy  of  warlike 
ardor,  amidst  which  the  no  Socialist  members  of  the  Reich- 
stag raised  scarcely  a  protest  against  the  enormous  votes 
passed  in  that  autumn  for  military  and  naval  purposes — 
votes  which  far  exceeded  all  possible  demands  of  a  defensive 
character.  Thereafter  the  Berlin  Government  was  convinced 
that  in  any  eventuality  the  German  Socialists  would  (to 
use  a  famous  phrase  of  Bebel's)  "fight  to  the  last  gasp  for 
the  Fatherland."  Of  course,  the  great  Socialist  had  spoken 
thus  only  for  a  really  defensive  war.  In  July-August,  1914, 
his  party  condoned  the  action  of  the  German  Government 
when  it  precipitated  the  long-dreaded  European  conflict. 

Here  it  is  well  to  recall  the  condition  of  Labor  in  the  chief 
countries.  The  spring  and  summer  of  1914  were  charac- 
terized by  great  unrest  in  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia. 
Strikes  were  numerous  and  others  were  threatened.  Fre- 
quent ministerial  crises  at  Paris  and  public  admissions  as 
to  the  unpreparedness  of  the  army  weakened  public  confi- 
dence. As  for  the  United  Kingdom,  it  seemed  on  the  verge 
of  civil  war  in  Ireland.  In  Russia  the  strikes  of  the  transport 
workers  and  others  opened  up  the  most  serious  prospects. 
It  was  in  this  state  of  affairs,  when  the  Entente  Powers 
hovered  on  the  brink  of  social  revolution  or  civil  war,  that 
Germany  launched  her  ultimatums  to  Petrograd  and  Paris 
(July  31).  Those  acts  alone,  following  on  the  insolent  de- 
mands of  the  Austrian  Government  on  Serbia,  sufficiently 
revealed  the  aggressive  designs  of  the  Central  Empires,  which 
became  clear  as  day  when  Germany  sought  to  "hew  her  way" 
through  Belgium. 

It  is  curious  that,  in  the  early  stages  of  the  diplomatic 


INTERNATIONALISM  195 

quarrel,  the  German  Socialists  raised  protests  against  being 
dragged  into  war.  On  July  28  they  held  twenty-eight  public 
meetings  in  Berlin  alone  for  that  purpose;  and  those  meetings 
were  even  protected  by  the  police.  This  fact  seems  to  show 
that  either  the  authorities  had  not  yet  decided  in  favor 
of  war  (it  is  thought  that  they  decided  on  the  evening  of 
July  29)  or  that  they  were  using  the  Socialists  to  lull  those 
of  Russia,  France,  and  Belgium  into  false  security.  In 
either  case  the  opposition  of  German  Socialists  to  war  thence- 
forth collapsed — why  is  a  mystery.  Were  they  coerced  by 
the  officials?  Or  were  they  terrified  by  the  Muscovite  bogey 
which  Berlin  officials  magnified  into  colossal  proportions? 
The  latter  supposition  is  incredible  in  view  of  the  almost 
complete  paralysis  of  the  transport  services  in  Russia.  It 
seems,  then,  that  the  German  Socialists  must  have  followed 
the  imperialist  impulse  which  had  won  them  over  in  and 
after  the  year  1912.  Whatever  the  cause,  they  all  (though  a 
few  silently  demurred)  supported  the  war  votes  of  August  4 
for  a  campaign  which  a  mere  tyro  hi  diplomacy  could  see 
was  of  an  offensive  character.  Nevertheless,  Hasse  read 
out  the  Socialists'  declaration  that  they  no  longer  had  to 
pronounce  on  the  cause  of  the  war,  but  only  to  defend  their 
fron tiers;  and  on  this  wretched  excuse  he  and  his  party  gave 
the  lie  to  their  protestations  of  several  years  past.  His 
action  was  all  the  more  disgraceful  because  on  July  29,  at 
a  great  meeting  of  Socialists  at  Brussels,  he  declared  Austria's 
demands  on  Serbia  a  veritable  provocation  to  war,  and 
affirmed  the  conviction  of  the  German  people  that  its  Govern- 
ment ought  not  to  intervene,  even  if  Russia  intervened. 
It  was  then  decided  to  hold  a  great  International  Congress 
at  Paris  on  August  9  to  concert  general  measures  to  prevent 
war.1  Did  the  knowledge  of  that  fact  induce  the  Berlin 

1  Royer,  pp.  24-31:  P.  G.  la  Chesnais,  "The  Socialist  Party  in  the 
Reichstag  and  the  Declaration  of  War,"  ch.  3,  shows  that  that  party 


196         NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Government  to  hurry  on  its  ultimatums  to  Russia  and  France 
on  July  31?  And  why  did  not  those  obvious  signs  of  hurry 
arouse  the  suspicions  of  the  no  Socialist  deputies?  Why, 
during  the  sitting  of  August  4th,  did  they  not  protest  against 
the  violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality,  which  the  Chancellor 
admitted  to  be  a  lawless  act?  Why,  finally,  did  they  not 
protest  against  the  horrors  perpetrated  in  Belgium  in  August- 
September? 

In  justice,  it  must  be  said  that  the  Socialist  journal,  the 
Vorwiirts,  protested  both  against  the  war  and  the  barbarities 
of  the  army.  Liebknecht,  too,  in  December,  1914,  in  oppos- 
ing the  second  war  credits,  declared  the  war  to  be  an  im- 
perialist and  capitalist  war  for  the  conquest  of  the  world's 
markets.  By  that  time  all  German  Socialists  were  aware 
of  the  absolute  preparedness  of  Germany  and  the  unpre- 
paredness  of  her  opponents.  Yet  only  sixteen  Socialist 
deputies  joined  in  his  opposition  and  protest.  By  degrees 
Ms  following  increased;  and  the  majority  of  the  German 
Socialist  party  has  finally  condemmed  the  policy  of  annexa- 
tion openly  avowed  in  the  tune  of  fancied  triumph.  Some 
of  its  members,  however,  sought  to  persuade  their  French 
and  Belgian  comrades  that  France  and  Belgium  ought  to 
discuss  terms  of  peace.  Against  this  suggestion  Bernstein, 
editor  of  the  Bremer  Burgerzeitung,  strongly  protested,  point- 
ing out  that,  as  France  was  attacked  and  part  of  her  territory 
still  occupied,  discussions  of  peace  by  her  would  be  a  fatal 
act.  Bernstein,  Liebknecht,  Kautzky,  and  Hasse  published 
a  Socialist  manifesto  demanding  peace,  without  annexations 

abandoned  all  opposition  to  war  in  its  manifesto  of  July  31,  that  is  before 
war  became  certain.  The  Vorwiirts  also  wrote:  "Social  Democracy  bears 
no  responsibility  for  forthcoming  events" — a  forecast  of  the  passivity 
of  the  party  on  August  4.  On  August  i  a  German  Socialist,  M  tiller, 
arrived  at  Paris,  and  sought  t:>  induce  his  French  comrades  to  oppose  the 
war  credits  at  Paris. 


INTERNATIONALISM  197 

or  conquests.  They  and  their  manifesto  were  repudiated 
by  the  party,  which  thus  associated  itself  with  the  policy 
of  the  Government  (June,  191 5). l 

As  for  the  French  Socialists,  though  stunned  for  a  moment 
by  the  assassination  of  their  leader,  Jaures,  they  soon  took 
up  the  position  which,  assuredly,  he  would  have  taken  up. 
In  face  of  the  unprovoked  and  treacherous  stab  of  the  Ger- 
mans at  France  through  Belgium,  they  rallied  as  one  man  to 
the  defence  of  la  patrie.  There  was  now  no  talk  of  a  "general 
strike"  such  as  might  conceivably  have  stopped  the  war  at 
its  two  sources,  Berlin  and  Vienna.  The  treason  of  German 
Socialists  to  the  Internationale  consigned  it  for  the  present 
to  the  limbo  of  vain  hopes;  and  nothing  remained  for  their 
comrades  in  Belgium,  France,  Serbia,  and  Poland  but  to 
fall  back  on  the  old  principle  of  duty  to  their  several  nations. 
The  supreme  lesson  of  the  crisis  of  July-August,  1914,  is  that 
Internationalism  can  succeed  only  when  its  votaries  stand 
firm  in  every  nation;  and  that  treason  in  one  quarter  involves 
collapse  in  all  quarters. 

The  genius  of  the  Latin  and  Slav  peoples  was  quick  to 
discern  the  truth  that  in  August,  1914,  the  patriotic  principle, 
which  many  of  them  had  consistently  derided,  formed  the 
only  possible  basis  of  action  during  the  war;  also  that,  in 
fighting  for  la  patrie  against  its  violators,  they  were  taking 
the  first  step  towards  reaffirming  the  cosmopolitan  ideal. 
Very  noteworthy  was  the  action  of  Gustave  Herve.  He  at 
once  became  a  flaming  patriot,  the  champion  of  war  to  the 

1  Destree,  pp.  17,  35-46.  H.  Bourgin,  Les  Responsabilites  du  Social- 
isme  allemand,  pp.  14-22.  The  assertion  of  Mr.  Snowden,  M.  p.,  in  the 
debate  of  February  23,  1916,  that  in  no  country  of  Europe  (except 
Hungary  and  Italy)  has  Internationalism  been  so  well  kept  alive  as 
by  the  German  Socialists,  is  incorrect.  They  have  made  some  fine 
speeches,  but  their  actions  have  been  timid  and  far  too  tardy  to  influ- 
ence events,  except  in  a  sense  favorable  to  Germany. 


198          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

death  against  Germany.  The  Belgian  Socialist,  Destree, 
by  his  fiery  denunciation  of  the  Huns,  did  much  to  arouse 
Italy  from  her  indecision  and  range  her  on  the  side  of  national 
liberty  against  an  overweening  Imperialism.  In  Great 
Britain  the  action  of  the  workers  has  in  general  been  marked 
by  self-sacrificing  devotion;  but  unfortunately  one  section 
of  the  Labor  party  has  been  blind  to  the  wider  issues  at 
stake  in  this  mighty  struggle.  Consequently  there  has  not 
been  here  that  unanimous  rally  to  the  nation's  call  which  has 
lifted  the  whole  life  of  France  to  a  higher  level.  In  France, 
despite  a  sharp  rise  in  prices,  there  has  not  been  a  single 
strike  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  up  to  mid-February, 
1916;  but  here  as  many  as  698  strikes  occurred  during  the 
year  1915  alone.  Of  these  several  were  due  to  merely  local 
and  sectional  considerations,  and  many  were  highly  detri- 
mental to  the  public  service.  The  contrast  is  deeply  humiliat- 
ing, and  is  not  to  be  explained  away  by  saying  that  France 
is  invaded  and  we  are  not;  for  the  same  principle,  the  free- 
dom of  the  smaller  peoples,  is  at  stake  everywhere.  Inability 
or  refusal  to  see  this  truth  must  discredit  a  portion  of  the 
British  Labor  party;  and  leadership  in  the  international 
movement  of  the  future  will  probably  lie  with  the  Latin  or 
Slav  peoples,  whose  workers  have  almost  unanimously  shown 
the  capacity  of  taking  a  wide,  generous,  and  statesmanlike 
view  of  this  unexampled  crisis  in  the  fortunes  of  the  Euro- 
pean peoples. 

In  Russia  the  Socialists  were  at  first  divided  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  war,  as  was  natural  in  view  of  the  despotic  nature 
of  their  Government.  But  their  leaders,  notably  Prince 
Kropotkin,  soon  perceived  the  seriousness  of  the  German 
menace;  and  the  party  rallied  enthusiastically  to  the  national 
cause.  At  the  International  Socialist  Congress  held  in  London 
in  February,  1915,  all  the  Russian  delegates  voted  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  until  the  rights  of  nationalities  were 


INTERNATIONALISM  199 

restored  and  a  federative  system  could  be  designed  for  the 
protection  of  the  peace  of  Europe. 

That  has  become  the  aim  of  nearly  all  Socialists  in  this 
war;  but,  in  spite  of  the  increase  of  distress  in  Germany, 
her  Socialist  party  continues  to  support  the  Government. 
In  a  debate  early  in  January,  1916,  Liebknecht's  anti-war 
group  mustered  forty-one  strong;  but  the  refusal  of  the 
German  Chancellor  to  repudiate  aims  of  annexation  on  either 
frontier  failed  to  alienate  the  majority  of  the  Socialists.  For 
their  part,  the  French  Socialists  demand  that  the  future  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  shall  be  decided  by  a  plebiscite  in  those 
provinces,  a  proposal  scouted  by  their  German  confreres, 
who  claim  that  that  future  is  irrevocably  bound  up  with 
German  rule.  On  this  rock,  then,  as  well  as  that  of  Poland, 
Internationalism  has  foundered;  and  it  will  be  observed  that, 
while  its  ideal  is  championed  by  French  and  Russian  Social- 
ists, those  of  Germany  have  in  the  main  taken  up  the  nation- 
alist standpoint  and  hold  to  the  lands  seized  or  conquered 
by  Frederick  the  Great  and  Wilhelm  I.1  In  January, 
1916,  the  Socialist  leader,  Scheidemann,  spoke  strongly 
for  peace  and  against  annexations;  but  he  uttered  the 
fatal  words:  "We  refuse  any  thought  of  an  annexation  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  by  France,  in  whatever  form  it  may  be  at- 
tempted." 

Another  blow  to  the  cosmopolitan  movement  is  the  utter 
failure  of  neutrals  to  give  effect  to  their  obligations,  con- 
tracted at  the  Hague  Conferences,  for  assuring  the  sanctity 
of  neutral  territory  and  the  rights  due  to  non-combatants. 
Though  Germany's  weaker  neighbors  were  obviously  ter- 
rorized into  silence,  yet  the  United  States  could  safely  have 
protested  in  the  case  of  outrages  so  notorious  as  those  com- 
mitted in  Belgium  and  Poland.  No  protest  has  come  from 

1  See  the  Temps  for  Nov.  6, 1915,  and  the  Nation  (London)  or  Jan.  15, 
1916. 


200          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

Washington; l  and  this  dereliction  of  duty  has  rendered  futile 
all  the  labor  expended  at  the  Hague  Conferences,  at  least 
during  this  war.  Here  again,  then,  experience  has  proved 
the  extreme  fragility  of  the  cosmopolitan  ideals.  At  the 
first  contact  with  a  brutal  and  overweening  Nationalism 
they  vanished;  and  Germany  has  plunged  the  world  back 
into  a  state  of  lawlessness  and  bestiality  comparable  with 
that  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 

Men  are  asking  everywhere:  Can  International  Law  and 
morality  ever  be  re-established  in  such  a  way  as  to  restore 
confidence?  Pessimists  and  cynics  deny  it.  On  historical 
grounds,  I  dissent  from  this  sombre  estimate.  For,  as  has 
appeared  in  these  studies,  Nationalism  shows  signs  of  having 
exhausted  its  strength  except  among  the  most  backward 
peoples.  This  war  is  the  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  the  move- 
ment in  its  recent  narrow  and  intolerant  form.  The  persistent 
attempt  of  one  nation  to  overbear  its  weaker  neighbors  in 
order  to  achieve  world-supremacy  has  sufficed  to  unite  against 
it  nearly  all  the  world;  and  the  frightful  exhaustion  which 
failure  must  entail  will  be  a  warning  to  would-be  world- 
conquerors  for  centuries  to  come.  Further,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  more  brutal  and  perfidious  the  violation  of  International 
Law,  the  stronger  is  the  demand  for  the  re-establishment  of 
that  law,  with  adequate  guarantees  for  the  future.  In  the 
domains  of  politics,  finance,  and  law  violent  action  always 
begets  a  strong  reaction;  and  we  may  be  sure  that,  when  the 
base  Nationalism  of  recent  years  has  brought  its  protagonist 
to  ruin,  there  will  be  a  potent  revulsion  in  favor  of  interna- 
tional ideals.  In  1871  those  ideals  were  foolishly  championed 

1  In  his  Allocution  of  January  22,  1915,  the  Pope  reprobated  all  acts 
of  injustice,  but  in  terms  so  general  as  to  render  the  protest  useless. 
Equally  disappointing  is  the  letter  of  Cardinal  Gasparri,  of  July  6,  1915, 
to  the  Belgian  Minister  (L'Allemagne  et  les  Allies  devant  la  Conscience 
chrttienne,  ad  fin.,  Paris,  1915). 


INTERNATIONALISM  201 

by  the  fanatics  of  Paris;  in  1914  they  were  foully  betrayed 
by  turncoats  at  Berlin.  Let  us  hope  that  in  the  future  good 
sense  and  good  faith  will  work  hand  in  hand  for  their  realiza- 
tion. Already  in  the  Hague  Tribunal  there  exists  the  means 
for  assuring  the  triumph  of  reason  in  place  of  force.  If  in 
due  course  all  the  European  Powers  consent  to  substitute 
the  will  to  reconcile  for  the  will  to  conquer,  the  task  is  half 
accomplished. 

Why  should  not  the  new  Europe  will  to  reconcile  its  in- 
terests? Every  leading  thinker  now  admits  that  the  saner 
of  the  national  aspirations  (that  is,  those  which  prompt 
the  political  union  of  men  of  like  sentiments)  must  receive 
due  satisfaction.  Belgium  will  be  reconstituted,  more  glo- 
rious than  before.  France  must  recover  Alsace-Lorraine. 
But  the  French  and  Belgian  peoples,  if  they  are  wise,  will 
not  covet  the  Rhine  boundary.  Poland  (the  Poland  of  1771) 
ought  to  emerge  once  more,  free  in  civic  affairs,  though 
under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Tsars.  Italy  will  gather  in  her 
people  of  the  Trentino  and  Trieste,  but,  if  she  is  wise,  will 
annex  no  Slovene  or  Slav  lands  further  east.  The  Austrian 
and  Eastern  Questions  are  more  difficult,  but  can  be  settled 
on  a  federative  system  based  on  Nationality  and  equality 
of  rights.  The  Macedonian  tangle  should  be  settled  by  a 
commission  appointed  by  the  Great  Powers,  not  by  wrang- 
ling delegates  of  the  peoples  concerned.  On  the  questions 
concerning  Albania,  Bulgaria,  and  Constantinople  no  pru- 
dent person  will  at  present  dogmatize;  for  they  must  be 
settled  largely  according  to  the  course  of  events.  This  much 
is  certain:  the  enormous  importance  of  the  issues  now  at 
stake  ought  to  nerve  every  Briton  to  do  his  utmost  so  that 
the  solution  shall  be  thorough  and  shall  not  end  in  the 
ghastly  fiasco  of  a  stale-mate.  Better  five  years  of  war  than 
that. 

The  new  Europe  which  I  have  outlined  ought  to  be  a  far 


202          NATIONALITY  IN  MODERN  HISTORY 

happier  Europe  than  ever  before.  For  the  first  time  prac- 
tically all  the  great  peoples  will  have  sorted  themselves 
out,  like  to  like;  and  it  may  be  assumed  that  all  dynasties 
hostile  to  that  healthy  process  will  have  disappeared.  Then, 
after  the  attainment  of  civic  freedom  and  national  solidarity, 
the  national  instinct,  which  strengthens  with  opposition  and 
weakens  after  due  satisfaction,  ought  to  merge  in  the  wider 
and  nobler  sentiment  of  human  brotherhood  in  the  attain- 
ment of  which  it  is  only  a  preparatory  phase. 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America. 


*HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  a 
few  of  the  Macmillan  books  on  kindred  subjects. 


The  Heritage  of  Tyre 

BY  WILLIAM   BROWN  MELONEY 

Once  our  flag  was  known  in  every  part  and  our  keels  traversed  every 
sea;  all  the  whalers  of  the  world  came  out  of  New  Bedford  then,  and, 
"  Salem  "  on  a  ship's  stem  was  as  familiar  a  sight  as  "  Liverpool "  is  to-day 
—  but  those  times  are  gone  —  forever  ?  The  Yankee  clippers  will  never 
come  back,  but  William  Brown  Meloney  shows  how  we  can  restore  the 
stars  and  stripes  to  the  seven  seas  and  the  prestige  of  the  world's  greatest 
merchant  marine  to  the  American  people. 

"An  opportunity  to  recover  our  sea  heritage  stands  forth,"  he  writes, 
"  an  opportunity  of  half  a  world  at  war  —  such  an  opportunity  as,  in  all 
likelihood,  will  never  present  itself  again  under  similar  circumstances.  We 
are  at  peace,  we  have  the  necessary  maritime  genius,  we  have  in  abun- 
dance the  natural  resources,  to  found  and  maintain  a  merchant  marine. 
Either  wit  shall  seize  this  opportunity  forthwith,  or  else  our  sea  folly  of  the 
past  will  continue  a  hostage  to  the  future,  to  be  delivered  only,  if  at  all,  by 
the  edge  of  a  crimson  sword." 

The  Forks  of  the  Road 

BY  WASHINGTON  GLADDEN 

Can  a  nation  lead  except  by  war  ?  That  is  the  question  which  faces 
the  United  States  to-day.  Two  paths  are  open,  and  Washington  Gladden 
has  written  a  book  forcefully  stating  his  conviction  of  which  we  must 
choose.  Our  example  is  of  greater  value  than  our  threats ;  our  position 
demands  that  we  stand  firm  for  peace.  The  author  points  out  that  the 
present  universal  desire  for  peace,  expressed  in  the  utterances  of  every 
nation,  the  ultimate  beliefs  of  every  religion,  the  hope  and  prayer  of  every 
individual,  needs  a  leader  in  the  church  and  an  exponent  in  America. 

"  If  each  nation  insists  on  continuing  to  be  a  law  unto  itself  and  on 
making  its  own  interests  supreme  and  paramount,  the  natural  reactions 
will  ensue,  retribution  will  repeat  itself,  and  the  same  dreadful  harvesting  — 
only  more  dire  and  more  universal  —  will  be  ready  for  the  reaper  before 
the  end  of  another  generation." 


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The  Pentecost  of  Calamity 

BY  OWEN  WISTER 


"  One  of  the  most  striking  and  moving  utterances.  .  .  .  'Let  all  Ameri- 
cans read  it."  —  The  Congregationalist. 

"It  is  written  with  sustained  charm  and  freshness  of  insight."  —  New 
York  Times, 

"  It  is  a  flaming  thing,  itself  a  tongue  of  Pentecost."  —  Boston  Adver- 
tiser. 

"  Mr.  Wister's  artistic  power  at  its  best."  —  Philadelphia  Ledger. 

"  A  strong  book  which  sets  out  to  be  just  a  passionate  plea  to  America 
to  find  its  own  soul."  —  Rabbi  STEPHEN  S.  WISE. 

"  In  '  The  Pentecost  of  Calamity  '  Owen  Wister  sees  and  speaks  as  a 
prophet.  With  rare  spiritual  insight  and  sympathy  he  penetrates  to  the 
real  meaning  of  the  world  tragedy  under  whose  shadow  we  are  living.  I 
am  glad  we  have  an  American  writer  able  to  speak  the  voiceless  longing  of 
an  awakened  world." — Rev.  CHARLES  A.  EATON,  Pastor  of  the  Madison 
Avenue  Baptist  Church. 


Leaves  From  a  Field  Note-Book 

BY  J.   H.  MORGAN 

Late  Home  Office  Commissioner  with  the  British  Expeditionary  Force 

An  unofficial  outcome  of  the  writer's  experiences  during  the  five 
months  he  was  attached  to  the  British  General  Headquarters  Staff.  His 
•official  duties  during  that  period  involved  daily  visits  to  the  headquarters 
of  almost  every  corps,  division,  and  brigade  in  the  field,  and  took  him  on 
several  occasions  to  the  batteries  and  into  the  trenches.  Mr.  Morgan  has 
written  with  spirit  and  sympathy  of  the  pathetic  presence  of  human  emotion 
amidst  the  cogs  of  the  machinery  of  war. 


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Roadside  Glimpses  of  the  Great  War 

BY  ARTHUR  SWEETSER 

III.,  cloth,  I2tno,  $1.25 

Mr.  Sweetser's  experiences  as  prisoner  of  both 
the  Germans  and  the  French  are  perhaps  the 
most  exciting  adventures  any  American  has  yet 
described.  His  book  is  not  a  grim,  depressing 
picture  of  war,  but  a  real,  human  account  of  the 
great  conflict,  exhilarating  in  its  graphic  pictures 
of  the  armies  and  full  of  many  thrilling  and  hu- 
morous episodes. 

"A  valuable,  stirring  tale  of  adventure." — 
Boston  Transcript. 

"Few  equally  thrilling  stories  of  personal  ex- 
periences have  been  published." — Bellman. 

"A  vivid  picture."— N.  Y.  Post. 

"Will  enthrall  the  reader  from  the  first  page  to 
the  last." — Pittsburgh  Dispatch. 


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The  Diplomacy  of  the  Great  War 

BY  ARTHUR  BULLARD 

Cloth,  i2mo,  $1.50 

A  book  which  contributes  to  an  understanding 
of  the  war  by  revealing  something  of  the  diplo- 
matic negotiations  that  preceded  it.  The  author 
gives  the  history  of  international  politics  in  Europe 
since  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878,  and  considers 
the  new  ideals  that  have  grown  up  about  the 
function  of  diplomacy  during  the  last  generation, 
so  that  the  reader  is  in  full  possession  of  the  gen- 
eral trend  of  diplomatic  development.  There  is 
added  a  chapter  of  constructive  suggestions  in 
respect  to  the  probable  diplomatic  settlements 
resulting  from  the  war,  and  a  consideration  of  the 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Europe. 


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